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RECEPTIVITY-ADAPTABILITY: A DYNAMIC MODEL OF
INFORMATION RECEPTIVITY IN PROBLEM SOLVING
By
Kenneth A. Beattie, B.A., M. Ed.
,
Stanford University
Chairman: Jeffrey W. Eiseman
The concept of an individual adapting his receptivity
to information to problem-solving circumstances is introduced
and labelled receptivity- adaptability (R-A) . In providing a
conceptual framework to explain the dynamics underlying
receptivity-adaptability, a literature review begins with the
works of Adorno, et a_l. (1950) on the Authoritarian Personality
and Rokeach (1960) on the Open and Closed Mind and then proceeds
to a discussion of the nature of a basic antinomy between
openness to information calling for a change in one's percep-
tions of the environment and a desire to preserve already
existing views and attitudes of the environment. Several
theories supporting the functionality of the "open" and "closed
sides of the antinomy are reviewed in this discussion.
The concept of a cognitive structure as the means by
which an individual organizes his perceptions of the environment
is then developed and the characteristics of this structure




Piaget, Rokeach, and Berlyne are compared. Three
characteristics
of cognitive structures are distilled from this review:
comprehensiveness, differentiation, and integration. The
concept of an individual's receptivity-adaptability (R-A)
profile is developed in more detail. First, patterns of
receptivity to information are described in terms of (1) scope
of receptivity and (2) category accessibility rules. Second,
problem situations are described in terms of (1) factors con-
tributing to the potential arousal level of an individual and
(2) factors contributing to the information input complexity
of the situation. The relationships between these problem
situation characteristics and the three characteristics of
cognitive structure are examined in a conceptual discussion
which provides a framework for explaining the dynamics under-
lying individual differences in R-A profiles.
An empirical study conducted to investigate the hypotheses
that (1) individuals change their patterns of receptivity as
problem situations change and (2) that r eceptivity- adaptability
is related to intolerance of ambiguity and to cognitive com-
plexity is then described and its results presented.
The dissertation concludes with a discussion of the
educational and research implications of the conceptual frame-
work and the empirical study.
A GRADUATE STUDENT’S SOLILOQUY
To imply or to infer, that is the confusion.
,
Whether ' tis nobler to be illuminating in one's
thoughts as is the sunshine of day, or to be
confounding in one's mental tribulations as is
the valley fog of early morn'
.
Me thinks it presumptuous, if not sumptuously
presumptuous, that me thinks me thinks aught of
value or intellectual coinage for the practical
mind of the impractical man. Me thinks, you thinks,
they thinks. 'Tis doubtless more a fool's folly
than ice cream, you scream, we all scream for I
scream.
But anon! A chapter awaits. This hand, this
mind, pax vobiscum, this curmudgeonly soul must
needs be productively engaged forthwith lest my
marriage and my life's degree be left forthwi thout
.
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Perhaps man should heed the plight of the mosquito.
Few, if any, of Man's adversaries have been as successful as
the mosquito in overcoming the situational obstacles placed
in the course of his existence as pest and sometime deadly
enemy to Man. Despite the ingenuity of Man's methods of eradi-
cating the mosquito, it always has survived - survived by
adapting to the new circumstances. Man also has had an
enviable record for overcoming the obstacles he has faced in
his short history. He, like the mosquito, has owed his success
to his adaptability.
The mosquito's adaptability is an outgrowth of the
rapidity with which the process of random mutation supplies
the species with resistance to the new pesticide or other
change that has been introduced into his environment. Man
owes his adaptability to different species characteristics.
His adaptability has been an outgrowth of his ability to
manipulate factors in his environment, or this solution
failing, to change his behavior patterns voluntarily to fit
the situation in which he has found himself.
Standard Oil of New Jersey (whose way of adapting to
environmental changes has been to change its name to Exxon)
believes it has finally come up with an obstacle to place in
1
2the mosquito ' s environment to which the mosquito will not be
able to adapt. Many writers on ecology, technology, and
sociology believe man may have also come up with obstacles to
which he himself will not be able to adapt. Man's earlier
(and present) failures to appreciate and respect the complica-
ted network of ecological interrelationships of which he is a
part threatens his existence on one side. His ever-increasing
dependence on a technology that threatens to become too special-
ized and elaborate for him to control presses on him from
another side. And the intricacies of his social relation-
ships produce larger and larger problems that threaten to de-
stroy his species from within. There is no easy way to
characterize the nature of all the obstacles, but there is a
characteristic common to the all: complexity . Through the
process of adapting his environment to his immediate needs
,
Man has triggered such rapid and complex change in his en-
vironment that the key to his surviving these problems is an
ability to adapt even more rapidly and on a more massive scale.
It is at this point that the potential role of educa-
tion becomes crucial. I believe that a major function of
education should be to aid society to adapt to changing ciicum-
stances (Many aspects and implications of this belief are
delineated in Eiseman, 1969). Given the context of Man's
existence described above, this function could most appio
priately be carried out by preparing individuals to be effective
problem-solvers in a highly complex world. A great deal of
3the effort of some educators has been devoted to this goal, but
a flaw in their effort has been their failure to deal with that
aspect of problem solving which concerns the appropriateness
of an individual's receptivity to available information. That
this is a crucial aspect of problem solving becomes apparent as
examine the present context of Man's existence.
This context is made up of two related components. The
first of these is the socio-his toric context. Briefly, it is
characterized by five general tendencies I believe are present
or evolving in men's relations with other men and with other
elements of their environment. The five are:
1. Movement toward ever-increasing specialization
of function resulting in greater and greater
interdependence among men, and a concomitant in-
crease in the complexity of social events.
2. Partly as a consequence of the above tendency,
an increase in the number of serious conflict
situations faced by men- -conflict situations
which frequently have at their heart attitu-
dinal or ideological components.
3. As the problems faced by men become more tech-
nical, an increase in the degree to which general-
ists in decision-making roles must rely on the
advice given them by specialists who, because of
their widely separated areas of expertise and
differing perspectives on the given problem, may
make recommendations which conflict.
4. An increase in mass participation in decision-
making due partially to the growth of mass
communications technology and partially to the
character of the dominant political philosophies
of the present.
5. An increase in the rate of social, technological
and environmental change necessitating ever more
rapid adaptation of men's behaviors to compensate
for the changes.
we
4• Problems that arise in the context of these socio-
historic tendencies are likely to put a premium on the ex-
change of information between people. This rise in depen-
dence on social sources of information creates two diffi-
culties for the p r ob 1 em- s o 1 ve r involving his receptivity to
information. First, the use of other people as sources of
information often complicates a problem-solving situation
by introducing a concern with information about the social
sources themselves in addition to his concern with the problem-
relevant information they offer. Should the problem- solver
be equally or differentially receptive to information from
different social sources? In making this decision, to what
sorts of information about the sources should he be recep-
tive (i.e., allow to influence him)?
The other difficulty accompanying dependence on social
sources or information is the ease with which the amount of
revelant and irrelevant information can increase to a point
that surpasses the information-processing capacities of the
problem- solver . Can he avoid an information overload by
closing out, or ignoring irrelevant or less important informa-
tion and attending only to relevant or crucial information?
Unfortunately, a partial answer to these questions comes
from a second component of the context of human activity.
This second component involves the susceptibility of most
individuals to several behavioral propensities I believe
influence their receptivity to information. These behavioral
propensities include:
51. Resis tence to changes requiring new
behavior patterns and low receptivity
to information urging or supporting
such changes.
2. Low receptivity to information from
other persons having attitudes, beliefs,
and behavior patterns differing signifi-
cantly from their own.
3. A capacity for disregarding and/or mis-
perceiving available and potentially
valuable information, especially that
which counters currently held beliefs,
attitudes and expectations.
4. Difficulty focusing upon relevant in-
formation available from the total
conglomerate of relevant and irrelevant
information present in the problem-solving
situation
.
5. Difficulty ignoring relevant but less
crucial information when exigencies of
the situation demand focusing upon a narrow
range of information.
When these human propensities regarding receptivity to
information are combined with the socio-histor ic conditions
outlined earlier, they greatly exacerbate the difficulties
encountered by Man as he attempts to solve the complex problems
he faces in adapting to his changing environment. For on the
one hand, he must avoid being too closed: he must be recep-
tive to information that contradicts his previously held
views or that comes from unexpected sources; he must be able
to evaluate the information and its source on their separate
merits and be only minimally biased by his own values; he must
be able to ferret out important information hidden among hosts
of irrelevancies or recognize it even when it is distorted by
the heat of emotion; and he must be able to foresee the long-
6term consequences that may be wrought by the complex inter-
actions of present events. Yet on the other hand, he must
avoid being too open; he must be able to close out the caco-
phony of irrelevant information that can so easily overwhelm
his limited information processing capacities; and when the
situation requires it, he must ignore the relevant-but-not
crucial information and focus only upon crucial information.
To cope with both sets of needs, I believe men must attempt
to match their receptivity to information to the characteristics
of the problem-solving situations they encounter. Some indi-
viduals achieve more successful matches than others. It is
this unequal distribution of the ability to adapt one's recep-
tivity to information to the characteristics of the problem-
solving situation that leads me to look for the factors that
influence the growth of this ability in an individual. My
hope is that some of the factors are susceptible to manipu-
lation by educators. If this can be demonstrated, schools
may someday be able to improve a person's ability to adapt his
receptivity to information to the characteristics of the sit-
uations he faces and thereby increase his problem-solving ability.
It should be apparent that an individual's having an
appropriate degree of receptivity to available information is
but one aspect of successful problem solving. Problem solving
in its broadest sense has been the concern of enlightened
educators at least since the early writings of John Dewey.
Occupying such a position of central concern for such a long
7period it has not failed to attract its share of talented
scientists to probe the intricacies of its functioning.
Among others, Piaget (Flavel, 1963), Bruner (Bruner, Olver
,
Greenfield, £t al.
, 1966) and Ausubel (Ausubel, 1963, 1969,
Anderson and Ausubel, 1965) have studied it from the perspec-
tive of the cognitivist while Skinner (Skinner, 1957),
Berlyne (Berlyne, 1965), and Maltzman (e.g., in Anderson and
Ausubel, 1965) have looked at it through the eyes of the
learning theorist.
As indicated above, my specific concern is with an
individual's receptivity to information, that is, with the
factors that influence the match between his receptivity
and the characteristics of the problem-solving contexts in
which he functions and this aspect requires attention to
more than the intelligent, rational functioning of an
individual. It also requires attention to the role of factors
in the affective realm -- attitudes, values, and commitments,
anxieties, and emotions. These aspects of human behavior
also have been a major concern of social scientists and
educators for a long time and have drawn their share of
investigators, primarily social psychologists. The
experiments and writings of Festinger (1952) , Heider (1946)
,
Osgood and Tannenbaum (1957), Rosenberg (1956, 1960, 1965),
and others just begin the list of those who have been
concerned with the role of attitudes, values, etc. on
perception, memory, learning, and other aspects of
8problem-solving behavior. The work of these social
psychologists and the psychologists concerned more directly
with cognitive functioning furnishes a solid base to build
upon; and it is by drawing together some of the theories
and findings of these two groups of pyschologists that I
hope to develop a theoretical framework for investigating
the factors influencing a person’s ability to adapt his
receptivity to situational characteristics.
The study outlined in Chapter V of this proposal is in-
tended to examine a few of the most basic assumptions under-
lying this theoretical framework and to give some indication of
the heuristic utility of the concept of an individual's
receptivity- adaptability (R-A) profile .
In characterizing the concept of an R-A profile it is
necessary to relate two sets of factors: (1) the nature of
the individual's receptivity to information in a given
problem-solving situation and (2) the nature of the receptivity
called for by the characteristics of the problem-solving
situation itself. I begin here by discussing the former of the
two aspects of the R-A profile.
One can imagine a receptivity to information dimension
running from low to high. A person high on this dimension
would be highly receptive to any information available,
whether it was in the form of written arguments for different
sides of a salient issue, irrelevant comments overheard from
a nearby conversation, or subtle changes in the background
9noises present in the setting in which he finds himself.
By contrast, a person low on this dimension would be essentially
unreceptive to available information as a result of either
actively avoiding or just not perceiving information that per-
tained to the conditions and problems surrounding him. An
example of the latter case might be a secretary deep in
reveries about last night's date. Somewhere between very
high receptivity and very low receptivity would be the cases
of the moderately receptive person who is actively seeking
information about all aspects of a salient issue regardless
of the viewpoint but at the same time completely unaware of
other events taking place around him, and the moderately un-
receptive person who is quite receptive to information about
new aspects of a salient issue only as long as this new
information does not contradict his presently held attitudes
concerning the issue.
In addition to its being possible to characterize an in-
dividual's receptivity to information along a low-to-high
dimension, it is also possible to characterize a situation
as calling for a particular receptivity somewhere along the
low-to-high dimension. One situation may require a person to
be very receptive while another situation may require this
same individual to be relatively unreceptive. For example,
prior to making a major foreign policy decision regarding the
distribution of foreign aid the situation calls for a high
degree of receptivity to information ranging all the way from the
10
likely short-term reaction of the domestic electorate, through
the impact of the aid program on the stability of a number of
crucial international alliances, to the long-term impact of
possible cultural and societal changes that might result
from alterations in the economic structure of recipient nations.
On the other hand, faced with a sudden crisis calling for
immediate action, it would be highly disfunctional for a
leader to consider too wide a range of alternative solutions,
thereby diminishing the amount of attention he could devote
to any one. Such a situation calls for only moderate recep-
tivity to available information. Furthermore, having made
a decision regarding a course of action, a very low recep-
tivity may become most appropriate. By ignoring all infor-
mation regarding what might have been done, and even information
regarding the quality and wisdom of the decision made, all
of the individual's energy and attention can be devoted to
seeing that everything possible is done to carry out the
elected course of action successfully. Overconcern with,
or high receptivity to, information regarding the advantages
of a foregone course of action often reduces the likelihood
of success of the chosen course by causing vacillation and
equivocation.
Assuming the possibility of placing both individuals
and problem-solving situations along the dimension of low-to-
high receptivity, it then becomes feasible to characterize
individual's abilities to adapt their receptivity to the re-
11
quircmcnts of the situation. The strategy becomes one of
placing an individual in a number of problem-solving situa-
tions requiring different degrees of receptivity and deter-
mining the extent to which his own receptivity matches that
required by the characteristics of the various problem-
solving situations. The hypothetical construct used to
describe the extent of this match I have designated the
receptivity-adaptability profile. The word profile is used
to indicate that receptivity- adaptability is probably a
multi- dimensional trait even though in this first chapter it
has been treated as a uni-dimensional trait.
This point and others regarding the hypothetical nature
of receptivity- adaptability and its underlying dynamics will be
discussed in Chapter IV when a conceptual framework is de-
veloped and presented. In Chapter V, a modest empirical
study undertaken to test a few of the basic hypotheses in-
cluded in the conceptual framework will be described and its
results discussed. The implications the conceptual framework
and the empirical study might have for future research and
for educational practice are set forth in Chapter VI . But
between us and the conceptual framework lies the material
contained in Chapters II and III. This material includes a
review of work by others, which comprises the base upon
which the conceptual framework is built, and a more extensive
description of the concept of a receptivity-adaptability
profile. It is to this material that we turn now.
CHAPTER II
A REVIEW OF EARLIER WORK IN RECEPTIVITY TO INFORMATION
The purpose of Chapter II is to review briefly the work
of several social scientists that have influenced the think-
^^8 presented in the Chapters III and IV. In these two chap-
ters a conceptual framework for identifying individual differ-
ences that determine to what extent individuals will have the
ability labelled in the last chapter r ecept ivl ty- adaptabi 1 i ty
is developed. As mentioned in the first chapter, this con-
ceptual framework will be built in large measure upon the com-
bined works of several social pyschologists who might be char-
acterized as ’’consistency theorists" and several developmental
psychologists who might be characterized as "cognitive theorists."
However, the works of two groups of psychologists who fit neither
of these categories constitute the initial parts of the base
underlying the conceptual framework, and they will be discussed
first. These two groups of psychologists were those led by
T. W. Adorno and Milton Rokeach. Though at first glance, the
works of Adorno e_t al
.
(1950) and Rokeach et_ al
.
(1960) do not
seem concerned with studying receptivity-adaptability, aspects
of both studies have an important bearing upon the investi-
gation of this ability.
12
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Early Work Bearing on Receptivity-Adaptability:
A Review of Adorno and Rokeach
In their well-known work, The Authoritarian Personality
,
Adorno and his co-workers were concerned with studying the
nature of prejudice and its relationship to the political
ideology of the prejudiced individual. Very early in the
course of their study, they discovered that prejudice seemed
to be a general trait rather than a specific and isolated
behavior. By this, it is meant that a person prejudiced against
one minority group, e.g., Jews, was also very likely to exhibit
prejudice toward members of any other minority groups he might
encounter, e.g., Chinese. Indeed, Levinson argued that the
prejudiced, or highly ethnocentric, person tends always to
view the social world in terms of an out- group- - ingroup situa-
tion in which the outgroup is viewed as less moral, weaker, and
generally inferior to the ingroup of which he is a member
(Adorno, 1950, pp. 145-150).
A second finding reported by Adorno, ejt al
.
concerns the
apparent relationship between ethnocentricity and political
ideology. Specifically, Adorno's group believed that the very
prejudiced person was also likely to be a very politically
conservative person - a fascist, in the terminology used in
Adorno's Authoritarian Personality . (Adorno, 1950, p. 279,
pp. 264-267) Although not specifically stated in their work,
much of the discussion pertaining to political ideology, and
indeed, the title of the work itself, make it clear that
Adorno et al. regarded the prejudiced person's attitude
14
toward authority to be a crucial trait in the personality
syndrome of the prejudiced individual. Again and again the
authors stress the dependence of the prejudiced person on
authority, his belief in unquestioned obedience to authority,
and the right of the superior ingroup to exercise authority
over the weaker, inferior outgroups.
The importance of Adorno's work for an investigation of
receptivity- adaptability becomes more clear when the two
phenomena discussed by Adorno, prejudice and authoritarianism,
are presented in terms of patterns of receptivity to informa-
tion. Viewed in these terms, a major aspect of prejudice can
be regarded as being the selective rejection of information
about certain groups of people when the information contradicts
the stereotype the prejudiced individual attaches to that
group. The other side of this phenomenon is that the pre-
judiced person will have a high receptivity to information
that supports his stereotypes. Again when viewed in terms of
patterns of receptivity, an important aspect of prejudice is
that a prejudiced individual is likely to have very low recep-
tivity to information from persons he regards as being members
of outgroups, e.g., a prejudiced person who is Caucasian and
lives in a predominantly white country is not likely to be
as receptive to information from Filippinos or others he
regards as members of inferior minority groups as he is to
information from members of his own race. Likewise, Adorno's
authoritarian personality, when described from the perspective
15
of patterns of receptivity to information, becomes an indi-
vidual who is very receptive to information from social
sources occupying positions of authority and quite unrecep-
tive to information which goes counter to the view prescribed
by authority. Adorno et al^ thus found that the ''authoritarian
personality" tended to adopt patterns of receptivity which
were chai acterized by evaluation of information on the basis
of its valence (i.e., receptive to pro-atti tudinal information,
unreceptive to counter-attitudinal information) and on the
basis of its source (i.e., receptive to information from in-
group sources
,
unreceptive to information from outgroup
sources). This recasting of Adorno's findings into terms re-
lating to receptivity to information helps highlight the fact
that his work is some of the earliest which investigates, if
only in a limited way, factors which influence the degree to
which individuals have the ability we have labelled receptivity-
adaptability.
The approach taken by Adorno and his co-workers was to
search for underlying personality characteristics that were
influencing particular aspects of an individual's behavior.
Having identified these personality characteristics, e.g.
repression, a power orientation, rigidity, etc., the investi-
gation was extended to include a search for the roots of these
personality characteristics in the individual's early family
experiences, especially his relationship with early authority
figures such as father and mother (Adorno, 1950, pp. 473-488).
16
It is their investigation of the early environmental conditions
to which individuals are exposed and the relationship between
these and an individual's development which have the greatest
import for our understanding the training conditions which
will result in individuals having differing degrees of re-
ceptivity-adaptability.
The approach taken by Milton Rokeach and his co-workers
departs in an important way from the emphasis placed on the
role of personality by Adorno et al
.
in their analysis of
prejudice and authoritarian ideology. Rokeach and his fellow
researchers believed that ideological extremism and attitudes
toward authority, as well as many aspects of cognitive be-
havior, aesthetic preferences, and even personality traits
themselves, had at their source still more basic individual
characteristics. In the words of Rokeach, he had set out
"to find a single set of concepts, a single language, that is
equally appropriate to the analysis of personality, ideology,
and cognitive behavior" (Rokeach, 1960, p. 7). Rokeach contended
that such a set of concepts would have to be concerned with
the structure, rather than the content of individuals' beliefs
and behaviors. The set of concepts Rokeach et_ al
.
developed
in The Open and Closed Mind for analyzing personality, ideo-
logy, and cognitive behavior deal specifically with the
structure of an individual's belief-disbelief system . Because
this set of concepts provided the jumping-off-point for
many of the ideas set forth in the conceptual framework
17
presented in Chapter IV, they deserve some discussion here.
According to Rokeach, the individual's belief
-disbelief
system includes beliefs concerned with religion, politics
science, philosophy, aesthetics, etc., and in fact, includes:
. . .every belief and disbelief of every
sort the person may have built up about
the physical and social universe he lives
in. ...we mean it to represent each man's
total framework for understanding his
universe as best he can. (Rokeach, 1960,
p. 35)
Rokeach uses the term "belief
- disbelief system" to highlight
the point that we must investigate the values and attitudes
rejected by the individual as well as those he holds. Further-
more, Rokeach is concerned that a person's disbelief system
not be regarded simply as the mirror image of his belief
system. He argues that:
...every [belief-disbelief] system is
asymmetrical; it includes on the one
hand a system of beliefs that one
accepts, and on the other, a series
of systems that one rejects.
•
. . .The belief system is conceived
to represent all the beliefs, sets,
expectancies, or hypotheses, conscious
and unconscious
,
that a person at a
given time accepts as true of the
world he lives in. The disbelief
system is composed of a series of sub-
systems rather than merely a single
one, and contains all the disbeliefs,
sets, expectancies, conscious and un-
conscious, that, to one degree or
another, a person at a given time
rejects as false. (Rokeach, 1960, pp. 32-33)
An illustration of Rokeach 1 s point might be the case of a
Catholic who accepts the system of religious beliefs set
18
down in Church dogma but rejects, to varying degrees, a
whole series of other religious belief systems including
Protestantism, Islam, Hinduism, Zoroastrianism, Agnosticism,
and Atheism.
In discussing the organization of belief-disbelief
systems, Rokeach identifies three characteristics or dimensions
of the system's structure. The first of these is a similarity-
of -belief s dimension. Rokeach hypothesizes that the individual
rejects each of the systems making up his disbelief system
to the extent that its content is similar to, or different
from, his own belief system. Accordingly, if a schematic
drawing could be made of an individual's belief -disbelief
system, it would show his own belief system at one end of a
dimension and the most different belief system of which the
individual is aware at the other end. At intervals between
these two belief systems, others of which the individual is
aware would be placed in order of their similarities to his
belief system. The extent to which the individual rejected
a given system would be indicated by its distance from his
own belief system along the dimension (See Figure 2.1).





Catholicism Islam Zoroastrianism Atheism
FIGURE 2.1
19
Rokeach also assumes that the organization of an indi-
vidual's belief-disbelief system along the similar ity-dissimi-
larity dimension will be influenced by three properties of
the system. As summarized by Rokeach these properties are:
!• ISOLATION of beliefs or subsystems
of beliefs as evidenced by (a) the
coexistence of logically inconsistent
beliefs within a belief system; (b)
the accentuation of differences and
minimization of similarities between
belief and disbelief systems; and (c)
the denial of existing contradictions
within a system.
2. DIFFERENTIATION of belief subsystems as
evidenced by (a) relative amount of
knowledge possessed pertaining to a
particular belief or belief system and
(b) the perception of similarity between
adjacent subsystems.
3. COMPREHENSIVENESS or NARROWNESS of the
system as evidenced by the total number
or range of disbelief subsystems re-
presented within a given belief -disbelief
system (Rokeach, 1960, pp. 35-39).
The second major dimension of belief-disbelief system
organization is the central-peripheral dimension. Rokeach
subdivides this dimension into three regions. The Central
Region is composed of "primitive" or "pre- ideological"
beliefs which include beliefs about the ultimate nature of
things, e.g. the nature of physical reality, the nature of the
social world such as the extent to which it is basically
hostile or friendly, the nature of one's individual existence
such as one's orientation in physical space, autonomy, etc.
These central or primitive beliefs are those which a person
assumes are held by everyone, those which are regarded as so
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basically obvious to everyone that they are not susceptible
to disconfirmat ion by any authority. The second of the three
regions, the Intermediate Region, contains an individual’s
beliefs regarding the extent to which he should be guided by
authority. Ihese intermediate beliefs concern such issues as
whether or not there is such a thing as absolute authority
(human or supernatural)
,
whether pronouncements by authority
must be accepted totally or if they should be tempered by an
individual’s own rational reflections, etc. The third of the
three regions, the Peripheral Region, contains all the indi-
vidual's remaining beliefs about specific aspects of the
world- -whether he has acquired these by his own experience
or from sources he regards as valid authorities. The issues
covered by peripheral beliefs would range all the way from how
one views government regulation of industry to whether one
believes the Yankee teams of the 1930s were better than the
Dodger teams of the 1950s.
The third major dimension of belief -disbelief systems
identified by Rokeach is a time perspective dimension which
ranges from broad to narrow. A broad time-perspective is
one in which the past, present, and future are all represented
in the belief system. A narrow time-perspective is one in
which beliefs are concentrated in either past, present, or
future. The belief systems of many religious sects and
utopian political movements are examples of narrow time-
perspectives in that they are often concentrated on recreating
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a "golden age" of the past or a "perfect world" in the
future. A narrow time-perspective can .also bo concentrated
in the present
,
as in the ease of an individual who "lives
only for the present" and has no significant beliefs concern-
ing either the past or the future.
The three dimensions of belief -disbelief systems just
discussed - the similar ity-dissimilarity dimension, the central-
peripheral dimension, and the narrow-broad time-perspective
dimension - arc the basic structural elements which Rokcach
believed underlay an effective analysis of individuals’
personalities, ideologies, cognitive behavior, etc. In contrast
to Adorno, Rokeach rejected the idea that a useful way of
categorizing people was according to the content of their
beliefs, e.g., on the basis of whether or not they favored
authoritarian forms of government and social organization.
Rokeach felt that a more profound way of categorizing indi-
viduals was according to the structure of their belief -disbelief
systems in terms of the three major dimensions lie had identified.
Categorization based upon a structural analysis, allowed
Rokeach to group together individuals with very different be-
liefs on the basis of behavior patterns they had in common.
For example, some extreme political conservatives and some
extreme political radicals are very similar with respect to
certain patterns of behavior they exhibit despite great differ-
ences in the content of their ideological beliefs. On the other
hand, this structural analysis also allowed Rokeach to make
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important distinctions between members of the same group,
e.g., communists, on the basis of fundamental differences in
their behavior patterns despite their holding common ideolo-
gical beliefs (Rokeach, 1960, pp. 109-131). The crucial
factor in predicting an individual's behavior, argued Rokeach,
was whether or not that person had an open or closed mind -
a condition Rokeacli contended would determine whether an
individual rejected others because they had beliefs that
differed from his own and accepted all those who had similar
beliefs, or whether an individual accepted others who held
beliefs that contradicted his own beliefs.
By casting Rokeach 's work in terms of receptivity to
information, we can see more clearly the relevance of
Rokeach' s ideas and findings to our concern with receptivity-
adaptability. From this perspective, his studies can be
regarded as an investigation of the effects of the structural
characteristics of an individual's belief -disbelief system
on his dependence upon the similarity of an information source
to his own beliefs in determining whether to accept or reject
information from that source. Given certain structural charac
teristics-, an individual's belief-disbelief structure should
influence him to be open-minded and receptive to information
regardless of its valence (i.e., pro-atti tudinal vs
.
counter-
attitudinal) and its source (i.e., those espousing dissimilar
beliefs as well as those espousing similar beliefs) . Given
a different set of structural characteristics, an individual's
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belief-disbelief system should influence him to be closed-
minded and receptive only to information consistent with
his own beliefs or coming from sources which espouse the same
important beliefs as he does. These are, of course, only
two polar-types of belief-disbelief system structures which
represent the opposite poles of a continuous dimension. The
characteristics which determine the extent to which a belief-
disbelief system will lead an individual to be open-minded
or closed-minded are summarized by Rokeach in Figure 2.2
which is taken from The Open and Closed Mind (Rokeach, 1960,
pp. 55-56). Note that Rokeach violates his own rule that it
is structure rather than content which should be analyzed by
including in his discussion of the central -peripheral continuum
a concern with content as a crucial variable.
In justifying the characterizations given in Figure 2.2,
Rokeach argues that the essence of the distinction between
the open and the closed mind is the inability of the closed-minded
individual to "discriminate substantive information from in-
formation about the source, and to assess the two separately"
(Rokeach, 1960, p. 60). This leads to the closed-minded person’s
evaluating others on the basis of the similarity of their
beliefs to his own and also to his accepting or rejecting
information on the basis of whether or not the source has the
same value, or belief bias as lie does. Rokeach then draws
from this and other assumptions what he regards as the logical
implications for the nature of open and closed belief systems.
FIGURE 2.2
A Belief-Disbelief System Is
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Open Closed
A. to the extent that, with respect
the belief
- disbelief continuum,
to its organization along
1. the magnitude of rejection
of disbelief subsystems is rel-
atively low at each point along
the continuum;
2. there is communication of
parts within and between be-
lief and disbelief systems;
3. there is relatively lit-
tle discrepancy in the degree
of differentiation between
belief and disbelief systems;
4. there is a relatively high
differentiation within the dis-
belief system;
1. the magnitude of rejection ofdisbelief subsystems is relatively
ligh at each point along the dis-belief continuum;
2. there is isolation of parts
within and between belief and
disbelief systems;
3. there is relatively great
discrepancy in the degree of
differentiation between belief
and disbelief systems;
4. there is relatively little
differentiation within the dis-
belief system;
B. to the extent that, with respect to the organization alone
the central-peripheral dimension,
1- the specific content of
primitive beliefs (central
region) is to the effect that
the world one lives in, or the
situation one is in at a par-
ticular moment, is a friendly
one
;
1- the specific content of primi-
tive beliefs (central region) is
to the effect that the world one
lives in, or the situation one
is in at a particular moment, is
a threatening one;
2. the formal content of be-
liefs about authority and about
people who hold to systems of
authority (intermediate region)
is to the effect that authority
is not absolute and that people
are not to be evaluated (if
they are to be evaluated at all)
according to their agreement or
disagreement with such author-
ity;
2. the formal content of beliefs
about authority and about people
who hold to systems of authority
(intermediate region) is to the
effect that authority is absolute
and that people are to be accepted
and rejected according to their
agreement or disagreement with
such authority;
3. the structure of beliefs 3. the structure of beliefs and
FIGURE 2.2 (Continued)
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and disbeliefs perceived to
emanate from authority (peri-
pheral region) is such that
its substructures are in rela-
tive communication with each
other, and finally;
C. to the extent that,
dimension, there is a
1. relatively broad time-
perspective
.
disbeliefs perceived to ema-
nate from authority (peripheral
region) is such that its substruc-
tures are in relative isolation
with each other, and finally;
1. relatively narrow, future-
oriented time perspective.
with respect to the time-perspective
The arguments offered by Rokeach in making these inferences
are not entirely satisfactory (see Rokeach, 1960, pp. 60-70).
However, in the course of presenting the arguments, Rokeach
does make a point that is crucial to the development of our
conceptual framework. This point is that the function of
belief-disbelief systems is a dual one. In the words of
Rokeach
:
...all belief-disbelief systems serve
two powerful and conflicting sets of
motives at the same time: the need
for a cognitive framework to know and
to understand and the need to ward off
threatening aspects of reality . To the
extent that the cognitive need to know
is predominant and the need to ward off
threat absent, open systems should re-
sult. In the service of the cognitive
need to know, external pressures and
irrational internal drives will often
be pushed aside, so that information
received from outside will be discriminated,
assessed, and acted on according to the
objective requirements of the situation.
But as the need to ward off threat becomes
stronger, the cognitive need to know should be-
come weaker, resulting in more closed belief
systems. Under threat, information and
source should become inseparable and should
be evaluated arbitrarily in linewith the re-
wards and punishments meted out by authority.
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(Rokeach
, 1960, pp. 67-68). (Under-
lining mine.)
We find in this statement by Rokeach our first mention
of what we have called receptivity-adaptability. According
to Rokeach, a person remains receptive to information (has
an open mind) when the need to understand the world is pre-
dominant, but as soon as information coming from the outside
world causes the individual to experience a maximum level of
threat, he adopts a pattern of receptivity (closed mind) which
leaves him receptive only to information which helps decrease
the feelings of being threatened. With this, Rokeach has taken
us several steps further than Adorno et al
.
He has highlighted
the importance of examining behavior patterns for an underlying
structure that explains behavior in a number of seemingly
disparate realms. He has raised to a more explicit level the
notion that the manner in which a person accepts and rejects
information is crucial to understanding many aspects of be-
havior. And, most important, he has suggested that the function
to be played by whatever structure it is that determines whether
an individual has an "open mind" or a "closed mind" is a dual
one which sometimes emphasizes his need to know and understand
reality and at other times emphasizes his need to be protected
from threatening aspects of reality.
But Rokeach has not taken us far enough. If the basic
functions of a belief-disbelief structure are: (1) to help us
satisfy the need to know and understand the world and (2) to
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help us ward off threatening aspects of this world, what in
turn are the sources of these two needs? Why is it need-
fulfilling or functional for an individual to understand reality,
or, on the other hand, why is it need-fulfilling or functional
not to understand reality? An attempt to give full answers
to these questions must wait until Chapter IV, but the work
of some of the social psychologists mentioned in the first
chapter brings us nearer to an understanding of why it may be
functional for an individual to adopt either of the two
opposite orientations toward information from the environment.
A Social Psychology Perspective
:
The Basic Antimony
An appropriate starting point for reviewing the work of
the psychologists we have labelled "consistency theorists"
is a discussion of the Jones and Gerard concept of the basic
antinomy (Jones and Gerard, 1967, pp. 227-240). They intro-
duced the concept of a basic antinomy between "openness to
change and the desire to preserve a pre-existing view or
or conviction" to explain much of the research data on the
impact of value and attitude on perceiving and remembering.
They hypothesize that one principle of human behavior is that
an individual will tend on the one hand to be open to, seek,
perceive, and respond to information which conflicts with
;
l
their present beliefs and expectations regarding aspects of
the environment and on the other hand to be closed to, avoid,
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distort, and ignore such information. The tendency toward
openness presumably favors changes in the behavior and be-
liefs of the person while the opposite tendency toward being
closed presumably favors the preservation of present behavior
patterns and beliefs.
A basic assumption underlying the reasoning presented
in Chapter IV is that the existence of this basic antinomy
can be attributed to its functional utility in Man's evolu-
tionary history. Though it may usually be treated as a
psychological phenomenon, it is the adaptive role it has
played in the biological survival of Man that may explain
its existence. 1 It may have evolved in much the same way that
Konrad Lorenz has argued that agression and several mechanisms
to curb agression came to be a part of Man's behavior (Lorenz,
pp. 54-83). Despite its largely speculative nature, it is
worth noting that the existence of the basic antinomy as a
basic principle of human behavior is probably justified by
its function as an aid to Man's survival.
To examine the manner in which this basic antinomy is
functional, it may be helpful to look separately at the advan-
tages of each of the opposing sides of the antinomy for an
individual. First, let us look at the case for the closed
good description of the notion that biological
adaptation consists of an organism's approximating his actual
response to the "optimal response" and the implications of
this for the organism's gathering and rejecting information
is given by Berlyne in his Structure and Direction in
Thinking
,
1965, pp . 34-48.
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side of the antinomy, that is the evidence that a pattern of
receptivity which allows an individual to perceive consistency
and stability in the environment is advantageous to him. The
most basic advantage to an individual of being able to close
out information from the environment is that it allows him
to give selective attention to certain aspects of his environ-
ment. The huge mass of potentially available information in
the form of sensory input cannot possibly be processed simul-
taneously by a person's limited cognitive abilities. He
therefore finds it to his advantage to "pay attention to"
only those aspects of the environment which in the past have
proven important to him.
A related, but somewhat more sophisticated, advantage
attributable to the closed side of the antinomy results from
the necessity of being able to predict events which will take
place in the environment. This allows an individual to adjust
his behavior so that it will be appropriate to forthcoming
events. In order for a person to anticipate events success-
fully, the environment must appear relatively stable and pre-
dictable to him. If he takes note of every change in the
environment, no matter how insignificant or irrelevant to
his present purpose, an individual will be much less likely
to note the over-all consistency and stability of the environ-
ment. It is the closed side of the basic antinomy - the
human tendency to ignore, distort, or simply not perceive
information in the environment - that allows an individual to
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perceive the environment as relatively stable and predictable
and helps an individual take note of the general laws govern-
ing the occurrence of events in the universe.
Another functional advantage of the closed side of the
basic antinomy is discussed by Jones and Gerard (Jones and
Gerard, 1967, pp . 180-184). They argue that it helps the
individual move toward an "unequivocal behavior orientation
(UBO)" which allows the individual "to act without the dis-
ruptive influence of holding conflicting views regarding what
actions he should take." Their assumption is that an action
taken by a resolute person is more effective than the action
taken by a person who is vacillating between a number of
choices. By becoming less receptive to information regarding
unchosen alternatives
,
the individual will become more and
more unequivocal about following the course of action he
has elected.
A last argument for the functionality of an individual's
receptivity being governed by the closed side of the antinomy
comes from the role habituation plays in human behavior. It
is through habituation that humans are allowed to follow a
sort of "least effort principle." After repeated exposures
to similar stimulus characteristics in the environment, or
after repeated enactments of the same behavior sequence,
an individual is able to perform a seemingly automatic be-
havior sequence in these oft-repeated situations. Under such
circumstances, a conscious level of involvement in the selec-
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tion of relevant elements of information or appropriate
actions is no longer necessary. If the essential aspects of
the situation remain unchanged and the originally acquired
habits remain appropriate ones, this habituation can result
in more efficient behavior than that based on conscious de-
cision-making. Performance in an assembly line or carrying
out a much practiced procedure such as a lunar landing are
examples of such situations.
A good deal of indirect empirical and theoretical support
for the existence of the closed side of the basic antinomy has
been produced by the social psychologists concerned with
demonstrating the influence of a human preference for con-
sistency. The commonality shared by all these theories is
the basic assumption that humans have a need to view themselves
and the world as maintaining an over-all consistency. Because
each of the major theorists differs somewhat from the others
in terms of how consistency is defined, it is worthwhile to
discuss briefly three of the major consistency theories.
Robert Zajonc (1968) has reviewed each extensively in his
chapter in the Second Edition of The Handbook of Social
Psychology and I have borrowed heavily from his discussion.
Perhaps the earliest of the consistency theories is the
balance theory of Fritz Heider (1946, 1958). Heider’s theory
stresses the importance of structurally balanced relationships
in dyads and triads. He begins with the assumption that when
a set of relations, e.g., between three people or between a
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person and an action or object, is perceived by an individual
as composing a unit, that unit will be either in a balanced
(steady) state or in a state of imbalance (disequilibrium).
The state of a unit is determined by the "dynamic character"
of its parts, i.e., whether each is perceived as positive or
negative. For example, a dyad consisting of persons A and B
will be balanced from A's standpoint if he perceives himself
to like B and perceives B as liking him in return. Cartwright
and Harary (1956) converted Beider' s theory into the language
of graph theory and used signed graphs to depict balanced
and unbalanced states. The example of a balanced unit given
above would be depicted as: A^^^B ; while an imbalanced unit,
e.g., A liking B but perceiving that B dislikes A, would
appear as:
"*J3
. In a similar fashion triads can also be






Heider's theory postulates that units in disequilibrium will
tend to move toward balanced relationships or the units them-
selves will break-up. However, these forces toward symmetry
or balance in unit relations is not presumed to be a power-
ful driving force, only a tendency.
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In reviewing the empirical literature applying to
balance theory as formulated by Heider and extended and
formalized by Cartwright and Harary (1956) and Abelson and
Rosenberg (1958), Zajonc raises an important question re-
garding this research. Though evidence exists which strongly
suggests a human preference for balanced states, Zajonc
questions whether these results are due to the ’’good figure
forces" of balance theory or due to the effects of attraction
or preference for agreement. He believes the latter is the
most important factor in many of the studies and regrets that
these studies fail to separate the effects of these different
factors
.
Osgood and Tannenbaum (1955) attempt to avoid the prob-
lems caused by the effects and interactions due to attraction
and agreement by limiting their concern specifically to the
relations between: the attitude of a person toward a
2 The term "good figure forces" derives from the basic
contention of Gestalt psychology that humans have a strong
perceptual tendency to "complete" fragmented stimulus objects
or regularize irregular stimulus patterns in such a way as to
result in the individual's perceiving a "good figure." The
assumption Heider seems to have made is that balanced states
constitute "good figures" and imbalanced states "bad figures"
with the consequence that an individual will tend to want to
bring about a balanced unit relationship whenever possible.
^Theodore Newcomb's theory of balance (Newcomb, 1953)
does deal directly with the role of agreement as a factor
determining the extent to which a social relationship is in
a balanced state. Because agreement in Newcomb's theory is
conceived of as a social force toward consistency rather
than as a cognitive force toward consistency, it is less
germane to the conceptual framework presented in Chapter IV
and, therefore, is not discussed here.
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source (s)
; the person's attitude toward a concept (c)
; and
an assertion made by the source about the concept. The basic
hypothesis of the theory outlined by Osgood and Tannenbaum
is the congruity principle-
-namely that attitude change will
take place in the direction of bringing into congruence an
individual s attitudes toward a source, a concept, and the
attitude expressed by the source in assertions made about the
concept
.
In empirical tests of the Osgood and Tannenbaum hypo-
thesis, the subject rates the source (s) and the concept (c)
on the semantic differential scales developed by Osgood and
then is presented with the assertion (positive or negative)
made by the source about the concept. Predictions are then
made from a mathematical model about the amount and direction
of the subjects changes in attitude toward the concept. The
model includes two weighting factors: (1) + A, the assertion
constant intended to balance the stronger effect an assertion
will have on the attitude toward a concept than it will have
on the attitude toward the source and (2) i, the incredulity
factor which is intended to balance the effect of the subject's
disbelieving that a source makes the alleged assertion. The
congruity principle predicts that the subject will use one of
four strategies to achieve congruity and still maintain his
attitudes unchanged. These four strategies are:




2. invalidating the assertion by bringing to bearinformation which contradicts it;
3. strengthening his attitude towards the conceptby seeking supportive information and beliefs-
and *
4. changing his attitude toward the source.
If these four strategies fail the individual, he must achieve
congruity by changing his attitude toward the concept.
Empirical tests of the congruity principle have generally
ordered the data but failed to give satisfactory numerical
fits between the quantitative predictions of amounts of
attitude change and the actual amounts of attitude change
obtained in the results.
Less formal, but also less limited in application, is
Festinger's theory of cognitive dissonance (1957). According
to the theory, cognitions that bear a relevant relation to
each other can either be consonant or dissonant, i.e. either
consistent or inconsistent with one another. In Festinger's
words
:
Two elements are in dissonant relation
if considering these two alone, the
obverse of one element would follow
from the other. To state it a bit
more formally, x and y are dissonant
if not-x follows from y. (Festinger,
1957, p. 13)
Presumably, humans have two tendencies that determine
the dynamics of dissonance: 1 ' (1) a propensity on the part of
an individual to bring his cognitions into congruence with
perceived reality and (2) a drive to maintain consistency
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among the cognitions themselves. Dissonance can arise because
of a number of occurrences including informational inconsis-
tency, disconfirmed expectations, insufficient justifications
for actions taken, and post-decision regret. As for the
theory itself, Zajonc summarizes the major elements by listing
nine propositions:
1. Cognitive dissonance is a noxious state.
2. In the case of cognitive dissonance the
individual attempts to reduce or eliminate it
and he acts so as to avoid events that will
increase it.
3. In the case of consonance the individual acts
so as to avoid dissonance
-producing events.
4. The severity or the intensity of cognitive
dissonance varies with (a) the importance
of the cognitions involved (b) the relative
number of cognitions standing in dissonant
relation to one another.
5. The strength of the tendencies enumerated
in (2) and (3) is a direct function of the
severity of dissonance.
6. Cognitive dissonance can be reduced or
eliminated only by (a) adding new cognitions
or (b) changing existing ones.
7. Adding new cognitions reduces dissonance if
(a) the new cognitions add weight to one side
and thus decrease the proportion of cognitive
elements which are dissonant, or (b) the new
cognitions change the importance of the cog-
nitive elements that are in dissonant relation
with one another.
8. Changing existing cognitions reduces disso-
nance if (a) their new content makes them less
contradictory with others, or (b) their impor-
tance is reduced.
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9. If new cognitions cannot be added or the
existing ones changed by means of a





tive consequences favoring consonance
will be recruited. Seeking new informa-
tion is an example of such behavior.
For our purposes it is important to note that the
propositions numbered 6,7,8, and 9 concern the means by which
cognitive consistency may be conserved and are similar to the
second and third strategy alternatives available for maintain-
ing attitudinal consistency mentioned by Osgood and Tannenbaum
in discussing their congruity principle (see p.34). These
propostions are the elements of greatest concern to us in
the consistency theories because they deal directly with the
role played by information in reducing the tension developed
by imbalance, inconsistency, or dissonance. In effect, these
propositions support the notion that by becoming receptive only
to information which helps achieve or maintain cognitive
consistency
,
the individual can escape from the anxiety or
tension these theories hypothesize accompanies cognitive
inconsistency.
Although a majority of the studies prompted by Festinger's
theory of cognitive dissonance deal witli attitudinal change as
a means of dissonance reduction, one class of studies has been
concerned more directly with receptivity to information.
These studies attempt to investigate the effects of dissonance
on selective exposure to information. The hypothesis in
these experiments is that an individual will avoid or reduce
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dissonance by attempting to expose himself only to information
which supports positions to which he has already committed
himself. In his review of the studies on selective exposure
to information, Zajonc (1968, pp. 382-386) calls attention
to the equivocal nature of the results. He attributes this
to experimental design difficulties which confound other
factors with dissonance and which are plagued by failures to
create sufficiently strong dissonance in the subjects. A
second failing of these studies which is more important from
the perspective of our concern with receptivity to informa-
tion is that they concern themselves only with whether the
individual exposes himself to supportive or to discrepant
information and not with how the individual actually deals
with the information to which he exposes himself. With regard
to this point, Festinger argues that a person with knowledge
that discrepant information does exist may experience disson-
ance until given the opportunity to seek out that discrepant
information with the intention of discovering and rebutting
the fallacious arguments it contains.
Not mentioned by Zajonc or Festinger but important to
the understanding of the results obtained in the selective
exposure experiments is the possibility that the individual
either perceives the discrepant information in such a biased
and distorted manner that it does not constitute a discrep-
ancy for him or that he reacts to the information by rejecting
its validity on the basis of its coming from what he regards
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as a biased source. Whatever the case, dissonance theory
and some of its supporting studies do highlight the tendency
for individuals to maintain a consistent outlook on the pheno-
mena composing their environments by remaining closed to, or
unreceptive to, information which threatens their maintaining
a consistent world view. In effect, all of the consistency
theories imply that inconsistency can be one of the 'threaten-
ing aspects of reality" Rokeach believes a closed belief-
disbelief system protects the individual from.
The support of the functional role of the closed side
of the basic antinomy does not rest solely on the arguments
and studies produced by the consistency theorists. Jones and
Gerard (1967, pp. 227-255) cite an impressive list of studies
dealing with perception, learning, and information retention
that also support the functionality of the closed side of the
basic antinomy. Because our interest lies more in the area
of the influence of cognitive consistency and inconsistency
on receptivity to information, these other studies will not
be discussed here.
All of the consistency theories have in common a tension-
reduction view of human motivation. They assume that a basic
force in man and other organisms is the desire to escape
tension, reduce drive, or avoid arousal. Somewhat in oppo-
sition to the tension-reduction theory of human motivation is
the contention by White (1959)
,
Berlyne (1960) and others
that man and higher organisms have a tendency to seek out
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novelty in the environment, to be challenged by changing
circumstances, and to welcome arousal. This second view of
human behavior reflects the functioning of the open side of
the basic antinomy and is consistent with the other function
of belief-disbelief systems - that of providing a "cognitive
framework to know and understand" the environment - identified
by Rokeach. Now that we have reviewed the support for the
functionality of the closed side of the basic antinomy, it is
necessary to review the support for the existence of the other
side of the antinomy - the open side - and of the advantages
to an individual of being open to information which conflicts
with his current view of the environment.
From a logical point of view the functionality of the
open side of the antinomy derives from man's information-
dependence on his environment. If an individual is to ad-
just his actions appropriately to the changes taking place
around him, he must constantly be open to information that
signals the coming or arrival of changes. As long as the
environment is stable or consistent, prediction of events,
and consequently decision-making and action, tend to be less
dependent upon the gathering of information from the environ-
ment. As the environment becomes increasingly unpredictable,
an individual has to grasp the significance of new events
and is consequently more dependent upon accurately perceiving
and processing information from the environment.
In addition to this logical argument, there exists both
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theoretical and empirical support for the functional advan-
tages of the open side of the basic antinomy. R.W. White (1959)
has reviewed a large number of studies done with higher ver-
tebrates and humans and has concluded that some explanation
other than drive reduction is necessary to explain such be-
haviors as :
. . . visual exploration
,
grasping, crawling
and walking, attention and perception,
language and thinking, exploring novel
objects and places, manipulating the
surroundings, and producing effective
changes in the environment. The [Mr.
White's] thesis is then proposed that
all of these behaviors have a common
biological significance: they all form
part of the process whereby the animal
or child learns to interact effectively
with his environment ... Such activities
in the ultimate purpose of competence must
therefore be conceived to be motivated in
their own right. It is proposed to desig-
nate this motivation by the term effectance,
and to characterize the experience produced
as a feeling of efficacy (White, 1959.
p. 32 97:
Thus, a feeling of efficacy, due in large part it will be
argued in Chapter IV to the ability of an individual to
predict the consequences of his interactions with the environ-
ment, is the ultimate motivation for the individual to let
his behavior and his receptivity to information be guided by
the open side of the basic antinomy.
Berlyne (1960) in discussing the motivations for what
he terms epistemic behavior or "behavior that augments know-
ledge" (1960, p. 262) rejects as insufficient the theories
based on extrinsic motivation, i.e., theories which argue
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that all behavior is motivated by seeking external rewards
which lead to drive reduction. His reason for rejecting
these theories is their inability to explain idle curiosity
or behavior which Berlyne calls
. ..epistemic searches concerned with
matters that are perplexing but trivial
from a practical point of view. (Berlyne
1960, p. 278)
Berlyne also rejects these theories as insufficient because
they do not explain how an individual is motivated to go
thi ough the chain of intervening symbolic responses, or
mental steps, involved in deductive problem-solving of the
sort typified in moving from the statement of an assumption
to the proof of a theorem. Only the final step of the proof,
that is, the symbolic statement which begins with the word
"therefore..." is capable of reducing the drive to achieve
solution of the proof. And yet, as Berlyne points out,
the person is capable of making this supposedly drive-reducing
symbolic response at anytime and without having performed
the intervening steps in the proof.
As an alternative to the extrinsic motivation theories,
Berlyne proposes that there is an intrinsic motivation to
seek information and that this drive is a consequence of con-
ceptual conflict. He likens it to the Gestalt position
that man seeks to fill the gaps in incomplete configurations
and to Dewey's contention that "the object of thinking is
to introduce a congruity between ...conditions at hand and
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a desiied and intended result, between an end and the means
for reaching it" (Dewey, 1910). Despite his opposition to
the dr ive - reduct ion theories, Berlyne recognizes that his
own theory of conceptual conflict is a highly modified version
of drive reduction (1960, p. viii) . The essential difference
is that he rejects the idea that the so-called "basic drives"
are the source of the motivation to think, and he substitutes
instead the idea that the most important motivation for epis-
temic behavior is the conflict which occurs when a stimulus
situation is such that several, incompatible symbolic responses
could be made by the individual but there are no cues which
clearly favor the enactment of any one of the responses over
any of the others. An individual trying to choose which of
four liberal democrats to support in the presidential primary
elections is an example of a situation in which several in-
compatible responses are elicited by the stimulus situation
and could lead to conceptual conflict, and hence, to epistemic
behavior. Though based largely upon extrapolation from
general principles of behavior theory, Berlyne also cites a
number of diverse studies which give strong, if not direct,
support for his contentions.^
Berlyne' s work has important implications for the con-
ceptualization presented in Chapter IV and will be discussed
4 For a detailed review of these studies see D.E. Berlyne,
Conflict, Arousal, and Curiosity , 1960, pp . 261-275.
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again there; but for the moment it is necessary to limit
ourselves to mentioning those aspects of his work which re-
late to the functioning of the open side of the basic antinomy.
This latter portion of his work can be summarized by noting
that Berlyne's review of work done on orienting responses,
investigatory responses, and arousal supplies considerable
evidence that both humans and higher animals assume states
of high receptivity to information and even seek arousal
from exposure to stimulus situations containing excitatory
levels of complexity, uncertainty, or incongruity.
In reviewing the evidence that a basic antinomy be-
tween openness to incongruent or discrepant information on
the one hand and closedness toward such information on the
other hand exists as a basic, and functional component of
human behavior, we have attempted to make a strong case for
Rokeach's observation that some internal structure (Rokeach
believes it to be a belief -disbelief system) performs two
important but opposing functions: (1) to furnish the individual
with a cognitive framework to help him know and understand
reality, and (2) to provide him with a protective screen to
help him ward off threatening aspects of reality. We have
shown that both of these functions can be advantageous and
that they seem to form an important part of typical human
behavior patterns. But we have not found a sufficient
explanation of the dynamics underlying the operation of this
basic antinomy.
45
In discussing this, Jones and Gerard (1967, pp. 227-
229) speak in terms of the dominance of one side or another
of the basic antinomy as being dependent upon the phase of
behavior in which a person finds himself. In the pre
-decision-
al phase of behavior, when attempting to determine what course
of action is most desirable, the open side of the antinomy is
dominant. In the post-decisional phase of behavior, when the
action is being, or has been taken, the closed side of the
antinomy is dominant. Where no action is perceived to be
possible - that is, when the individual does not believe his
behavior can significantly change the course of events - the
closed side of the antinomy is again dominant. For Jones and
Gerard these are functional determinants of which side of the
antinomy will be dominant. They lead the person to be "better
prepared to approach attractive stimuli," perceptually defend
against uncongenial events when action is not possible, or
be hypervigilant to negative stimuli when preventative action
is possible (Jones and Gerard, 1967, p. 225).
The argument by Jones and Gerard that the dominance
\'
of either >side of the basic antinomy is determined by whether
a person is in the pre- or post-decisional phase of behavior
and whether or not action on his part is possible does ex-
plain why one or another side of the antinomy should be
dominant. But it does not explain why in reality the
balance between the two sides of the antinomy may function
in an inappropriate manner causing a person to be open when
46
he should be closed and vice-versa
. This explanation gives
us no insight into why there should be the individual differ-
ences in receptivity to information that so concerned Rokeach.
Nor does it give us a means of characterizing these indivi-
dual differences.
This is partially due to the fact that Jones' and
Gerard's conception of open-closed as a single dimension
indicating the degree to which an individual is receptive to
counter-attitudinal and incongruent information does not
take into account other characteristics of the individual,
of the information, or of the problem situation than whether
or not action can be taken by the individual. In Chapters
III and IV we will introduce some of these other factors
which may be determinants of whether or not an individual's
patterns of receptivity to information are striking an
appropriate balance between the two sides of the basic
antinomy.
Ic H A P T E R III
COGNITIVE STRUCTURE AND THE CONCEPT OF
A RECEPTIVITY-ADAPTABILITY PROFILE
At the close of Chapter II it was noted that Jones’s
and Gerard's explanation of the dynamics underlying the
functioning of the basic antinomy was insufficient partly
because it did not take into consideration important charac-
teristics of individuals which might influence the functioning
of the basic antinomy and partly because it did not take into
consideration important characteristics of the environmental
situation which might also influence the functioning of the
basic antinomy. To rectify this shortcoming, we will (1)
discuss the nature of cognitive structures and the important
characteristics of their organization which may influence
the functioning of the basic antinomy and (2) discuss the
notion of a receptivity-adaptability (R-A) profile as a use-
ful expansion of the basic antinomy notion of Jones and Gerard
and the open-closed mind notion of Rokeach.
Characteristics of Cognitive Structure
One useful way of conceptualizing the manner in which
a mature human organizes and reacts to the diverse stimuli
of his environment is by postulating the existence of a cog-
nitive structure in all individuals. This cognitive structure
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has been variously described by a number of cognitive theorists
including Ausubel (1963), Bruner (1956, 1966), Harvey, Hunt,
and Schroder (1961), Piaget (1950, 1952), Schroder, Driver,
and Streufert (1967), and Berlyne (1965). 1 All of these
theorists, with the exception of Berlyne, have in common the
assumption that the cognitive structure is the organizational
pattern through which are filtered, or into which are fitted
stimuli from the individual’s environment. The structure is
regarded as a sort of cognitive representation of the envi-
ronment. Baldwin (1969, p.333), in discussing the nature of
this cognitive representation, suggests that it is a coding
of the information in the environment, and he goes on to stress
that the cognitive representation "must be a coding that in-
dicates the structure of the environment, i.e., the relation-
ships among items as well as the items themselves ..." and is
not limited to information currently present, but also includes
information available in the individual’s memory. Thus, the
cognitive structure is not only a representation of the en-
vironment, but also is a structure that the individual "pro-
jects onto the environment" thereby highlighting the relation-
ships among the elements composing the environment.
^Berlyne's position differs significantly from the
others mentioned here because he is essentially an S-R theorist.
His concept of the cognitive structure is discussed in Chapter
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Bruner's model of cognitive development (Bruner, 1966,
p.319) assumes that the individual’s "knowledge of the world
is based on a constructed model of reality, a model that can
only partially and intermittently be tested against input,"
and that, Bruner, contends, can represent reality in any of
three modes: (1) action (enactive mode); (2) imagery (ikonic
mode); and (3) symbolism (symbolic mode) (1966, pp.1-67).
In mature members of western societies the symbolic mode
usually supercedes the other two. According to Bruner (1966,




and modification because "any symbolic activity ... is logically
and empirically unthinkable without these properties." Pre-
sumably then, Bruner's model of the cognitive structure is a
set of categories organized in a hierarchical fashion and
having the functions of enabling the individual to predict
events in his environment, infer causation in these events,
and cognize actions to modify them. Bruner (1957) has also
argued that each of the categories in such a cognitive
structure is characterized at any point in time by having
some particular degree of "category accessibility" which
governs the ease with which an individual will perceive and
process different stimuli into the various categories he has
in his cognitive structure.
In Ausubel's view, the cognitive structure is composed
of a hierarchy of "traces" of past experience including some
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"highly inclusive conceptual traces under which are subsumed
traces of less inclusive subconcepts as well as traces of
specific informational data’. (Ausubel, 1963, p. 24). Accord-
ing to Ausubel, structures typified by this "progressive
differentiation" correspond most closely to the "postulated
way in which
...knowledge is represented, organized, and
stored in the human nervous system" (1963, p. 79)
More fully developed than Bruner’s and Ausubel 's
characterization of cognitive structure, but very similar to
them, is that of Harvey, Hunt, and Schroder (1961). They
conceive of the structure as a system of concepts and give
the following explanation:
A concept in the most general sense is a schema
for evaluating impinging stimulus objects or
events. Abstracted from the experience of
objects in the environing world, it represents
a category of varying definitiveness and
breadth along some specifiable dimension
(hot-cold, good-bad, and so forth) (Harvey and
Rutherford, 1958). Once a concept has evolved,
it serves as a psychological yardstick in terms
of which stimuli are compared and guaged, a
kind of experiential filter through which
objects are screened and evaluated on their
way from sensory reception to ultimate response
evocation.
Concepts, in their matrix of interrelated-
ness, serve the critical cognitive function of
providing a system of ordering by means of
which the environment is broken down and organ-
ized, is differentiated and integrated, into
its many psychologically relevant facets. In
.this capacity, they provide the medium through
which the individual establishes and maintains
ties with the surrounding world. It is on
the basis of the web of these conceptual ties
that one is able to place oneself stably and
meaningfully in relation to time, space, and
other dimensions of his psychological universe.
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It is on this basis, hence, that
one | s self-identity and existence are
articulated and maintained. Threat
to such ties or severance of them
leads to a psychological mobilization
aimed at maintaining or restoring
them
,
efforts, which if unsuccessful
may result in a major reorientation
and organization of ties to the world,
or moi e drastically, even to breakdown
or destruction of the self. (1961, p. li)
We have in this statement something very close to the idea
expressed by Rokeach concerning the dual functions of a
belief-disbelief system (see page 25) except that the structure
under discussion is a conceptual system or cognitive structure.
Piaget's conception of the cognitive functioning of
the mature individual is also based on the assumption that
structui al elements allow the individual to organize and
understand his environment. In Piaget's theory 2 (Piaget
,
1950)
the basic element of structure is the scheme or schema (the
term being translated each way by different translators) . The
schema is a pattern the individual uses for interacting with
the objects and events in the environment, or in the vocabu-
lary of Piaget, for assimilating the environment. For Piaget,
who was educated as a biologist, the schema is the psychologi-
cal analog of biological structures, e.g. the digestive system.
Just as the digestive system is a structure whose function is
2
In addition to the primary sources cited, much of the
discussion of Piaget's theories is based upon A. L. Baldwin's
chapters on Piaget in his Theories of Child Development ,
1967, pp. 171-300.
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to enable the organism to assimilate food, so Piaget conceives
of schemata as structures enabling the individual to assimi-
late elements of his environment. Piaget discusses two kinds
of schemata: (1) sensory-motor schemata which are overt
patterns of behavior performed as a reaction to stimuli in
the environment, e.g., reacting to the stimulus of a baby
rattle by reaching for and grasping it; and (2) conceptual
schemata which consist of cognitive operations such as classi-
fying or determining relationships between stimuli perceived
in the environment or retained as memories of past interactions
with the environment. It is this latter kind of schema with
which we are most concerned since it is the structure most
akin to what we have labelled cognitive structures. Piaget's
conceptual schema can be regarded as the elements of which a





and the concepts of
Harvey, Hunt, and Schroder.
Because the cognitive structure, as described by the
theorists discussed above, is the major component of an
individual's information-processing mechanism, it is reason-
able to assume that the patterns of receptivity to information
exhibited by an individual will be reflections of his cognitive
structure. Marked individual differences in patterns of re-
ceptivity displayed by two individuals probably have as their
source important differences in the characteristics of the
two individuals' cognitive structures. This is a view very
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similar to Rokeach's structural theory as presented in
Chapter II, except that the structure postulated here is a
cognitive structure rather than a belief
-disbelief structure.
This hypothesized influence of cognitive structure
characteristics on receptivity to information is based on the
same assumptions that are made by the "cognitivists" about
the functioning of cognitive structures. One such assumption
is that information perceived in the environment is in some
way categorized as it is taken into the cognitive structure.
A given stimulus object is likely to have a number of differ-
ent attributes any one of which, or combination of which,
determines the manner in which it is fitted into the cognitive
structure. A green rubber ball, for example, has attributes
which include size, color, weight, hardness, smell, taste,
resiliency, density, suitability for playing jacks, suitabil-
ity for playing handball, suitability for use in a one-way
valve, etc. Which of these attributes are noted by an in-
dividual is likely to depend on the categories or concepts
the individual's cognitive structure contains, as well as
upon current situational demands.
Another assumption underlying the concept of cognitive
structure that has implications for the relationship between
cognitive structures and receptivity is the notion that the
cognitive structure does more than represent the elements in
the environment. It also serves to highlight the relation-
ships between these elements, to reflect the structure of
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the environment itself. The nature of these relationships
extends beyond the temporal and special relationships that
our senses relay to us. There are also intricate cause-and-
effect relationships which cannot be perceived without the
individual's having a means of representing these relation-
ships. Thus, a person whose cognitive structure reflects
the interdependence between heat and the expansion of materials
is likely to be receptive to a different set of hypotheses
regarding the behavior of a bi-metallic bar than a person
whose cognitive structure reflects only the interdependence
of heat and the melting or burning of materials.
Furthermore, the cognitive structure is likely to
influence the patterns of receptivity an individual adopts
for one other reason. The information available in the
environment at any particular time is only a portion of the
information at the individual's disposal for understanding
that particular sitaution. An individual's cognitive struc-
ture represents a storehouse of information which may be
brought to mind by characteristics of the environment at
a given time. Missing or obscured elements of information
may be added to the situation from the individual's cogni-
tive structure and, therefore, differences in the dimensions
defining the various categories in an individual's cognitive
structure are likely to influence his ability to supply the
appropriate bits of information to a given solution.
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In addition to characterizing in one manner or another
the nature of cognitive structures in general, each of the
cognitive theorists mentioned above supplies some hints re-
garding what characteristics of cognitive structures might
contribute to individual differences in receptivity to
information. According to Harvey, Hunt and Schroder (1961)
the crucial variable of cognitive structure contributing to
individual differences is the degree of concreteness-abstract-
ness of the concepts making up an individual's cognitive
structure. In contrast to Ausubel's emphasis on the hierar-
chical nature of cognitive organization, Harvey, Hunt, and
Schroder hypothesize that conceptual concreteness - abstractness
is reflected in four organizational characteristics of con-
ceptual systems, namely:
i
1. The clarity-ambiguity dimension which
refers to "the distinctness with which
the component aspects of the system
. .
.
are differentiated or articulated;
2 . compar tmentalizat ion- interrelatedness
which refers to "the extent to which
concepts within a system are inter-
connected" or isolated from one
another
;
3. centrality-peripherali ty which refers
to "the degree of essentialness of a
concept to the larger constellation
of concepts;" and
4. openness - closedness which refers to
"the receptivity of the system to ex-
ternal events or to varied interpreta-
tions of the situation" and which Harvey,
Hunt, and Schroder hypothesized might




It is worth noting the similarity of these dimensions
of cognitive structure to the dimensions of belief
-disbelief
structure identified by Rokeach. In both cases differen-
tiation (termed clarity-ambiguity by Harvey et alj and inte-
gration (termed compartmentalizat ion- interrelatedness by
Harvey et al^ and isolation by Rokeach) are identified as
crucial dimensions. Both theories also consider centrality
-
periphei ality an important dimension, but the definitions
of this dimension given by Rokeach and Harvey, Hunt, and
Schroder differ significantly from one another. It was noted
in the discussion of Rokeach' s theory in Chapter II (see page
23) that he violated his own structural approach in defining
the centrality-peripherality dimension. The definition
given by Harvey, Hunt, and Schroder is much less extensive
but also violates the consistency maintained in their
definitions of the other dimensions of cognitive structure.
The others are all defined as structural characteristics,
but centrality-peripherality is defined as a characteristic
of the units making up the structure. Thus it is possible
to speak in terms of the differentiation (i.e., clarity-
ambiguity), integration (compartmentalization- interrelated-
ness)
,
or receptivity (openness-closedness) of a cognitive
structure, but it is inappropriate to speak in terms of the
centrality or per ipherality of a cognitive structure.
In a later work written with Driver and Streufert
(Schroder, Driver, and Streufert, 1967), Schroder abandoned
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the notion of centrality-peripherality as a dimension of
cognitive structure and chose to define the levels of
information processing attainable by a conceptual structure
as being a function of three dimensions:
1. differentiation, or the number of
unique dimensions used by an indi-
vidual to arrange the perceived in-
formation
;
2. discrimination, or the capacity of the
structure to distinguish between differ-
ent stimuli or elements of information
along a single dimension; and
3. integrative complexity, or the number of
different ways in which "dimensional
units of information can be interrelated
in different ways in order to generate
new and discrepant perspectives about
stimuli." (1967, pp. 14-28)
There is apparently room for confusion and disagreement
t
concerning the identification of tliose dimensions of cognitive
structure which are the sources of individual differences
in receptivity to information. Figure 3.1 presents a com-
parison of the dimensions identified by Rokeach et al
.
(1960),
Harvey, Hunt, and Schroder (1967), and Schroder, Driver, and
Streufert (1967) as well as the dimensions or characteristics
of cognitive structure used in the development of the con-
ceptual framework presented in Chapter IV. The centrality-,
peripherali ty dimensions identified by Rokeach and by Harvey,
Hunt, and Schroder are not used in the conceptual framework
for the reasons discussed above regarding the inconsistency
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to the problem. As a characteristic of categories making up
a cognitive structure, centrality-per ipherality is discussed
in Chapter IV. Rokeach’s time -per spective dimension is also
rejected as being essentially a concern 'with the content
,
(and therefore subsumable under the comprehensiveness dimension)
rather than the organization of cognitive structures and of
little importance to the development of the conceptual frame-
work dealing with receptivity-adaptability. The openness-
closedness dimension identified by Harvey, Hunt and Schroder
is rejected because this characteristic of cognitive structures,
it is hypothesized in our conceptual framework, is likely to
be determined by the other dimensions of the structure. Finally,
the two dimensions which Schroder, Driver and Streufert iden-
tify as discrimination and differentiation are combined into
a single dimension in the conceptual framework of Chapter IV.
In their definitions of these two dimensions, differentia-
tion and discrimination, Schroder, Driver and Streufert
attempt to make a distinction between what in common usage
are synonymous terms. Differentiation they use to indicate
the number of dimensions available in a cognitive structure
for evaluating a given set of information. They use discrimi -
nation to indicate the fineness of the gradations available
on a given dimension in a cognitive structure for evaluating
a given set of information. We have combined these two
dimensions because most stimulus situations an individual
will encounter are complex enough that discrimination be-
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tween stimulus elements is usually made on the basis of com-
parision of multiple dimensions rather than on the basis of
quantitative differences along a single dimension. Because
of this, and because gradations along a single dimension
often can be translated into points along more specific com-
binations of dimensions
,
3 we shall assume that our usage of
the term differentiation encompasses both the existence of
multiple dimensions and fine gradations along single dimen-
sions; but we will also assume that the latter is the more
important aspect of cognitive structure in terms of influence
upon receptivity to information.
We are left, then, with three major characteristics of
cognitive structure - differentiation, integration, and
comprehensiveness - and may presume that significant differences
between structures on any of these dimensions will result in
differences in the cognitive functioning and patterns of
receptivity exhibited by individuals. With these three charac-
teristics in mind, we will now offer a more detailed conceptu-
alization of cognitive structure which will serve as the basis
for the conceptual framework developed in the next chapter.
We will hypothesize that a cognitive structure is com-
posed of a number of categories or concepts that are interre-
lated in a complex fashion. Each category, or concept, can
3For example, points along the dimension "redness"
be translated into points along the dimensions
intensity
may
of redness" and "purity of hue.
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be imagined to consist of tbe location where a number of
dimensions overlap and thereby define the category. Figure
3.2 gives a rough pictoral representation of such a definition
of cognitive categories. The large circle is the area re-
presenting the category "ball" defined by the overlapping
of portions of the four dimensions: size, hardness, roundness,
and resiliency. Any object judged to have appropriate amounts
of these four physical attributes (i.e., fall within the
admissible ranges on these four dimensions) will be categor-
ized as a ball. The circle within the larger circle represents
the category "game ball." Again, the category is defined
by the same four dimensions which define the broader category
"ball", but the category "game ball" is more restrictive
because the permissible range of variation along the four
defining dimensions is narrower. Several objects (viz. a
basketball, football, golfball, medicine ball, cotton ball,
and moon) are then evaluated according to the four dimensions
and located in the "cognitive structure" represented in
Figure 3.2. This is done by placing a point on each dimension
to indicate the amount of this attribute possessed by each
object and then connecting these points so that the ’location"
of each object in the "cognitive structure" is shown by the
area encompassed by the lines connecting the points. Thus,
for example, the area contained by the green lines represents
a medicine ball (which falls in the category "ball" but not
in the category "game ball") and the area bounded by the blue
KEY: Basketball' — • Medicine Ball
Football Cotton Ball
Golfball-F + + + Moon#**#
A pictoral representation of the categories "Ball" (large circle)
and "Game Ball" (smaller circle) defined by four dimensions: size
hardness, roundness, and resiliency. Shown "located" in this
four- dimens ion "cognitive structure" are the six objects listed




lincjs represents a football (which falls in both the cate-
gory "game ball" and the category "ball").
Some of the categories in a cognitive structure would
be completely subsumed under others, e.g., the category
"basketball" would be subsumed completely under the cate-
gory "game ball" which in turn might be subsumed under the
category "ball". Some of the categories would overlap
without one or the other being completely subsumed, e.g.,
the categories "sociology" and "psychology" may overlap in
a smaller category "social psychology". Yet other cate-
gories might be related to others only by virtue of their
possessing a common dimension, e.g., the categories
"bureaucracy" and "steam engine" may have in common the
dimension "degree of entropy".
Building on this conceptualization of a cognitive
structure, we can begin to envision the differences between
cognitive structures characterized by differing degrees of
differentiation, integration, and comprehensiveness. A
more comprehensive structure would contain a much larger
number of dimensions and categories available for evaluating
objects or events perceived in the environment than a less
comprehensive structure would. For example, a comprehensive
structure might include the dimensions and categories re-
lating to geogrpahy, transportation, economics, politics,
sociology, aesthetics, psychology, religion and architecture
for dealing with the problem of choosing a site for a
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community development. A less comprehensive structure might
include only dimensions and categories relating to shelter,
climate, proximity to drinking water, and the availability
of food supplies for dealing with the same problem. This
difference in comprehensiveness of the two structures could
significantly influence the receptivity patterns adopted by
the two individuals as they evaluate prospective sites for
a community development.
Ihe use of an analogy between cognitive structures on
the one hand and library classification and cataloging sys-
tems on the other is helpful for envisioning the differences
between a more and a less comprehensive cognitive structure.
In classifying a book or other object, the library is actually
assigning a location to that object in the library collection.
This location establishes a spatial relationship between this
and other books in the library that is reflective of the re-
lationships between their contents. In terms of our analogy
to a cognitive structure, a particular class, or subclass,
in the library classification system would be the analog of
a particular category, or sub-category, in the individual's
cognitive structure. Distinct from the process of assigning
a book to a class or subclass, is the process of cataloging
a book. This involves the identification of key attributes
of the book (e.g., the topics dealt with by the book, its
author or editor, its title) and the use of these attri-
butes to indicate (through cards in the catalog) the various
65
access routes an individual can use to locate the book.
For example, it might be possible that a book on erotic
Japanesepainting of the 18th Century written by Ino Mishiko
might be found by an individual looking in the catalog under
art, under painting, under eroticism, under Japan - art,
under the title, or under the author’s name. In terms of our
analog)
,
these different aspects of the book are the analogs
to the dimensions characterizing a stimulus in the environ-
ment. Just as the headings used in a catalog give an in-
dividual access to the classes or subclasses partially de-
fined by these headings (and hence access to the books con-
tained in them)
,
so dimensions give an individual access to
the cognitive categories defined, or partially defined, by
these dimensions (and hence access to the elements of in-
formation the categories contain). In this way, it can be
seen that what Bruner calls the "accessibility” of a cate-
gory can be raised by the individual’s noting one of its
defining dimensions in the environment. For example, if
the dimension "round" is a salient characteristic or
dimension of the environment at a particular moment, cate-
gories partially defined by the dimension "roundness"
will be made more accessible.
The reverse of this relationship between category accessi-
bility and the salience of particular dimensions is also
likely to be true. That is, given that a particular category
has a high accessibility, it is likely the dimensions which
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define that category will be more salient aspects of the
environment for the individual than dimensions not defining
the highly accessible category. An example from our library
analogy would be the case of a student who has been studying
works m the class "erotic Japanese art of the 18th Century"
beginning to note Japanese influences in European art.
This library analogy is valid for characterizing
compi ehensiveness also. Comprehensiveness indicates the
number of classes, or categories, into which a book, or a
stimulus, can be placed. Thus, a college library using the
Dewey Decimal System has ten such classes in its classification
system while an art library using the Dewey system would have
only one class. The college library is much more compre-
hensive than the art library in terms of classification
structure. The implication of this structural difference
is that the college library has a much broader range of
receptivity to information than has the art library. The art
library is receptive only to material which belongs in the
class "art" and rejects information which belongs in the
other nine classes of the Dewey Decimal System. The analo-
gous relationship between the comprehensiveness of an
individual's cognitive structure and the range of recep-
tivity to information he is able to adopt is discussed in the
next Chapter.
Differentiation of a cognitive structure, as mentioned
earlier, is indicated by the number of dimensions available
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for evaluating information encountered in the environment.
In Figure 3.2 four dimensions are available for defining
the categories "ball" and "game ball" and for evaluating whether
or not objects encountered in the environment fit these cog-
nitive categories. In Figure 3.3, a pictoral representation
of these same two categories defined by the overlapping of
only two dimensions, size and roundness, is presented. The
cognitive structure" of Figure 3.2 is therefore character-
ized by a higher degree of differentiation than is the
"cognitive structure" of Figure 3.3. The implications of
this structural difference becomes apparent when the objects
included in the category "game ball" shown in Figure 3.2 are
compared with the objects included in that same category shown
•in Figure 3.3. Because of the increased differentiation of
the "cognitive structure" of Figure 3.2, it excluded from the
category "game ball" two of the objects (medicine ball and
cotton ball) included in this category in the "cognitive
structure" of Figure 3.3.
Returning to the analogy between libraries and cog-
nitive structures, a more complex picture of structural
differentiation can be presented. A small high school
library might subdivide its classification for art into the
subclasses "painting", "sculpture", "architecture", and
"crafts". In the subclass "painting" might be placed in
alphabetical order such diverse works as a catalog of
works by Rembrandt, a book titled Great Paintings of the
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A pictoral representation of the categories "Ball" (large circle)
and "Game Ball" (smaller circle) defined by only two dimensions:
size and roundness. Shown "located" in this two-dimensioned






a book on how to paint with water colors, and a
book called Renaissance Painters and Paintings
. An art
library, on the other hand, would subdivide its classifica-
tion for art into far more specific classes and subclasses.
The category "painting", for example, might be further sub-
divided into categories by medium (e.g., watercolor, oil,
tempera, etc.), each of these into categories indicating
geographical areas (e.g., France, China, Mexico, etc.) and
>
each of these, in turn, into categories denoting historical
period. A book on French watercolor painting in the 19th
Century, then, would have its place in a specific class -
a class quite distinct from those containing books about
19th Century o il painting in France, from those containing
books about 19th Century Japanese watercolor painting, or
from those containing books about 20th Century French water-
color painting. In contrast, the much less -di f ferentiated
classification structure of the high school library would
place books on these subjects all in the same undifferentiated
class "painting". The essential difference between the two
types of library classification systems is the number of
dimensions each uses for evaluating information about art.
The high school library uses only one dimension - art form
(i.e., painting, sculpture, crafts) - while the art library
uses several dimensions just to define the category painting
and its many subclasses. The implication of this structural
difference is that the art library will be far more discrim-
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mating than the high school library in evaluating the mate-
rials it acquires for its collection. An analogous differ-
ence between the differentiation of two individual's cog-
nitive structures would have the effect of making one of the
individuals much more discriminating in his evaluation of
stimuli from the environment.
The third major characteristic of cognitive structure
with which we will be concerned is integration. The degree
of integration of a cognitive structure indicates the inter-
relatedness of the different categories making up the
structure. Ausubel and Bruner seem to have stressed inter-
relationships of a hierarchical nature such as that depicted
in Figure 3.4 which is a representation of the Dewey Decimal
System's treatment of the classes "sociology", "social
psychology", "groups", and "small groups". Each of these
classes is related to the next more general class by
virtue of its being completely subsumed by it.^ This
hierarchical form of organization does not result in a very
high degree of integration because categories are related to
one another only within vertically connected groups.
^Credit for the library analogies is due to a very
helpful librarian in the Cataloging Department of Frost
Library at Amherst College.
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FIGURE 3.4
A representation of the hierarchical organization of four
classes within the Dewey Decimal System. Integration be-
tween the c sses is limited to vertical interrelation-
ships
.
A more complex, and significant, way in which cate-
gories within a cognitive structure can be interrelated
becomes apparent when it is recalled that categories are
defined by the overlapping of dimensions. This makes possible
horizontal, as well as vertical, relationships between cog-
nitive categories. For example, the category "game ball" is
related to the category "ball" in a hierachical fashion by
virtue of possessing the same defining dimensions. But the
categories "coconut" and "tomatoes" can be related to the
category "game ball" without any hierarchical relationship
connecting them. The three categories are related by their
having in common the dimension "roundness". With common
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defining dimensions as the basis for relationships between
cognitive categories it becomes feasible for a cognitive
structure to be characterized by very complex and subtle
relationships between categories. The more this is the
case m an individual's cognitive structure, the greater
its degree of integration. The implication of this is that
such diverse categories as "ecology," "endocrinology," and
organizational change," which may be regarded as unrelated
by an individual whose cognitive structure has a low level
of integration, will, in the cognitive structure that is
highly integrated, be related by the dimensions: "structural
differentiation," "specialization of sub-parts," "interde-
pendence of sub-parts," and "control of change," The con-
sequence of this higher level of integration is that relation-
ships between cognitive categories will create new dimensions
which the individual can use for evaluating environmental
stimuli. For example, the relationship between the cate-
gories just mentioned may result in the individual's genera-
ting the new dimension "degree of dynamic equilibrium."
This example also calls attention to another important
point. This is the interrelationship between the three
characteristics of cognitive structures we have been discussing.
First, the greater the degree of differentiation of a cog-
nitive structure, the greater the potential for high levels
of integration. This relationship follows from the fact that
common dimensions are the basis of interrelationships between
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categories and the more dimensions defining each category,
the more dimensions are likely to be common to large numbers
of other categories. Second, the greater the integration of
a cognitive structure, the greater the potential for high
levels of differentiation since it is integration which leads
to the generation of new dimensions and hence to greater
differentiation. The primary purpose at this point is to
characterize the three structural characteristics. Having
done so, we will leave a more detailed discussion of their




Up to this point we have been concerned with the
individual differences (specifically, differences having to
do with the organization of cognitive structure) which may
influence the patterns of receptivity to information adopted
by individuals. However, it was noted at the beginning of
this chapter that a better understanding of the functioning
of the basic antinomy identified by Jones and Gerard (see pp.
27-46) might be obtained by expanding their notion to in-
clude a consideration of important character is tics of the
environmental situation which might also influence the
functioning of the basic antinomy and hence the patterns of
receptivity individuals will adopt.
We begin this expansion of the notions of Jones and
Gerard and Rokeach by returning briefly to Bruner's hypotheses
74
regarding category accessibility (see pp. 48-50). Bruner
(1957) suggests that an individual may be more receptive at
a given time to information falling into certain categories
or be more likely to perceive a given stimulus as belonging
to one category rather than to another. This difference
between categories Bruner calls category accessibility to
indicate the accessibility or receptivity of a particular
category to information at a given moment. Building on this
notion, we can redefine the openness shown by an individual
as being the number, or range, of his cognitive categories
having high accessibility at a given moment. When faced
with information in a problem situation, the more open
person would have a broad range of categories available (i.e.,
categories with high accessibility) for classifying the
different items of information in the environment. In con-
trast, a more closed person may at that moment have only a
limited number of categories with high accessibility for
classifying information from the environment. In effect,
his receptivity to information is narrowed down, or focused,
in such a way that he will receive only information fitting
a small number of categories. As a result, he would be re-
ceptive to a much smaller proportion of the total informa-
tion available than the open person, and he would either
exclude the information which is not readily classifiable
in his high-accessibility categories or be forced to distort
the information in such a way that it would fit into these
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few categories.
An important consequence of redefining the openness-
closedness dimension in terms of the breadth or narrowness
of the information spectrum covered by categories with high
accessibility is that it removes the negative and disfunction-
al connotations of being "closed" that are attached to that
term by Rokeach and others. Being closed no longer has to
mean that a person is unreceptive to information because it
does not agree wtih his view of the world (the definition
given the term by Rokeach and Jones and Gerard)
; now being
closed can also be interpreted more generally to mean that
the individual has focused his attention (for whatever good
or bad, conscious or unconscious, reasons) on a limited,
rather than broad number of categories of information.^
We are taken a step further in our expansion of the
notion of openness-closedness into a notion of receptivity-
It should be noted here, perhaps, that this re-
definition of the openness -closedness dimension does not
preclude an individual's being considered closed-minded in
the sense that Rokeach uses the term. If an individual has
only a narrow range of categories with high accessibility at
a particular time, it could be that the narrowness is based
on the desireability of focusing on information relevant to
a specific problem; or, it could be that the narrowness is
based on purely attitudinal criteria. In the latter case, all
information of a counter-attitudinal nature could be excluded
because the individual has low accessibility in those
categories of his cognitive structure that pertain to matters
contradicting his beliefs. Such a receptivity pattern would
indicate that the individual is closed-minded. This issue
will be discussed in more detail in Chapter IV with regard
to the domination of receptivity patterns by particular types
of category accessibility rules.
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adaptability by some comments made by Ausubel. He introduces
the idea that a discussion of individual differences in cog-
nitive structures should include a concern with the relation-
ship between an individual’s structure and the characteristics
of the situation in which he finds himself. It is in the
context of discussing factors which influence meaningful
reception learning that Ausubel identifies three variables
of cognitive structure (Ausubel, 1963, pp . 28-29):
1. . . .the availability in cognitive organi-
zation of relevant subsuming concepts at an
appropriate level of inclusiveness to pro-
vide optimal anchorage" for the information
received from the environment;
2. the extent to which the information is dis-
criminable from the "established conceptual
systems that subsume it;" and
3. the stability and clarity of the subsuming
traces in the cognitive structure.
Here Ausubel is actually defining variables of cognitive
structure in terms of the appropriateness of the structure
to the information being encountered by the individual. In
speaking of "relevant subsuming concepts," "appropriate
level of inclusiveness," discriminability of the information
from the "established conceptual systems," etc. Ausubel is
implying that changes in either the cognitive structure or
in the information in the environment could modify the
appropriateness of the cognitive structure to the situation
facing the individual. If this reasoning is extended, it is
apparent that any static cognitive structure could not be
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appropriate to all, or even a majority, of the varied
circumstances an individual will encounter. To maintain
appropriateness in a variety of problem situations, the
individual’s cognitive structure should be capable of change,
i.e. cognitive restructuring. Along these lines, Piaget
speaks of conceptual schemata having "scope [s] of application"
(Piaget, 1950, p. 120) and of their having mobility or the
ability to adapt themselves to new situations (Piaget,
1950, pp. 142-143). This notion of adaptability to differing
situational characteristics leads us to the second aspect
of our expansion of the open-closed dimension into the notion
of a receptivity-adaptability profile.
Just as it is unlikely that a single, static cog-
nitive structure could be expected to suit all circumstances,
so it is equally unlikely that a single pattern of receptivity
to information could be expected to suit a wide variety of
circumstances. Therefore, rather than thinking in terms of
an individual's having a certain degree of openness to in-
formation (i.e., having a certain range of categories with
high accessibility)
,
it is more fruitful to think in terms
of the adaptability of the individual's receptivity. Is lie
capable of adopting a broad range of receptivity when the
situation requires it and then switching to a narrower,
focused pattern of receptivity when changes in the situation
call for it? Cast in these terms, receptivity patterns take
on a dynamic character rather than the static character
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-decision character ascribed to recep-
tivity m the Jones and Gerard concept of the basic antinomy's
functioning. Characterizing an individual's receptivity to in-
formation now can be seen to involve much more than whether he
is open or closed at a given instant. An appropriate description
of an individual's receptivity must include:
1. a determination of what particular
patterns of receptivity are most
appropriate to the variety of sit-
uations the individual encounters
in his environment;
2. a determination of the extent of the
match between the patterns of recepti-
vity adopted by the individual and the
patterns of receptivity called for by
the situations he encounters; and
3. a determination of the situational
factors which are affecting the types
of receptivity patterns the indivi-
dual will adopt.
In determining the pattern of receptivity called for by
a particular situation or in characterizing the pattern of
receptivity adopted by an individual, it is necessary to examine
two crucial elements of the receptivity pattern. The first
is the scope o'f receptivity, broad vs. focused, indicated by
the range of different categories in the individual's cog-
nitive structure which have high category accessibility. We
have discussed this aspect of receptivity patterns previously.
1
The second element of receptivity patterns which must
bo examined is the rule, or rules, being applied by the in
dividual to govern which categories will have high uccessi
bility (i.e. ho most open to information from the environ-
ment). There are at least four typos of category access!-
bility rules which can be identified. These are:
1 • Co n font
- Or i on t a t i on rules which
uc t e rin 1 n*e th a t a 1 1 categories
having to do with a particular
subject or aspoct of the environ-
ment will have high category
accessibility. The inverse of
this type of rule would determine
that, all categories having to do
with a particular subject or aspect
of t. he environment will have very
low category accessibility.
2* Pr occss-Or.icntat i on rules which
determine that all categories having
to do with taking a particular approach
or set of approaches to the situation
will .have high category accessibility
(or in the case of t lie inverse, low
category accessibility).
3. Sour c e
- Or i en t a t i on rules which deter-
111 i nr 1 fi;i l ;i I I i ;i I rj-or i c s ha v i ng l o
do with information emitted by a
particular source or sources (c.g.,
an expert, authority figure, or
grantor of rewards) will have high
category accessibility (or in the
case of the rule's inverse, low
category accessibility).
4 . A 1 1 i t u d
i
n al - or Belief -
V
alencc rules
which determine that a D. categories
having a particular valence (i.e.,
pro-attitudinal or counter- attitudi-
nal valence) will have high category
accessibility (or in the case of the
rule's inverse, low category accessi-
bility) .
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In addition to these four rules, two other cases
influencing category accessibility should be mentioned. One
is the possibility that category accessibility may appear to
be completely random with no particular category accessibility
rules being applied to govern the individual’s pattern of
receptivity. The other possibility is that whatever rule or
rules are governing category accessibility will be superseded
by characteristics of the information in the situation such
as the novelty or the intensity of a particular stimulus.
For example, three men in an apple orchard discussing apples
may be functioning under a content-orientation rule to the
effect that only categories having to do with apples will
have high category accessibility. If there is suddenly a
loud lion's roar behind them, it is likely that the "apples
only content-orientation rule will be superseded by a rule
resulting in high category accessibility for those categories
having to do with lions, modes of escape available in an
apple orchard, the consequences of being eaten by a large
hungry carnivore, etc.
Possessed of the ability to describe patterns of recep-
tivity to information in terms of the two elements just dis-
cussed, i.e., the scope of categories with high accessibility
and the rules governing category accessibility, it becomes
feasible to identify the pattern of receptivity required by
a particular situation and to compare that with the pattern
of receptivity adopted by a particular individual in that
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situation. If it were possible to create a number of problem-
solving situations each of which requires a different pattern
of receptivity, place an individual in each of these situa-
tions in turn, and then compare the patterns of receptivity
adopted by the individual with those required by the situa-
tions, we would have a rough profile of the individual's
ability to adjust his receptivity patterns to fit varying
situations. However, such a profile of the individual's
receptivity-adaptability would have little or no generali-
zability beyond the specific situations in which the indi-
vidual s receptivity-adaptability has been observed. To achieve
an R-A profile of an individual that does have some measure
of generalizability
,
it is necessary to add another facet to
the profile.
This additional facet is a concern with the situational
variables that are having an influence on the individual in
terms of the receptivity patterns he adopts. There are a large
number of such situational characteristics which could be
used for measuring the differences between problem-solving
situations, but for purposes of manageability and for concep-
tual reasons discussed in Chapter IV, we will place all these
situational characteristics into two categories and treat them
as only two variables. The situational characteristics will
be classified into those influencing the arousal level of the
individual, and into those influencing the complexity of the
potential information input to the individual. Factors con-
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tributing to arousal of the individual would include time
restraints, physical conditions, reward and punishment con-
tingencies, the individual's involvement or interest in the
situation, the individual's committment to influencing the
situation, etc. Factors contributing to the complexity of
information input to the individual would include the change-
ability of the information, the number of sources emitting
information, the novelty of the information, the intricacy of
the relationships among elements of information, the size of
the information load (i.e., the number of elements of infor-
mation which are crucial, must be generated by the individual,
must be rejected, etc.), etc. Rather than constructing an
individual's receptivity- adaptability (R-A) profile from his
information-processing behavior in randomly varied situations,
attention to arousal factors and complexity factors permits
the construction of R-A profiles for an individual under
given sets of circumstances, e.g., high arousal-high complex-
ity, high arousal-low complexity, low arousal-high complexity,
and low arousal-low complexity. Such an R-A profile would
permit generalizations to be made about the patterns of
receptivity an individual is likely to adopt in the presence
of given levels of the two situational variables, arousal and
complexity
.
The first step in constructing such an R-A profile for
an individual would be to construct a typology of problem-
solving situations that vary (a) with respect to the patterns
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of receptivity most appropriate to them and (b) with respect
to their situational characteristics. Thus each situation
could be rated in terms of the presence of factors contri-
buting to an individual's arousal level, in terms of the pre-
sence of factors contributing to information complexity, in
terms of the scope of receptivity most appropriate to it,
and in terms of the category accessibility rule(s) most
appropriate to it.
Having rated the situations in the typology in the
manner just described, the next step in constructing an in-
dividual's R-A profile would be to observe what patterns of
receptivity the individual actually adopts in each situation
included in the typology. His patterns of receptivity would
then be compared with the appropriate receptivity patterns to
determine the extent of the match between the two sets of
receptivity patterns. The final step would then be to ex-
amine the relationships between the levels of the two situa-
tional variables (arousal and complexity) and the two re-
ceptivity variables (scope of receptivity and category accessi-
bility rule dominance). Such an analysis would indicate what
pattern of receptivity the individual would be likely to
adopt under various situational circumstances.
A concrete example may be helpful in understanding the
concepts we have been discussing in abstract terms. We will
use the example of a single play in a football game as the
situation and the quarterback as the example of the individual
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whose pattern of receptivity we are interested in. First we
look at the situational factors which determine the levels
of the two situational variables, arousal and complexity.
Contributing to arousal is a time limitation
- there are only
twenty seconds left in the game. Also contributing to arousal
are the reward contingencies of the situation - it is the
third- down
-and
-goal from the nine-yard- line
,
with the team
behind 12-7 in the Super Bowl. The winners get fame and
glory, the satisfaction of being the best team, $32,000 per
player in winner's shares, and untold fortunes from product
endorsements. Also contributing to arousal is uncertainty 6 -
the opponent's pass and rush defenses have been equally
effective. A pass is more likely to gain the long yardage
needed, but an interception, dropped pass, or fully- covered
receivers are all possible obstacles to the success of a
pass-play. A run is safe from any interception, but a fumble
is possible and wide runs have not been effective against the
opponent's defense while runs up the middle have been averaging
only five yards per carry. All of these factors add up to a
relatively tense situation which we would label "high arousal."
The situation is also characterized by factors contri-
buting to high information input complexity. The information
available to the quarterback is highly changeable because the
opponents change their defensive formations several times
^The relationship between uncertainty and arousal
is discussed at length in Chapter IV.
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while the quarterback is in the huddle and after he has begun
calling his signals at the line of scrimmage. Information
complexity is also increased by the high information load,
primarily in terms of information which must be rejected by
the quarterback. This includes the sound of jet planes over-
head, sirens and other traffic noise in the streets outside
the stadium, thoughts of the weekend he spent in New York
with last month's Pl ayboy "Playmate," and remembrances of the
sensation he had two plays ago when he was "sacked" by two
300-pound linemen. There are also the perspicacious comments
from spectators yelling for a pass to wide-receiver "Lean
Louie" Lowenthal, a run by "Slippery Sam" Salvatorre, and the
talk in the huddle about the results of the Redskins' attempt
at a double-reverse suggested by the President in a similar,
crucial third-down situation.
Further complicating the information input is the
inconsistent relationship between the intensity of different
elements of information and their potential importance to
helping the quarterback choose the correct solution to the
problem facing him. The linebackers' obvious feints toward
the line of scrimmage may be revealing a blitz or only be
fakes, while their true intentions may or may not be reflected
by their barely noticeable glances toward the receivers they
would normally cover. The situation qualifies as a high
arousal-high complexity situation.
With regard to the pattern of receptivity appropriate
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to the situation it is apparent that the quarterback should
have a focused, rather than broad, scope of receptivity.
The categories with high receptivity should be limited to
those having to do with information about the game itself,
more specifically, those categories having to do with the
probable actions of the defense, the whereabouts of open
receivers, the timing of the snap from center, etc. The most
appropriate pattern of receptivity would be dominated by
content-orientation and source-orientation rules intended to
include specific information, e.g. rules to the effect that
only categories having to do with the immediate play situa-
tion will have high accessibility/’ or "only categories
having to do with information emanating from the coaching
staff (not spectators or politicians) will have high category
accessibility." Process-orientation rules, e.g., "only
categories having to do with a passing approach will have
high category accessibility," and attitude -valence rules, e.g.,
"all categories having to do with information which contra-
dicts my opinion will have low accessibility," would both be
inappropriate types of rules for this situation. All situa-
tions could be examined and rated in a similar fashion.
Through such a procedure, individuals could be characterized,
for example, as exhibiting appropriately broad scopes of
receptivity under conditions of low arousal and moderate
complexity, and to adopt receptivity patterns dominated by
source - or ientation and attitude -valence rules when arousal
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reaches moderate levels.
In abstract terms, at least, we have moved from the
limited notions of the open and closed minds of Rokeach and
the Jones and Gerard basic antinomy to the concept of a
receptivity-adaptability profile that allows us to character-
ize the functional adaptability of a person’s receptivity
over time and across varying circumstances. Such a means
of characterizing an individual’s receptivity would have
important uses in predicting performance in various roles,
performance under different conditions, etc., but our concern
here lies in another direction. For us the importance of
having a means of characterizing an individual's receptivity-
adaptability is its usefulness as a tool for investigating
factors which give rise to individual differences in re-
ceptivity-adaptability. Assuming that individuals must have
adequate receptivity-adaptability if they, and their society,
are to cope with the problems resulting from the socio-
his tor ical conditions outlined in Chapter I, it becomes
crucial that educators be able to maximize the likelihood
of each individual's attaining a minimal ability to adopt
and maintain appropriate patterns of receptivity in changing
circumstances. If the search for these factors is to be
productive, it must be guided by a conceptual framework which
proposes an explanation of the dynamics which underlie
differences in receptivity-adaptability. It is the task of




In the last chapter we developed the notion of a re-
ceptivity-adaptability profile as a more useful way of
looking at an individual's receptivity to information than
the open-v_s
-closed concept of receptivity put forward by
Rokoach and the basic antinomy notion developed by Jones and
Gerard. We also suggested that the patterns of receptivity
exhibited by an individual under different circumstances
reflect underlying characteristics of that individual's
cognitive structure. In describing the characteristics of
cognitive structures - for example their being made up of
cognitive categories whose interrelationships reflect the
interrelationships of environmental phenomena, their being
characterized by different degrees of comprehensiveness,
differentiation, and integration, and also their being charac-
terized by some categories having higher accessibility to
environmental stimuli than others - we portrayed the cog-
nitive structure in a relatively static state. This is in
contrast to our contention that receptivity should be looked
upon as a dynamic process rather than as a static state.
Therefore, we have reached a point where it is appropriate
to discuss the dynamic properties of cognitive structures
and their influence upon the dynamic process of receptivity,
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or, as we have labelled it, receptivity-adaptability.
Dynamic Views of Cognitive Structure
Several of the theorists discussed in the last chapter
have devoted some of their thinking and writing to the prob-
lem of how an individual's cognitive structure develops and
changes. Ausubel (1963) believes that growth of the cognitive
structure can result from the systematic exposure of the in-
dividual to pioperly organized information. The information
must be presented in a sequence that first provides a general
framework of subsuming categories ("traces" in Ausubel '
s
terminology) which is firmly anchored to existing categories
in the structure by careful efforts to highlight the logical
connections between the new categories and the stable, al-
ready present ones. Subsequently, information is presented
which differentiates the newly acquired framework of cate-
gories into more and more discrete sub - categories
. This
process of anchoring "advance organizers" to stable parts
of the cognitive structure and then supplying more detailed
information to form sub-categories constitutes Ausubel's
conception of meaningful verbal learning.
Bruner, who, as an advocate of "discovery learning,"
has disputed Ausubel's contention that cognitive growth will
result merely from the presentation of carefully organized
information, emphasizes the necessity of some motive force
being present before cognitive growth will take place.
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Bruner (Bruner etaL, 1966, pp. 11-29) argues that this
motive force derives from an individual's experiencing a
conflict between his cognitive representation of the world
and the appearance" of the world. Bruner interprets this
conflict as being a conflict between representational modes
used by the individual in constructing a model of reality.
Thus the individual's symbolic representation of the world
may be contradicted by events perceived in the environment
that are consistent with his "ilconic" or "enactive" repre-
sentations of reality. This conflict is resolved when the
individual reorganizes his cognitive representation in such
a way that the new relationships between symbolic categories
reflect more accurately the relat ionships between environ-
mental phenomena.
Harvey, Hunt, and Schroder (1961, pp . 85-112) propose
a stage theory of cognitive development (their term is
"conceptual development") which has the individual's cog-
nitive structure passing through four stages en route
from a concrete structure to an abstract structure. 1 The
progression through the four stages is hypothesized to re-
sult from a Hegelian process of conflict between "antithe-
tical poles or opposites in development" followed by their
1The concrete- abstract dimension of a structure is
a measure of its dependence upon the "physical attributes
of the activating stimulus" (Harvey, Hunt, and Schroder,
1961, p. 3).
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integration and the subsequent emergence of two new anti-
thetical poles. The poles, in pairs of A-B, C-D, and E-F,
represent variations of the two opposities, dependence and
independence. Harvey, Hunt, and Schroder support their
belief m the likelihood of such a process by noting several
points
:
1. The discrimination of extreme oppo-
sites can be made more easily than
the discrimination between less differ-
ent stimuli. Once these opposite poles
have been discriminated, the person is
in a position to make finer and more
difficult discriminations. The refer-
ence points placed around the extreme
limits of a given conceptual system
(that is, the two poles) therefore
serve as anchorages for making finer
discriminations with the "gap".
2. Interpretations based on opposite poles
are more easily integrated than differ-
entiations based on concepts that have
no necessary relationship to each other.
That is, black and white are opposites,
but they are also both colors. There-
fore the very opposition of the two
poles on the same dimension facilitates
integration whereas the integration of
differentiations based on unrelated
anchors would be more difficult.
3. If the person can differentiate such
opposing poles and integrate them, such
a process represents the "optimal"
developmental leap because the emerging
conceptual system would have the charac-
teristics of maximal abstractness re-
lative to the poles of the original
concept on which it was based.
The facilitating effects of "opposites"
upon progression may be viewed in another
way. Progression is facilitated under
conditions of clarity of the initial
concept, openness of the developing
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concept to discrepant (parti-
cularly opposing) events, and
the successful integration of
these two systems of mapping
into a new conceptual schema.
This view of the process of
development is one of emerging
concepts. When training condi-
tions favor the generation of
discrepant conceptual orderings
(opposing poles) a new synthesis
can emerge if the opposing or
discrepant differentiations can
be integrated. The new synthesis
contains modified aspects of the
two initially discrepant poles.
When a new synthesis emerges, it
in turn serves as a baseline for
the possible generation of new
discrepant differentiations and
the development of new syntheses.
Piaget's theory of cognitive development also proposes
that cognitive growth takes place in stages, moving from a
sensorimotor period to a preoperational period, to a concrete
operational stage, and finally, to the stage of formal opera-
tions. But the stages Piaget identifies are less important
to our concern with the relation between cognitive develop-
ment and receptivity-adaptability than are his concepts of
equilibrium and equilibration.
Piaget (1957) views the interaction between the in-
dividual and the environment in terms of a balanced vacillation
between the two processes of assimilation and accomodation .
Assimilation is the process of the individual's cognitive
structure (schema's in Piagetian terminology) taking in
environmental stimuli and organizing it in accordance with
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the model of reality implicit in the cognitive structure.
Accommodation is the process of the individual's cognitive
structure undergoing changes or reorganizations to make it
more congruent with perceived reality. When the cognitive
structure has achieved a balance between assimilation and
accommodation, Piaget considers it to be in a state of
equilibrium. According to Ginsburg and Opper (1969, p. 172),
"When in equilibrium the cognitive system need not distort
events to assimilate them; nor need it change very much to
accommodate to new events. Equilibrium then, involves
activity, openness, and a state of relative harmony with the
environment .
"
But the process by which cognitive structures achieve
higher and higher levels of equilibrium is the process Piaget
calls equilibration
. Piaget theorizes that the equilibrium
of a structure is upset when the individual encounters novel
information in the environment which cannot be assimilated
by his cognitive structure. However, if this disturbance
of the equilibrium of the structure results from a condition
of "moderate novelty," the cognitive structure accommodates
to the new information and thereby undergoes development
which results in re-establishment of equilibrium at a higher
level. Piaget characterizes the condition ofmoderatc novelty"
as existing whenever the incongruity between perceived reality
and an individual’s cognitive structure is large enough that
the structure cannot assimilate the new information yet the
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incongruity is small enough that a reasonably small change in
the structure will result in the accommodation of the structure
to this new perception of the environment. Piaget maintains
that the individual seeks out aspects of the environment that
are "moderately novel" because he becomes habituated or sati-
ated with familiar stimuli (not sufficiently incongruous) yet
also remains unattracted to radically novel stimuli because
they do not correspond to anything in his cognitive structure
(Piaget, 1952, p. 68). Thus, only if there are sufficient
opportunities for the individual to encounter moderate novelty
will the process of equilibration, or cognitive growth, be
a consequence.
Berlyne, who has studied with Piaget and his co-
workers in Switzerland, regards himself as an S-R psychologist
rather than a cognitivist, and argues that cognitive behavior
must be explained in terms of S-R associations. Berlyne
recognizes the likely existence of internal stimuli and re-
sponses which constitute mediating processes between environ-
mental stimuli and overt behavior much as cognitivists argue
that the components of a cognitive structure mediate between
the environment and the individual's behavior. However,
Berlyne insists that these "internal responses" operate in
accordance with the same laws of behavior governing overt
responses (1965, pp. 14-19). He has gone on to explore the
effects of what he labels "conceptual conflict" upon human
behavior and, in so doing, has translated many important
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Piagetian notions into the language of the S-R psychologist.
He has also developed and investigated a theory of "directed
thinking" ("thinking whose function is to convey us to the
solutions of a problem" (Berlyne, 1965, p. 19)) that is
based on Maltzman's extension of Hull's notion that response-
chaining leads to the formation of compound habit-family
hierarchies. Berlyne contends that the combining of these
habit-families into what he terms "Transitive-Group" and
Tree - Structure" Habit-Family Hierarchies forms the mediating
structure which directs an individual's thinking and purpose-
ful interactions with the environment. In constructing this
theory, Berlyne touches upon many issues that are critically
related to our conceptualization of the development of an
individual's R-A profile. For this reason it is worth
sketching the outlines of his theory of structure and direction
in thinking.
Berlyne (1965) begins by arguing that thinking evolved
as a consequence of its contribution to biological adaptation.
His argument is cast in the terminology of information theory
with the problem of the organism's functioning effectively
in his environment being conceived of as a problem of
matching his actual response to the optimal response. Pre-
sumably the organism must choose one of a number of possible
alternative responses in any given stimulus situation, and,
Berlyne contends, will seek information which will reduce
the uncertainty as to which of the possible actual responses
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matches most closely the optimal response. Because the in-
formation from the external stimulus situation is often
insufficient to reduce this uncertainty, a human will rely
on learning and thinking to supplant the information avail-
able from the environment. When repeated encounters with
similar stimulus situations occur, the individual acquires
a set of alternative response-chains to each stimulus situa-
tion. For each situation these response-chains are grouped
into what Maltzman calls compound habit-family hierarchies
with the placement of any habit-family of responses within
the hierarchy dependent upon the generalized reinforcement
which that set of responses has received in the past. Thus,
if one habit-family of responses has resulted in the indivi-
dual's making an actual response that matches the optimal
response for that situation, that particular habit-family of
responses to that particular situation will be reinforced
and repetitions of this reinforcement will result in that
habit- family ' s having a higher reaction potential in that
stimulus situation (i.e., in its being higher in the habit-
family hierarchy) than other habit-families.
This structuring of the individual's responses is re-
flected in the receptivity patterns of the individual in
the form of his rejecting initially information (i.e.,
stimulus characteristics of the situation) which would serve
as stimuli to evoke responses that are low in the compound
habit-family hierarchies. On the other hand the individual
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Will tend to attend selectively to those stimulus aspects
of the situation which evoke the response patterns which are
high in the compound habit-family hierarchy. If we translate
this portion of Berlyne's theory into the language we used
m Chapter III to discuss receptivity-adaptability, the
result would be the statement that those categories of an
individual's cognitive structure which have been associated
with behavior that has been rewarded in a particular situation
will have higher category accessibility than those cate-
gories which have not been associated with rewarding behavior
sequences in that particular situation.
The portion of Berlyne's theory which is most pertinent
to our immediate concern with how cognitive structures de-
velop and change, is his discussion of the notion of concep -
conflict and its role in motivating directed thinking.
Berlyne (1960) believes that an individual will experience
conceptual conflict any time a stimulus situation elicits two
or more conflicting responses. This would presumably occur
(1) when the stimulus situation is sufficiently novel that
no response pattern has acquired a greater reaction po-
tential than any other, (2) when the situation is associated
with response patterns with equal reaction potential, or (3)
when the reaction potential of the previously-favored response
pattern has been reduced to a point equal to other response
patterns because enactment of the previously- favored response
pattern has failed to bring about the sought-after consequences.
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Berlyne believes that the individual experiencing concep-
tual conflict, or uncertainty (if we return to the informa-
tion theory terminology Berlyne uses interchageably with the
term conceptual conflict), will have a drive to reduce the
uncertainly by engaging in directed thinking which will
result in the response pattern which leads to the successful
outcome of the situation (i.e., by discovering the optimal
response). By engaging in directed thinking, the individual
provides himself with information not available in the
immediate stimulus situation which is causing the conceptual
conflict. He can then use this information to relieve the
conceptual conflict in one of four ways: (1) disequalization
of the reaction potentials of the conflicting responses; (2)
swamping the conflicting responses by the introduction of a
new response with a much higher reaction potential than all
of the conflicting responses; (3) conciliation of the con-
flicting responses by revealing that the conflicting symbol-
ic responses are not necessarily incompatible; and (4)
suppression of the "thoughts about conflict-ridden subject
matter or avoiding stimuli that tend to evoke such thoughts."
(Berlyne, 1960, p. 260)
Growth of the cognitive structure, or in the belief of
Berlyne, the development of new habit-family hierarchies,
results from the reduction of conceptual conflict when the
directed thinking engaged in by the individual leads to the
development of new "solution chains" of responses within a
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compound habit-family hierarchy. These solution chains can
be likened to paths leading from the stimulus situation
through a number of intermediate symbolic stimulus
-response
pairs, or "situational thoughts,” representing successive
changes in the state of the environment until the last situa-
tional thought represents the desired state of the environ-
ment. For example, a quarterback who finds himself on his
own 20 yard-line in a third-and-fifteen-yards- to-go stimulus
situation will construct a solution chain consisting of
symbolic representations of changes in the state of the game
which will end in the symbolic representation of the state of
the game which has one of his teammates having just scored
a touchdown. Connecting each of these situational thoughts
with the ones preceding and following it, will be what Berlyne
calls a "transformational thought," or symbolic stimulus-
response pair which represents the actions taken to transform
each stimulus situation into the one following it in the so-
lution chain. The football quarterback would thus link each
of his symbolic representations of the stages of the game
(between his standing behind the line of scrimmage at the
twenty yard-line and the scoring of the touchdown) with a
symbolic representation of the actions which would bring
about these developments, e.g. his completing a 63-yard pass
to the wide receiver. If the individual is rewarded by
success when he performs the overt responses contained in
the new solution chain, the reaction potential of this set
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of responses will be increased, thereby raising it within
the hierarchy of the compound habit - family
. When faced with
a similar stimulus situation, the individual will experience
less uncertainty or conceptual conflict because he has high
in his repertory of responses the new solution chain which
has successfully coped with past occurrences of this parti-
cular stimulus situation. Further growth will not take place
until the individual experiences conceptual conflict because
this newly acquired solution chain fails to cope with a stimu-
lus situation which has elicited it (i.e.
,
the sixty-yard
pass does not work in- the third-and- fifteen situation because
the opponents use double coverage on the wide receiver).
When such a solution chain fails to cope with the stimulus
situation and no other response chains in the compound habit-
family hierarchy are successful in coping with the situation,
a new solution chain containing a different set of situational
and transformational thoughts must then be constructed. In
constructing this new solution chain, the individual may give
new attention to elements of the stimulus situation which
were not previously noticed (e.g., pass coverage being used
by the opposing team)
.
In noting the role of conceptual conflict in directed
thinking (i.e., the development of new solution chains and
their combination into compound habit-family hierarchies),
Berlyne explicitly builds a link between his theory and those
of the cognit ivists
.
This link is his contention that directed
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thinking motivated by conceptual conflict is at the heart
of Piaget's concept of the role of moderate novelty in the
process of equilibration (Berlyne, 1965, pp. 273-275).
The Conceptual Framework
Incongrui ty, uncertainty, and arousal
. Berlyne and
Piaget have provided us with the two essential links between
the dynamics of cognitive structure and receptivity-adapta-
bility. The first link is the notion that uncertainty (i.e.,
conceptual conflict or moderate novelty) is the result of
an individual's perceiving a conflict between his cognitive
representation of the environment and the actual information
he is receiving from it or of an internal inconsistency with-
in his cognitive representation itself. The second link is
the notion that this uncertainty motivates the individual to
take some action to mitigate this conflict and thereby escape
from the condition of uncertainty. The three choices open
to the individual are; (1) to tolerate the state of uncertainty;
(2) to seek information from the environment, stored in his
cognitive structure, or generated by directed thinking which
will allow him to reconcile the conflict between his cog-
nitive structure and the information present in the situation
by making appropriate changes in his cognitive structure;
or (3) to avoid exposure to, ignore, or alter those elements
of information in the environment that are in conflict with
his cognitive structure. His choice of either of the last
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two alternatives will determine the pattern of receptivity
to information which the individual will adopt, and, we will
argue below, the characteristics of the individual’s cognitive
structure in combination with the characteristics of the stimu-
lus situation will determine which of the three means of
reducing uncertainty an individual will use.
In developing a conceptual framework to explain the
dynamics of receptivity- adaptability
,
we begin with the assump-
tion that all interactions between the individual and his
environment are mediated at their interface by the individual's
cognitive structure. This cognitive structure is the indi-
vidual's symbolic model of the environment and is built up
of numerous categories or concepts representing the ranges
of phenomena the individual has encountered in the environment.
The relationships between these categories reflect the in-
dividual's perceptions of the relationships between the phen-
omena which in the past have been present in his environment.
When the individual encounters a set of phenomena in the en-
vironment he arrives at an understanding of these phenomena
by sorting them into their appropriate categories in his
cognitive structure, or in the terminology of Piaget, he
assimilates them into his structure (presuming his structure
is comprehensive enough to include categories covering all
the perceived phenomena) . By assimilating the current elements
of the environment into his cognitive structure, or symbolic
model of the world, and presuming adequate integration and
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and differentiation of the structure, the individual is able
to discover the relationships between these phenomena and
between past and future phenomena. The individual is able to
discover these relationships because they already exist in
the structure of his cognitive representation of the world.
The categories into which the phenomena have been assimilated
will be related in particular ways to other categories in
his cognitive structure and these relationships between cate-
gories allow the individual to predict the existence of
similar relationships between elements of the environment.
For example, if the individual perceives a bimetallic bar
about to be placed over a flame, these phenomena will be
assimilated into categories having to do with flames, metals,
and methods of fastening strips of metal together. Having
assimilated this information into his cognitive structure,
the individual then takes note that the categories having to
do with metal have as one dimension their behavior in the
presence of heat and that this dimension relates it to the
categories having to do with flames. One relationship
between the categories "metal" and "flame" in the cognitive
structure is that metals expand when exposed to heat. If
his cognitive categories having to do wtih metals are ade-
quately differentiated, the individual will also note that
the rate of expansion is different for each of the two metals
fastened together to make the strip. Finally, the individual





-together” categories and the "flame”
and "metal” categories and realizes that the two strips of
metal will be held together in spite of the presence of heat
and in spite of the different rates of expansion of the two
metals. On the basis of these interrelationships between
the categories of his cognitive structure the individual
may be able to predict that the bimetallic strip, when ex-
posed to the flame, will bend in such a way that the faster
expanding metal strip is on the outside of the curving strip.
If an individual encounters phenomena in his environ-
ment which are incongruent with his cognitive structure -
that is, if the objects and events he perceives in the
environment do not conform to the representations and re-
lationships present in his cognitive structure - the indivi-
dual is no longer able to predict successfully the occurrences
of those phenomena in his environment. For example, if the
individual's categories having to do with metal and heat are
not adequately differentiated, the only relationship between
these categories which may exist in his cognitive structure
is that when heat is applied to metal, it first softens and
then liquifies. This individual would predict that the
bimetallic bar, when exposed to the flame, would soften and
bend down toward the floor. If he then observed that the
bar bends up toward the ceiling, apparently having softened
as expected, but unexpectedly defying the force of gravity,
the individual finds that his cognitive structure does not
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allow him to successfully predict environmental phenomena
having to do with metals exposed to heat. Such an individual
is thus placed in a state of uncertainty regarding the be-
havior of metals exposed to heat.
This state of uncertainty (or conceptual conflict in
the terminology of Berlyne) can be predicted to result in an
increase in the arousal level of an individual. An explana-
tion of this prediction requires a short digression and the
introduction of a concept developed by Harold Kelley and J.
IV. Thibaut (Thibaut and Kelley, 1959). In formulating their
model for explaining the behavior of individuals interacting
in groups, Thibaut and Kelley argue that an individual has
"a comparison level of outcomes'’ which is an indication of what
he regards as a minimally acceptable level of reward to be
received as the result of an interaction with other indivi-
dulas. The Comparison Level (CL) is the standard against which
an individual measures the outcomes (rewards or costs) of
any social interaction in which he takes part. His CL is
a sort of neutral point, or average outcome level to which
he has become habituated. Any level of outcomes above his
CL is relatively satisfying and any level of outcomes below
his CL is relatively unsatisfying. An individual’s Comparison
Level for alternatives, or CL . , is the outcome level he
can expect from the best alternative social interaction avail-
able to him. If given the opportunity, the individual will
take part in that particular social interaction which will




action having the highest CL,
alt
If we generalize the notions of CL ' s and CL , > s soalt 150
that they apply to any sequence of behavior, whether part of
a social interaction or not
- just any sequence of behavior
involving an interaction between an individual and the en-
vironment - we have a useful method of explaining the re-
lationship between arousal and uncertainty. The CL can then
be regarded as the general level of outcomes to which the
individual has become habituated in his interaction with the
environment or with which the individual is satisfied as a
result of these interactions. Thus, most of the habitual
behavior patterns he follows in interacting with the environ-
ment can be predicted by him to result in his receiving out-
comes roughly equal to his CL. If some occurrence in the
environment disrupts a habitual behavior pattern being en-
acted in pursuit of the usual level of outcomes, the indivi-
dual is no longer able to predict that he will achieve outcomes
at the CL level. This disruption of his habitual behavior
patterns, either by the failure of his responses to have
their usual effect on the environment or by obstacles standing
in the way of his enacting the response sequence composing the
habitual behavior pattern, thus results in the individual's
experiencing uncertainty regarding what the immediate out-
comes of his interactions with the environment will be.
If we presume (as Thibaut and Kelley do) that an individual
will always try to optimize the outcomes of his interactions
107
with the environment, or as Berlyne phrases it, always seek
to match his actual response with the optimal response in
any situation, then we can conclude that any uncertainty
regarding what level of outcomes he will receive will motivate
the individual to take actions that will restore his ability
to precidt the occurrence of environmental phenomena and thus
his ability to maximize the outcomes he receives as a result
of his interaction with the environment. This motivation con-
stitutes the arousal which results from a state of uncer-
tainty. ^
In our later discussion it is important to make dis-






arousal (anxiety) . Positive arousal could be expected to
result when the disruption of a habitual behavior pattern
opens up the possibility that enactment of a new behavior
sequence will result in higher outcomes than usual - that
is, when it is predictable that the CL of the new behavior
sequence will be higher than CL, positive arousal is likely.
An example might be a gourmet who usually eats his wife's
cooking and has come to expect a certain amount of pleasure
from these meals (i.e., the habitual behavior pattern of
eating his wife’s cooking results in predictable outcomes at
^For a concise review of the concept of arousal in
motivation theory, see Appley, 1970, pp. 489-492. For a
more complete treatment of the role of uncertainty in arousal,
seeBerlyne, 1960.
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the level of CL). If this usual eating pattern is disrupted
by an invitation to the home of a renowned chef from
Afghanistan, the gourmet can no longer predict the level of
outcomes he is likely to receive as a result of eating for
the first time a meal prepared by a famous Afghan chef.
Though never having eaten Afghan cooking, he believes it will
be better than the usual dinner his wife would prepare
(i.e., predicted CL
alt is higher than CL), and, therefore,
the gourmet experiences pleasurable excitement as a result
of his uncertainty regarding what the night's dinner will
be like.
Should an individual have reason to predict that the
outcome of the disruption of his usual pattern of behavior
will result in outcomes lower than those he expected from
the habitual behavior pattern (i.e., if the predicted CL
alt
is lower than his CL) the individual would experience negative
arousal, or anxiety, as a consequence of the uncertain state
in which he finds himself. For example, if our gourmet breaks
out in hives at the sight of lamb in any form and gets itchy
eyes when he has eaten anything containing goat's milk, and
there is a chance that the Afghan chef will make these two
foodstuffs the central ingredients of the evening repast,
our gourmet is likely to experience anxiety as a result of
his uncertainty regarding what the night's dinner will be
like. The actual level of arousal, whether the arousal is
pleasurable excitement or unpleasant anxiety, will increase
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as the predicted difference between the CL resulting
from the disruption and his CL increases. The better, or
worse, the gourmet believes the Afghan meal will be than
the one his wife would have prepared the higher the arousal
resulting from the uncertainty caused by disruption in his
usual dining behavior.
If the disruption in an individual's usual behavior
patterns results in uncertainty that the individual can pre-
dict will lead to outcomes either above or below his CL,
he/she is likely to experience arousal that is ambivalent
(i* e.
,
both negative and positive at the same time). An
example of a situation giving rise to this sort of arousal
would be a rookie race car driver entering a new car in an
important race. He can predict that his fast, new car will
help him to a victory and net him fame and fortune (i.e.,
outcomes very high above his CL) or, at the other extreme,
he can predict that the new car will lead to his taking a
corner too fast and having a fatal accident (i.e., a CL
alt
far below his CL). Given these conflicting predictions,
the rookie driver might experience ambivalent arousal.
The individual's predictions as to the direction and
amount of the difference between his CL and the CL made
alt
likely by the disruption of his habitual behavior patterns
are made on the basis of two sets of factors. The first set
of factors are the situational characteristics accompanying
the state of uncertainty. As mentioned in Chapter III
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(pp. 80 - 82 ) these were: time constraints upon behavior;
presences or absence of conditions causing physical discom-
fort; potential social, material, or physical rewards or
punishment contingencies, etc. These situational charac-
teristics will influence the individual's judgements regard-
ing the eventual outcomes of a particular situation and will
therefore influence the extent to which his being in a state
of uncertainty increases his level of arousal.
The second set of factors which will influence the in-
crease in arousal the individual will experience in a parti-
cular state of uncertainty are his combined past experiences
in coping with uncertainty. If the individual's past experi-
ences with uncertainty have largely been followed by reward-
ing outcomes (either because he successfully overcame the
uncertainty and was able to bring about rewarding outcomes
himself, or because the outcome of uncertainty was always
a "pleasant surprise") he is likely to experience a positive
arousal (excitement) and a higher level of arousal than an
individual who has not experienced anything of consequence
as the outcome of the uncertainties he has encountered. On
the other hand, if an individual's past experiences with un-
certainty have been followed most often by unpleasant occur-
rences, he is likely to experience a negative arousal (anxiety)
at a higher level than the individual who had not encountered
anything of importance subsequent to experiencing uncertainty.
These are, of course, polar cases. Most individuals' reactions
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to uncertainty would be geared more specifically to the
contexts of their own past experiences with uncertainty.
In the case of a certain person, for example, uncertainty
encountered at an amusement park may always result in pleasur-
able excitement whereas uncertainty encountered during a final
exam may always result in unpleasant anxiety.
C o_gn i t iv
e_
r_e s_t rue t u r i n g and the reduction of uncc r t a i n t
y
.
Given that the individual is motivated to a greater or lesser
degree to reduce the uncertainty resulting from the incon-
gruity between the environment and his cognitive structure,
the individual can, as mentioned earlier, (1) tolerate the
arousal level caused by the uncertainty, (2) seek information
which will help him reconcile the incongruency by making
changes in his cognitive structure, or (3) avoid those elements
of information in the environment which give rise to the in-
congruency. If we presume that the information in conflict
with the cognitive structure is of importance to the survival
and effective functioning of the individual, then the recom-
mended action is for the individual to reconcile the in-
congruency by making changes in his cognitive structure.
Making appropriate changes in the cognitive structure
requires that the individual seek information, either in the
environment or stored in the cognitive structure itself
which will: (1) identify the new dimensions which must be
added to his cognitive categories (i.e., increase differ-
entiation of his structure), (2) identify the way in which
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these new dimensions result in new relationships between
categories (i.e., increase the integration of his structure),
and/or (3) identify how these new dimensions should be combined
to form new categories (i.e., increase the comprehensiveness
of his structure). For example, the student who experiences
the incongruity between his cognitive structure and the en-
vironment when the bimetallic bar bends toward the ceiling
when heated may be sufficiently aroused by the resulting un-
certainty that he seeks information which will reconcile the
conflict. He may first seek to reconcile the incongruity
without attempting any change in cognitive structure by assum-
ing that he did not "see all there was to see" in the situa-
tion. By reexamining that portion of his cognitive structure
having to do wr ith metals he may remember that some metals
can be attracted by a magnet. "Aha! There must be a strong
magnet pulling on the end of the bar and causing it to turn
up when the heat softens the bar sufficiently." Having formed
this hypothesis the individual may reexamine the environment
in hopes of finding the strong magnet in the ceiling. Fail-
ing to do so, he may seek further information from his cog-
nitive structure. If the category "magnetism" retains high
category accessibility, the individual will be more receptive
to information fitting that category, e.g., magnets can also
repel magnetized metals. "Alia! The strong magnet is located
under the table below the tip of the bimetallic bar." When
investigation disproves this hypothesis, the individual may
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abandon all magnetism explanations (i.e., that category's
accessibility is decreased) and seek information in other
categories. If the puzzled student then sees someone move a
metal ball freely back and forth through a metal ring, then
heat the ball over the flame and be unsuccessful in making
the ball fit through the same ring, the student may again
give attention to the categories "heat" and "metal" and
perhaps grasp a new dimension which relates these two cat-
egories, namely, heat not only softens metal but makes it
expand. Further information-seeking might then be directed
toward investigation of this relationship, i.e., measuring
the lengths of strips of different metals before and after
heating them to see how much and how fast each one expands.
The investigation of this new relationship might then lead
to increased differentiation of his cognitive structure (i.e.
addition of more dimensions to categories having to do with
metals) with the eventual result that our curious student
finally realizes why the bimetallic strip behaves as it does
when exposed to heat. The points being illustrated are:
(1) that uncertainty can be reduced, and therefore arousal
mitigated, by the individual’s making changes in his cog-
nitive structure which make it a more accurate representation
of his environment, and (2) that this restructuring requires
information-seeking on the part of the individual.
If cognitive restructuring is the most advantageous
way of dealing with uncertainty, we would presume that all
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individuals would react to uncertainty by being open to new
information and by exhibiting a willingness to change the
beliefs contained in the present organization of their
cognitive structure. Such behavior is the epitome of the
open side of the Jones and Gerard basic antinomy (see pp.
26-44). But, as was stressed in our discussion of the support
for the existence and functionality of the closed side of the
basic antinomy, humans have a strong tendency toward being
closed to new and conflicting information and toward exhibiting
a desire to preserve their existing beliefs. We return again
to Rokeach's contention that belief-disbelief structures
perform two opposing functions: (1) to help the individual
know and understand the world and (2) to help the individual
ward off threatening aspects of the world. Neither Rokeach
or the consistency theorists offered an adequate explanation
of the sources of these two needs
,
but we have now reached a
point in our conceptual framework where we can offer such an
explanation.
The heart of this explanation lies in the relationship
between uncertainty and arousal. As noted above, a cogni-
tive structure enables an individual to predict the occurrence
of events in the environment. To the extent that the indi-
vidual can make successful predictions, he will be in a better
position to match his actual responses to the optimal re-
sponses, i.e., he will be able to behave in a manner which
maximizes the benefits and minimizes the punishments he
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receives from the environment. When the individual en-
counters uncertainty he experiences arousal (positive,
negative, or ambivalent). In an aroused state he is ready
to take action - action which gives him the best of the
alternative outcomes available. But such action is pre-
dicated on knowing and understanding the world. Hence the
need to know and understand the world has as its source the
arousal to action that is a consequence of uncertainty.
Carried to its extreme, the individual may even have as his
motivation to have an accurate cognitive representation of
the world the desire to take actions which place him in sit-
uations of uncertainty so that he can experience the conse-
quent positive or ambivalent arousal (excitement or thrill).
Should an individual find himself faced with uncertainty
that is causing him to experience negative arousal, but he
sees no possibility of taking actions that will bring his un^
certainty to a pleasant end, he is in need of some way of
escaping from the conditions causing him to experience anxiety
Herein is the source of the other basic need identified by
Rokeach - the need to ward off threatening aspects of the
world. Faced with uncertainties he can not overcome, an in-
dividual experiences negative arousal and is thus motivated
to "ward off" these threatening uncertainties.
Structural characteristics and the difficulty of
cognitive restructuring . Remaining to be explained is the
source of the need not to know and understand reality, which
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is served by the "ward- of f- threat" function of the cognitive
structure. This explanation also rests on the relationship
between uncertainty and arousal, but it also requires further
discussion of the conditions which must be present for cog-
nitive restructuring to occur. The primary condition that
must pertain for successful cognitive restructuring to take
place is that the incongruency between the cognitive structure
and the phenomena perceived in the environment must be large
enough that it is noticed by the individual, yet small enough
that the changes in the cognitive structure required to re-
move the incongruency are not so large that the individual
is incapable of making them. This condition of optimal in-
congruity is analogous to Piaget’s concept of moderate novelty
(see pp. 92-95). If the uncertainty encountered by the in-
dividual is not within the limits of optimal incongruity,
cognitive restructuring is too difficult and not likely to
take place. Therefore, uncertainty exceeding the level of
optimal incongruity prevents restructuring and the relief
from anxiety it would achieve. If an individual is to
avoid undue anxiety, there must be a high probability that
the incongruities he encounters are within optimal limits.
Determining what this probability will be are a number of
factors, most of which have to do with the structural charac-
teristics of the individual's cognitive structure.
In the last chapter we identified three characteristics
of cognitive structures which were useful for describing the
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differences between one individual's cognitive structure and
that of another. These three characteristics were: (1)
comprehensiveness or the range of different phenomena for which
there exist categories and dimensions in the cognitive struc-
ture; (2) differentiation or the subdivision of the structure
into smaller, but related, categories having more exact
criteria (i.e., more dimensions defining each category) for
the classification of stimuli; and (3) integration or the extent
to which sub-parts of the cognitive structure are interre-
lated by their having common dimensions. Greater degrees of
any or all of these structural characteristics increase the
probability that the individual will encounter optimal in-
congruities between the environment and his cognitive structure.
Greater comprehensiveness increases the probability of
encountering optimal incongruity because a broad range of
categories and dimensions in a cognitive structure increases
the likelihood that one or more categories will bear some
relation to the phenomena contributing to the incongruity.
If this is the case, the size of the incongruity is more
likely to be small enough to fall within the range of optimal
incongruity. For example, the student struggling with the
bimetallic- strip problem is much more likely to be able to
make the appropriate changes in his cognitive structure
necessary for an understanding of the problem if his cognitive
structure contains the categories "molecules", "kinetic energy,"
and "expansion" than if he has none of these categories.
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Greater differentiation of a cognitive structure in-
creases the probability of an individual's encountering
optimal incongruity by increasing the likelihood that the
incongruity encountered is large enough to fall within the
optimal range. When more dimensions are used for evaluating
phenomena encountered in the environment, it is more likely
that an individual will notice differences between these
phenomena and realize they do not fit in the same category
or do not conform to the same relationships indicated by the
organization of his cognitive structure* It is unlikely that
an individual whose cognitive structure pertaining to animals
was so undifferentiated to be divided only into the categories
"them what swims in the sea," "them what crawls on the ground,"
and them what flies in the air" would have noticed any in-
congruity while watching the birds flying around the different
islands of the Galapagos group that might later have spurred
him on to formulate a theory of evolution of the species. On
the other hand, Darwin, whose highly differentiated cognitive
structure doubtless had numerous categories for birds alone
and defined each of these categories by attention to such
dimensions as shape of tail feathers, wing structure, and the
shape of beak, did notice the differences in the beaks of the
birds on the different islands and did eventually reduce the
uncertainties this incongruity raised by formulating his
theory of evolution. The greater differentiation of his cog-
nitive structure than that of our "them what.." naturalist
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made it more likely that he would notice this small incon-
gruity when observing the birds during Cook’s visit to the
Galapagos Islands.
The third structural characteristic, integration of
the subparts of the cognitive structure by their having in
common one or more defining dimensions, also influences the
probability of the individual's encountering optimal levels
of incongruity in the environment. Remember that the upper
limit of optimal incongruity is set by the difficulty of
the change in the cognitive structure which must be made in
order for the structure to become congruent with the environ-
mental phenomena which have caused the incongruity in the
first place. Any characteristic of the cognitive structure
which decreases the difficulty of cognitive restructuring in
response to a given stimulus situation will increase the
likelihood that the incongruities present in that situation
fall within the optimal range of incongruity. Greater in-
tegration of the cognitive structure can decrease the
difficulty of cognitive restructuring by showing relation-
ships between different categories which suggest their com-
bining into more comprehensive new categories or suggest
that important new dimensions be added to existing categories
to differentiate them into more discrete categories. An
example illustrating this point might be the reactions of
two individuals with different degrees of integration of
their cognitive structures upon encountering for the first
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time a "funny mirror" or a mirror which distorts the re-
flections of objects in such a way as to make them appear
much wider than they actually are.
Papu, a primitive tribesman living in New Guinea will
serve as our example of an individual with a cognitive
structure that has a very low level of integration. Papu's
cognitive structure contains the category "mirror" as a
result of his familiarity with the shaving mirror used by
an anthropologist who once lived with the tribe. His cog-
nitive structure also contains the category "eyeglasses"
because lie had tried on a pair of prescription sun-glasses
belonging to the nearsighted anthropologist, the category
"bubbles" because he had been given a bubble blower by the
anthropologist, the category "pool of water" because he
often drank from one near his village, and the category
"reflection" which he had experienced in connection with
both the mirror and the pool of water.
One day as Papu is hunting in the jungle he comes upon
\
a full-length "funny mirror" propped up between two tree
trunks. The image Papu sees in the mirror is that of an
immense tribal warrior at least three feet across at the
waist and four at the shoulders. Succumbing to his first
instinct, Papu turns-tail and runs to hide behind the nearest
tree, but a glance over his shoulder reveals that the huge
warrior is fleeing in the opposite direction and is also
looking back over his large shoulder at the fleeing Papu.
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Papu stops. The fat warrior stops. Papu gets a puzzled
look on his face. The fat warrior gets a puzzled look on
his face. "Oh ho," thinks Papu, "a mirror!" The fat warrior
gets an "Oh ho!" look on his face too. Papu hesitantly
raises an arm. The fat warrior hesitantly raises his arm.
Papu smiles and returns to the mirror pleased that he has
figured out that the presence of the fat warrior is only
his own reflection in a mirror. A shocked look suddenly
appears on the face of the fat warrior. Papu has just
realized that the huge reflection in the mirror means that he,
Papy, has grown immensly fat! Had the witch doctor put a
strange spell on that three-toed sloth Papu ate for break-
fast? Papu and the fat warrior each reaches for his stom-
ach. Papu looks down at his average-sized stomach, then at
the huge belly of his reflection, then back down at his own
stomach. "Hmmm," thinks Papu, "there is an incongruity
between that portion of my cognitive structure pertaining
to mirrors and the environmental phenomenon 1 have just en-
countered - namely, that my reflection in this mirror is
much more obese than I." Papu thought back to the near-
sighted anthropologist's mirror. No, it had not made Papu
look any larger than he was. However hard he tried, Papu
could remember no occasion when the anthropologist's mirror
made anything appear larger than its true size. Because the
only categories Papu was concerned with (i.e., the only
categories in his cognitive structure which had high
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accessibility) were the categories "mirror" and "reflection"
and because he did not associate these with the categories
eyeglasses" and "pool of water", Papu's cognitive structure
seemed to contain no clues as to the explanation of this
strange mirror. Consequently Papu was uncertain as to the
properties this mirror might have. Papu begins to become
anxious. If this mirror has the power to make you appear to
look fat, what other strange powers did it have? Papu's
anxiety changes to outright fear. He turns and flees from
the mirroi
. The fat warrior flees in the opposite direction.
Edith Ann, a thirteen year-old girl living in Indiana,
will serve as our example of an individual with a cognitive
structure that has a high level of integration. Edith Ann's
cognitive structure contains the category "mirror" because
she has several in her home. Her cognitive structure also con-
tains the category "eyeglasses" because her older brother was
nearsighted and wore glasses to correct this, the category
"bubbles" because she had often blown soap bubbles, the cate-
gory "pool of water" because she often played in an inflat-
able wading pool in her backyard, and the category "reflection"
which she had experienced in connection with both the mirrors
in her home and the wading pool in her backyard. One day
Edith Ann goes to the county fair in Muncie and buys a
ticket to the fun house. She goes giggling and screaming
through its dark "Evil Passage," strangely slanted "Topsy-
Turvy Room," down its "Roller-Coaster Slide," and finally
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into its "Haunted Room." There Edith Ann comes upon her first
"funny mirror." At first she thought the fat girl reflected in
the mirror was her friend Gladys, but then Edith Ann notices
that the fat girl seemed to be doing everything that Edith Ann
did. Furthermore, the fat girl looked very much like Edith Ann
complete with pony tail and freckled nose. "Oh! A mirror,"
realized Edith Ann, "and that's my reflection. But I look so
fat!” she went on to herself. "There must be something wrong
with the mirror. It's just like putting on my brother's glasses
and having everything look bigger and out of focus." But she
wasn't wearing any eyeglasses and had never seen a mirror that
made anyone look fat. Edith Ann begins to wonder what makes thi
mirror different - what made it stretch her reflection out of
shape. Then she remembers that she had seen her reflection
stretched out of shape before. While making ugly faces at
herself in the undisturbed water of her wading pool one
boring afternoon, the barette she was wearing in her hair
had fallen into the pool causing a small splash and a series
of ripples in the surface of the water. The rippled water re-
flected ugly faces back to Edith Ann that not only showed her
contorted mouth, wrinkled nose, and squinting eyes, but also
showed her whole face assuming weird shapes as the ripples
on the water distorted her reflection. Edith Ann made one of
her favorite ugly faces at the fat girl in the mirror who
immediately returned the gesture in a fatter, shorter version.
"There must be a connection," she thinks.
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'Let’s see, ripples m the wading pool water are like moving
bumps." She looks carefully at the surface of the mirror.
No bumps are apparent, only two fat blue eyes looking back
into Edith Ann's. Edith Ann then tried to think of other
places she had seen her reflection. "Oh yea, my brother's
prescription sun-glasses! Everything in them looks curved,
just like the things reflected in bubbles. That's it!
Ripples in the pool, my brother's glasses, and the bubbles
all had curved surfaces and they all make funny reflections.
Ah ha! That mirror must be curved!"
Because Edith Ann had been concerned with the cate-
goiies "mirror" and "reflection," and because the dimension
"reflective surface" is common to the categories "pool of
water," "eyeglasses," and "bubbles," Edith Ann eventually
associated these separate categories of her cognitive
structure with the most accessible category, "mirror," which
was also partially defined by the category "reflective
surface She also noted for the first time that rippled
pools of water, eyeglasses, and bubbles all had in common
the dimensions "curved surface" and "distorted reflection."
These relationships between the categories in her cognitive
structure led Edith Ann to hypothesize that distorted re-
flections result from curved surfaces. In so doing, she
added a new dimension to her category "mirror," i.e., the
dimension "curvature of the reflecting surface." No doubt
further exploration by Editli Ann would lead her to differen-
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tiate the category "mirror" into the sub
-categories "flat
mirror," "concave mirror," and "convex mirror."
All of this restructuring was within the capability
of Edith Ann when she encountered the incongruity of a
funny mirror" because her cognitive structure was suffi-
ciently integrated that the high accessibility of the
catgeories "mirror" and "reflection" was eventually trans-
ferred to other categories having the dimension "reflective
surface in common with these first two categories. With
high category accessibility for "rippled pools of water,"
eyeglasses," and "bubbles" Edith Ann became more receptive
to information having to do with these categories, especially
information which fit into, and united, these diverse cate-
gories. The realization that objects in all these categories
had curved reflecting surfaces which distorted reflections
was just such a piece of information. That Papu could not
make the appropriate changes in cognitive structure when he
encountered a "funny mirror" (even though his cognitive
structure contained the same categories as Edith Ann's) is due
to the lack of sufficient integration in his cognitive
structure to highlight important relationships between differ-
ent categories. Low category accessibility in these other
categories that were related to mirrors caused him to be un-
receptive to information having to do with these other cate-
gories - information which was crucial to his being able to
make appropriate changes in his cognitive structure. Edith
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Ann successfully overcame the uncertainty she encountered
and thereby escaped from the arousal, or anxiety, brought on
by the uncertainty. Papu failed to overcome the uncertainty
he encountered and therefore experienced not only anxiety,
but also sufficient fear of the phenomena causing the un-
certainty that he fled from its presence.
The point being made by this digression into a dis-
cussion of the relationship between characteristics of cog-
nitive structure and the ability to make changes in the
cognitive structure is that insufficient comprehensiveness,
differentiation, and/or integration makes it likely that many
individuals will encounter incongruities between the en-
vironment and their cognitive structures which they are
unable to remove because the incongruity does not fall
within the limits of optimal incongruity . ^ Such an in-
dividual must then tolerate whatever level of anxiety
accompanies the state of uncertainty caused by the in-
congruity or find some way other than cognitive restructuring
to remove the incongruity. If the anxiety accompanying the
state of uncertainty in which the individual finds himself
is too great, the individual will find it uncomfortable and
possibly intolerable. Herein lies the source of the need
not to know and understand reality. When reality consists of
3As noted later in this chapter, a cognitive structure
may be characterized by too much integration to make cognitive
restructuring likely.
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an incongruity causing a great degree of uncertainty and con-
comitantly high levels of anxiety, the effective functioning
Of the individual may be best achieved by enabling the
individual "to ward off threatening aspects of reality" as
Rokeach phrased it. In the terminology being developed
here, this "ward-off-threat" need can be filled by enabling
the individual to avoid any information (from the environ-
ment or his own cognitive structure) which calls attention
to incongruities between the environment and his cognitive
structure which might cause him to experience excessive
levels of anxiety. Thus, both of the functions of cognitive
structures suggested by Rokeach have as their source the
need to escape from the anxiety which accompanies uncertainty
The anxiety can be escaped by coming to understand the sit-
uation (achieved through cognitive restructuring), or, that
avenue being closed, by a sort of "cognitive-hiding" from
the situation.
Whichever of the two methods of dealing with uncer-
tainty the individual chooses, his cognitive structure
provides him with the means of carrying it out. If he
chooses to attempt to overcome the uncertainty by gaining
a better understanding of the environment, his cognitive
structure can help him discover important information and
reject unimportant information. This it does by controlling
the individual's pattern of receptivity to information.
Rules of category accessibility will be applied which are
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aimed at making important categories of the cognitive
structure highly accessible (e.g., categories having to
do with reflective surfaces) while at the same time making
less important categories inaccessible. If the individual
chooses to ward off the anxiety caused by his failure to
overcome the uncertainty
,
his cognitive structure can help
him ignore, reject, or alter information which brings to
mind the existence of the troublesome incongruity. Again,
this is accomplished by controlling the individual’s pattern
of receptivity to information. Rules of category accessi-
bility will be applied which make all categories having to
do with the contradictory information inaccessible (e.g.,
categories having to do with reflections will have low
category accessibility) . In the case of choosing to attempt
cognitive restructuring, the individual’s pattern of re-
ceptivity is likely to be dominated by category accessibility
rules intended to include particular kinds of information.
In the case of choosing to close off awareness of the in-
congruity, the individual’s pattern of receptivity is likely
to be dominated by category accessibility rules intended to
exclude particular kinds of information. In either case,
the individual’s pattern of receptivity can have a broad or
narrow (or intermediate) scope of category accessibility.
Because of the negative connotation attached by Rokeach
et al. and by Harvey, Hunt, and Schroder to becoming closed
to information it is important to stress that closing out
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information which leads to uncertainty is not necessarily
''bad" or disfunctional. It is impossible for any individual
to be able to understand all of the complex phenomena which
he encounters daily in his environment; and it may be that
the anxiety caused by his concern with not being able to
understand some of these phenomena will seriously impair
his ability to cope with more crucial aspects of his world.
It is even more important to stress that an individual
may be adopting a pattern of receptivity that closes out
much available information (i.e. adopting a pattern of
focused receptivity) not to avoid information which leads
to uncertainty, but instead to focus his attention only on
information which will help him overcome the uncertainty
by carrying out appropriate cognitive restructuring. In
many instances the scope of a problem with which an indi-
vidual is dealing may be such that efficient problem solving
requires his focusing attention on only a narrow segment
of information. In such cases, closing out much of the in-
formation from the environment becomes very functional. In
fact, the ability to focus one’s pattern of receptivity when
it is called for is as important as being able to maintain
a broad pattern of receptivity when that is called for.
Before leaving this discussion of the relationship
between characteristics of cognitive structures, anxiety,
and cognitive restructuring some additional points should be
made. First, it should be noted that when cognitive re-
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structuring is taking place the affected portions of the
structure cannot be used by the individual to predict the
occurrence of phenomena in the environment. When in the
process of making changes in a portion of his cognitive
structure, the individual is temporarily acknowledging the
invalidity of that portion of the structure as an accurate
representation of the environment. Consequently, he has no
model upon which to base his predictions about the environ-
ment, and he must instead temporarily tolerate being in a
state of uncertainty while the cognitive restructuring is
taking place. The process of restructuring itself will
therefore temporarily increase the amount of uncertainty
facing the individual above the level of uncertainty caused
by the originally perceived incongruity between the environ-
ment and his cognitive structure. It stands to reason that
the larger the incongruity between the environment and the
individual's cognitive structure, the larger the changes
that will have to be made in the cognitive structure.
As the amount of restructuring becomes larger, the longer it
will take and the greater the amount of uncertainty result-
ing from the restructuring process itself that will have to
be tolerated by the individual. This relationship is important
because individuals with a higher tolerance of uncertainty will
be able to make larger structural changes than those in-
dividuals having a lower tolerance of uncertainty. In this
manner, tolerance for uncertainty becomes another factor which
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determines the upper limit of what constitutes optimal in-
congruity for a particular individual. The greater the
tolerance for uncertainty possessed by an individual, the
larger the amount of restructuring he can tolerate, and
the gieater the probability that he will encounter optimal
levels of incongruity between the environment and his
cognitive structure.
Related to this issue is another concomitant of re-
structuiing. This is the fact that the individual's ability
to predict environmental phenomena is not restored until
he has had the opportunity to validate the changes made in
his cognitive structure. He does this by using the newly
restructured portions of his cognitive structure to make
predictions about environmental phenomena and then he checks
to see if his predictions are borne out. If they are, the
structural changes are evaluated as being accurate cognitive
representations of reality and congruency between the cog-
nitive structure and the environment is assumed by the in-
dividual to have been restored. ^ If the predictions are not
borne out, congruency is assumed by the individual not to
have been restored, further restructuring is necessary, and
further uncertainty must be tolerated.
4lt should be noted that an individual could incorrect-
ly perceive his environment because his pattern of receptivity
excluded incongruent elements of the environment. This would
lead the individual to believe he had made appropriate changes
in cognitive structure when in fact he had not.
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The ease with which these validations of structural
changes can be made will influence the amount of uncertainty
caused by the restructuring. If the validity of the changes
is easily confirmed, for example, our Edith Ann can check
her predictions about the relationships between the shapes
of reflecting surfaces and the distortion of reflections in
a variety of curved mirrors, an individual will not be in
doubt about the validity of the new portions of his cognitive
structure very long. By contrast, it may take a very long
time for an individual to validate the cognitive changes
he has made with regard to those sections of his cognitive
structure dealing with morality or religion since predictions
concerning the importance of a particular moral code or
the powers of a diety may be very difficult to evaluate. The
longer the time it takes the individual to validate to his
satisfaction the structural changes he has made, the longer
he must exist in a state of uncertainty and the greater the
total amount of arousal he must tolerate. An individual
with a history of success in overcoming uncertainty and con-
sequently a greater tolerance for uncertainty may be able
to devote long periods of time to validation attempts be-
fore he begins to experience undue anxiety. An individual
with a history of failures in overcoming uncertainty and
consequently a smaller tolerance for uncertainty may be
able to devote only a short time to validation attempts
before his anxiety level forces him to assume prematurely
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that the changes made during cognitive restructuring are
valid, to abandon them and return his cognitive structure
to the state it was in prior to encountering the incongruity
that fostered his attempts to make the changes in the first
place, or to make additional changes in his cognitive struc-
ture.
It should also be noted that some portions of a cognitive
structure are more "central” than others in the sense that
large portions of the cognitive structure are related to them
in such a way that changes in these central portions of the
structure will require changes to be made in the related
peripheral sections. It is this property of particular
portions of a cognitive structure to which Harvey, Hunt, and
Schroder (1961) were addressing themselves when they dis-
cussed the centrality-peripherality dimension of conceptual
systems
:
Centrality-peripherality refers to the
degree of essentialness of a concept to
the larger constellation of concepts, the
total self-system or a subsystem of the
self, which might or might not be the
same. There are numerous ways in which
centrality may be reflected. A con-
ceptual linkage or sub j ect- ob j ect
relationship could be completely destroyed
or severed, and its effects on other
concepts and the larger system noted...
manifestations of greater centrality that
may be elicited by ... refutation (or confir-
mation) include: higher affective arousal,
either negative or positive; a more intense
feeling of threat and anxiety in condi-
tions portending violation to the direction-
ality of the concept(s); heightened sen-
sitivity and openness or receptivity
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to those stimuli perceived
as confirmatory; and increased
closedness to negatively rele-
vant objects. (1961, pp . 75-76)
Making changes in these centra! portions or categories
of the cognitive structure necessarily causes more uncertainty
than do changes in peripheral sections or categories. This
is because these central parts of a structure, by definition,
are integrated with large numbers of peripheral categories
which will be affected by the restructuring. By involving
larger portions of the cognitive structure in the restruc-
turing effort, more of the environment becomes unpredictable
and greater uncertainty for the individual results. A
corollary to the notion that restructuring of central portions
of a cognitive structure is more difficult is the possibility
that increased integration (which we demonstrated earlier
(pp. 119-126) can facilitate restructuring) may make cognitive
restructuring more difficult. Such a notion would agree
with the observation that the most significant discoveries
of a scientist's career, that is, those that constitute
major revisions of previously accepted theory, are made early
in his career. He may make many significant extensions of
this original discovery late in his career, but with the in-
creasing complexity of interrelationships he builds up in
that portion of his cognitive structure (i.e., with higher
levels of integration), it is less likely that the scientist
will change his basic point of view' or approach enough to
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favor his making discoveries which represent significant
departures from the body of theory he has been building up
during his career. To do so would require making changes
in portions of his cognitive
-structure whose integration with
many other sections would escalate the size of the cognitive
restructuring undertaken very rapidly. This postulated re-
lationship between level of integration and significance of
discoveries would not be expected to apply in those many
cases where the discovery is accidental, i.e., where the
scientist is working toward clear aims, but makes a surprise
discovery because he encounters a notable incongruity be-
tween the results of his efforts and the hypotheses he had
been trying to validate.
An example of a highly central set of concepts or
categories in an individual's cognitive structure might be
those having to do with material possessions. If the indi-
vidual defines these categories partially, but significantly,
by the "good" portion of the dimension "good-bad," many of
the individual's cognitive categories are going to be organized
in such a way as to facilitate behaviors whose effect on the
environment is to help the individual acquire material
possessions. If the individual encounters information in
the environment that suggests "goodness" is not the appro-
priate portion of the "good-bad" dimension which should
define categories having to do with material possession,
but instead indicates that it is the "bad" portion of the
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dimension which appropriately defines these categories, then
the individual has discovered a large incongruity between
his cognitive structure and the environment. A reorgani-
zation of his cognitive structure to make it congruent with
this new information would effect large portions of his
structure and upset their functioning as a means of evalua-
ting a broad range of environmental phenomena. Such a set
of structural changes would have, the potential for changing
the individual’s entire life style, e.g., from that of a
wealthy industrialist to that of a proper ty- less balladeer.
Needless to say, the uncertainties raised by contemplating
such a change would be immense and therefore the arousal
created very great.
Also contributing to the immensity of the uncertainty
and arousal accompanying the restructuring of highly central
portions of a cognitive structure is the fact that the
appropriateness of such changes, i.e., whether or not they
have succeeded in restoring congruency between the cognitive
structure and the environment, is often very difficult to
validate. Thus the period of time during which uncertainty
must be tolerated is often greater when central categories
are involved in restructuring. All of these points about
the property of centrality lead to the conclusion that re-
structuring of central portions of a cognitive structure is
more difficult and therefore less likely to be attempted
as a means of avoiding anxiety than is restructuring of
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peripheral portions of a cognitive structure.
Ihese considerations all point out that the amount of
uncertainty caused by the restructuring process itself sets
limits on an individual’s ability to overcome uncertainty by
cognitive restructuring. The difficulty of validating the
structural changes, the centrality of the categories involved
in the restructuring, and the individual's own tolerance
for uncertainty join with the three structural characteristics
discussed earlier (comprehensiveness, differentiation, and
integration) in determining the probability that the indivi-
dual will encounter optimal levels of incongruity which will
lead to the growth of his cognitive structure. They also
play a role in determining the patterns of receptivity a
person is likely to adopt under different circumstances. It
is this relationship between cognitive structure and recep-
tivity-adaptability to which we now turn our attention.
Cognitive structure and receptivity-adaptability
. W
e
have characterized receptivity-adaptability as the ability of
an individual to adopt and maintain patterns of receptivity
to information which are appropriate to the different problem-
solving situations he is likely to encounter. The extent to
which an individual lias this ability will be determined largely
by the characteristics of his cognitive structure because
these will set limits on his ability to adopt and maintain
the widely varying patterns of receptivity required by the
different situations he is likely to encounter. In order to
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explain why this is the case it is necessary to recall some
of the discussion presented in Chapter III. (see pp. 77-80)
It will be remembered from Chapter III that patterns
of receptivity can be characterized by attention to two
different elements of the receptivity pattern. One of
these elements is the scope of receptivity to information.
It was described as being the range of categories in the cog-
nitive structure with high accessibility. Thus, an indi-
vidual could be said to have adopted, or a situation to
require
,
a pattern of broad receptivity (i.e.
,
many diverse
categories having high accessibility) or perhaps a pattern
of focused receptivity (i.e., only a narrow set of categories
have high accessibility). The other element of a receptivity
pattern was the type of rule governing which categories in
the cognitive structure would have high or low accessibility.
The types of category accessibility rules identified were:
(1) content- orientation rules; (2) process -orientation rules;
(3) source-orientation rules; and (4) belief- or attitudinal-
valence rules. Thus, an individual could be said to have
adopted, or a situation said to require, the application of
certain rules, e.g., content-orientation rules intended to
include specific types of information or perhaps source-
orientation rules intended to exclude specific types of
information.
If we presume that an individual will encounter, over
time, a number of problem-solving situations requiring widely
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varying patterns of receptivity, it follows that his receptivity-
adaptability will be limited by his ability to adopt and main-
tain the appropriate receptivity patterns. Therefore, the
individual will have to be capable of assuming and maintaining
a broad scope of receptivity at times and a focused scope of
receptivity at other times. Likewise, there will be some
times when the individual will have to apply only certain types
of rules (e.g., content- or process - or ientation rules) to
govern category accessibility rules and other times when he will
have to apply other types of category rules (e.g., source-
orientation or attitude-valence rules) to control the scope
of his receptivity.
The comprehensiveness, differentiation, and integration
of an individual's cognitive structure will influence his
ability both to adopt and maintain the proper scope of re-
ceptivity and to apply the appropriate category accessibility
rules. With respect to the scope of receptivity, compre-
hensiveness will set the limit on the breadth of the scope
of receptivity an individual can adopt and maintain. The
greater the range of categories in a structure, the broader
the potential range of categories with high category accessi-
bility. For example, a problem situation requiring attention
to information falling into the categories "mirror," "re-
flection," "eyeglasses," "pool of water," and "bubbles"
is a breadth of receptivity whose scope exceeds the compre-
hensiveness of the cognitive structure of a New Guinean whose
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world has contained no mirrors, eyeglasses, or bubbles.
In a similar fashion, effective urban planning requires
attention to categories of information ranging from the
technology of mass transit systems to sociological variables
which determine the cohesiveness of a community and on to
principles of aesthetics and architectural design necessary
for creating living spaces that are both functional and
aesthetically pleasing. An individual capable only of re-
sponding to information in the categories "politics" and
"economics" will be unable to adopt and maintain a broad
enough scope of receptivity to deal effectively with the
problems of urban planning.
Increased differentiation increases the breadth of an
individual's scope of receptivity also. Differentiation
increases the potential number of dimensions available for
evaluating any phenomenon perceived in the environment or
recalled from memory. If only a single dimension is used
for classifying a stimulus, it will immediately be put in
only one category, or, at most, one closely related set of
categories. If a number of dimensions are used for classify-
ing a stimulus, any category defined by one or more of these
dimensions can potentially have high accessibility for an
element of information contained in the phenomenon. Thus,
one individual may evaluate political candidates according to
the single dimension "dovish-hawkish" with respect to foi eign
policy. The only categories in this individual s cognitive
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structure having high accessibility are those partially
defined by the dimension "dovish-hawkish," e.g., the cate-
gories "candidates' positions on war in Southeast Asia,"
"candidates' positions on ABM systems," "candidates' positions
on defense spending," etc. These categories represent the
scope of his receptivity pattern regarding the foreign policy
positions of all candidates. An individual with a more
highly differentiated cognitive structure in the area of
foreign policy might evaluate candidates on the dimensions
amount of military aid that will be given to dictatorships,"
"amount of economic aid given to dictatorships," "amount of
trading that will be done with colonial powers and nations
practicing apartheid," "amount of foreign aid that will be
given to neutral, developing nations," "amount of trading
that will be done with communist nations," "amount of tariff
restrictions that will be placed on foreign imports,"
"desire to achieve at least partial nuclear disarmament,"
"willingness to use military pressure to prevent nationali-
zation of U.S. -owned businesses abroad," "amount of support
that will be given the United Nations and other supra-
national institutions," "willingness to cooperate with other
nations on scientific and environmental problems," and
"willingness to trade musk oxen for panda bears in the pur-
suit of international peace." The individual defining his
cognitive categories pertaining to foreign policy by these
eleven dimensions instead of the single "dovish-hawkish"
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dimension can adopt, a much broader scope of receptivity to
information about candidates’ foreign policy positions be-
cause any category partially defined by any of these dimen-
sions would be likely to have high category accessibility.
Increased integration of cognitive structures increases
the potential for adopting and maintaining broader scopes of
receptivity by making possible the activation (i.e., the
raising of the accessibility) of a number of categories by
their having in common one or more defining dimensions. For
example, our New Guinean friend, Papu, had a narrow scope of
receptivity because the dimension "reflective surface" did
not connect the categories "mirror," "eyeglasses," and "pool
of water" with the result that the high category accessibility
of "mirror" was not transferred to the other categories.
Edith Ann had a broader scope of receptivity because the
dimension "reflective surface" did connect all these categories
with the result that the high category accessibility of "mirror,"
was transferred to the other categories.
If higher levels of structural development (i.e.,
comprehensiveness, differentiation, and integration) permit
an individual to adopt broader scopes of receptivity, so too
do they better enable him to adopt and maintain narrower,
focused scopes of receptivity. Focused receptivity is attained
by keeping the category accessibility of a few relevant cog-
nitive categories higher than the accessibility of the many
other less relevant categories of the cognitive structure.
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es
ihe key in maintaining focused receptivity is continuity.
If the higher accessibility of the few relevant categori<
drops below that of any other category, the individual’s
attention can be side-tracked to less relevant information
causing him to miss important pieces of information belonging
in the crucial categories with temporarily lowered accessi-
bility. focused receptivity therefore requires conti nuously
higher accessibility in the relevant categories than in all
other categories. Maintaining this continuously high accessi-
bility is facilitated by the individual’s receiving a constant
flow of information which he perceives as useful in making
progress toward achieving a match between his actual response
and the optimal response for the situation in which he finds
himself. In some cases this information will be of the sort
useful for making predictions about environmental phenomena
on the basis of his cognitive structure as it currently
exists; at other times this information will be of the sort
useful in the process of making appropriate changes in cog-
nitive structure that will remove an incongruency between
the individual's cognitive structure and the environment.
An example of this relationship between continuity of
information flow into high accessibility categories to main-
tain a focused pattern of receptivity is given by the ex-
ample of a bey who undertakes the building of a treehouse.
His receptivity to information will be focused on those
categories of information having to do with this activity only
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i.e., he will have high category accessibility for information
regarding tree branch configurations, pieces of scrap wood,
boxes of rusty nails in the barn, etc. while he will have low
category accessibility for information regarding blossoms in
the trees, birds in trees, old rubber tires in the barn,
boxes of old shoes in the barn, etc. As long as there is in-
formation being assimilated into the "treehouse focus" cate-
gories of the boy's cognitive structure which permit him to
predict successfully a sequence of interactions between his
behaviors and the environment that bring him closer to
achieving his goal of a tree-house, he will be able to main-
tain this focused pattern of receptivity. When, however, he
runs out of long nails, returns to the barn to look for more,
and finds none
,
the flow of useful information into the
"treehouse focus" categories is interrupted. There are no
longer stimuli in the environment whose assimilation into
these high- accessibility categories will help the boy
approximate his actual response to the optimal response, i.e.,
there are no longer any nails he can use for fastening the
floor of the treehouse to the branches of the tree. His
unsuccessful attempts to use shorter nails and then screws to
attach the treehouse to the tree cause the boy to look for
other similar fasteners. Failing to find any such objects,
the accessibility of the "treehouse focus" categories may
drop below the accessibility of other categories in the boy's
cognitive structure, e.g., the category "old rubber tires."
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If such becomes the case, the boy's pattern of receptivity
will have lost its focus, perhaps only to gain a different
focus, e.g., a focus on those categories having to do with
making a swing out of the old rubber tire he noticed during
his last trip to the barn to look for nails.
The necessity of maintaining continuously high accessi-
bility in only the relevant categories applies also to less
overt activities such as productive thinking. As long as an
individual continues to be able to generate information stored
m his cognitive structure or present in the environment which
allows him to make progress toward his goal, category accessi-
bility in the relevant categories will remain high enough to
maintain the focused pattern of receptivity. The only thing
likley to disrupt this focus is the interruption of this
continuity or the appearance of some stimuli in such intensity
that it raises the accessibility of some other unrelated
category above the accessibility of the categories contained
in the focus. 5 (see p.79)
Greater differentiation of the cognitive structure makes
it more likely that the individual will receive a continuous
flow of information into the categories included in the focus
of his receptivity pattern. This is due to the fact that
5A special case of disruption of a focused pattern of
receptivity is fatigue. Sufficient fatigue would constitute
an intense stimulus capable of raising the individual's accessi
bility in such categories as "rest," "sleep," etc. until they
are more accessible than the categories originally within the
focus of the pattern of receptivity.
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greater differentiation means that more dimensions, or
aspects, of a stimulus situation will eventually be assimi-
lated by the individual. For example, a man who divides the
category "automobile engine" into the sub-categories "battery,"
"carburetor , " and "main part of the engine" will run out of
information as to why his car will not start as soon as he has
determined that the battery is not dead, the car is not out of
gas, the engine not flooded, and the "main part of the engine"
not broken because "it seems to turn-over okay." A mechanic
may divide the category "automobile engine" into the sub-
categories "engine block," "fuel system," "lubrication
system," "cooling system," and "ignition system" and it is
piobable that he would break each of these down into smaller
categories (e.g., "ignition system" is broken down into the
"primary system" and the "secondary system") and these smaller
categories down into still more discrete sub- categories (e.g.,
the "primary system" is broken down into "battery," "igni-
tion switch," distributor contact points," "condenser,"
"primary coil winding," and 'fesistor") • As a consequence
of his greater cognitive differentiation with respect
to automobile engines, the mechanic's focus on the
starting problem will include more dimensions for evaluating
the problem with the result that he "can get more information
out of the situation" and will be less likely to have exhausted
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the flow of useful information before locating the source of
the problem, e.g., the contact points are badly burned.
Greater integration of the cognitive structure may also
facilitate an individual's efforts to maintain a focused
pattern of receptivity. Continuously high category accessi-
bility, remember, is dependent on the availability of informa-
tion which the individual can assimilate into his cognitive
structure for use in predicting what actual response will
match most closely the optimal response. If there is little
integration between sub-parts of a cognitive structure, the
individual may exhaust the supply of information included in
the narrow range of categories with high accessibility and
become side-tracked when their accessibility drops below that
of an irrelevant category. By contrast, greater integration
of these categories with other parts of the cognitive struc-
ture may result in the individual's noticing that one or more
other categories he had thought irrelevant to the problem have
an important dimension in common with the categories included
in the focus. ^ When this occurs the individual can raise the
category accessibility of just these few relevant categories
and include them with the other high-accessibility categories
without disrupting the focus of the receptivity pattern. By
^Note that increased integration of the cognitive struc-
ture may also be detrimental to maintaining a focused pattern
of receptivity. This would be the case when relationships be-
tween categories cause the individual's attention to stray to
'delated" but problem- irrelevant categories.
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so doing he makes available a whole new set of information
which may allow him to make successful predictions regarding
what the optimal response in the situation is.
For an example of this, we can return to our treehouse
builder who has temporarily shifted his attention to rubber-
tire swings. When we left him he seemed to have exhausted
the information in categories having to do with fastening the
floor of his treehouse to the tree and was wandering through
the barn looking for the materials to build a swing. Pre-
suming he has a sufficiently integrated cognitive structure,
his stumbling upon a box of U-bolts may rekindle his inter-
est in (i.e., focus his receptivity) the task of completing
his treenouse. This will be the case if his cognitive struc-
ture connects the categories "nails," "screws," and "bolts"
by the common dimension "utility as a fastener" and results
in the accessibility of the category "bolts" being raised by
the boy's noticing the box of U-bolts. As he rummages through
the box of U-bolts and through his memory, the boy recalls
that U-bolts are often used for fastening things to cylindrical
objects, e.g., a car's leaf springs to its axle. Eureka!
Tree limbs and axles are both of the same shape so U-bolts
may work as a means of fastening the treehouse to the tree.
Unfortunately, the boy discovers that none of the U-bolts are
large enough to fit around the tree limbs. But the category
"bolts" still has high category accessibility and the boy
decides to look for some long, straight bolts that he can
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bend into sufficiently large U's to fit around the tree
limbs. Blaah! No luck here either. The only bolts he finds
which are long enough are also too hard for him to bend.
Bend! Bendableness (pliability to those without fluency in
treehouse builders' colloquialisms) is a dimension that
connects the category "bolts" with another category, i.e.,
"baling wire." Not only is the category "baling wire"
connected to the category bolts, but it is also connected to
the categories "nails" and "screws" by its having in common
with them the defining dimension "utility as a fastener."
His integrated cognitive structure serves the boy well.
Baling wire is easily found around any old barn, can be bent
around tree limbs easily, poked through nail holes made in
the floor of the treehouse, the ends tied and then twisted to
pull the wire tight, and the .treehouse is complete. The boy
was successful in regaining and maintaining a pattern of re-
ceptivity focused on treehouse building because his inte-
grated cognitive structure facilitated the continuous flow
of new information into those categories having to do with
building treehouses and thereby kept their category accessi-
bility from dropping below that of other categories.
A boy with the same cognitive categories as our success-
ful treehouse builder, but lacking sufficient integration be-
tween them, would probably have run out of useful new infor-
mation about fastening treehouses to trees as soon as he had
run out of long nails. With no common dimensions providing
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a ready connection between the category "nails" and any of the
other potentially relevant categories of fasteners, this other
boy would have access to no new sources of information on how
to solve the problem. Consequently, the accessibility of the
categories in his cognitive structure having to do with build-
ing treehouses would be likely to drop below the accessibility
of other categories, and the boy's receptivity would lose its
focus on the problems involved in treehouse construction.
Having seen how higher levels of structural develop-
ment facilitate an individual's being able to adopt and main-
tain greater breadth or focus in the scope of his receptivity
to information, we can now go on to investigate the way in
which these same structural characteristics influence the in-
dividual's ability to apply category accessibility rules that
are appiopriate to the situations he encounters. High re-
ceptivity-adaptability requires that an individual not rely
on the use of inappropriate types of rules to govern category
accessibility, but the principles embodied in our conceptual
framework for explaining the dynamics of cognitive functioning
and their influence on receptivity-adaptability lead to the
prediction that some individuals would have a tendency to
rely on the use of source-orientation and/or attitude- valence
rules at times when it may be inappropriate to the situation.
Such would be the case when an individual with a cognitive
structure characterized by a low level of structural develop-
ment (i.e., low levels of comprehensiveness, differentiation,
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and integration) encounters environmental situations causing
him to experience excessive levels of uncertainty - levels
that lead to his experiencing high anxiety.
The reasoning supporting such a conclusion takes us
back to some points made earlier in this chapter (see pp.109-
130) During this earlier discussion it was argued that an
individual's tolerance for uncertainty in any situation (i.e.,
the extent to which he reacts to uncertainty by experiencing
anxiety) is partially determined by the past success he has
had in overcoming uncertainty in similar situations. It was
argued that a low level of structural development lowered the
probability of encountering optimal levels of incongruity
between his cognitive structure and the environment; that this
decreased his ability to make appropriate changes in cognitive
structure to overcome uncertainty; that this led to his
often failing to successfully overcome uncertainty (i.e., make
accurate predictions about what behavior sequences would lead
to favorable outcomes from his interactions with the environ-
ment)
; and that this in turn led to his experiencing anxiety
when he encountered uncertainty.
An individual with a low tolerance for uncertainty will
be motivated to escape from the concurrent state of anxiety
as quickly as possible. If he does not readily perceive the
appropriate changes he must make in his cognitive structure in
order to remove the incongruity causing the state of uncertainty,
t
another path open to him is to seek information from a source
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which has consistently helped him out of uncertain situations
before. Often this source, whether an ideology, single in-
dividual, or group or class of individuals, will constitute
an authority figure for the anxiety-prone individual. Such an
authority figure is obeyed because the individual has come to
believe that the source possesses the most accurate avail-
able knowledge of the environment (i.e., the best ability to
predict environmental phenomena) and therefore, the individual's
failure to obey the authority figure is likely to lead to un-
anticipated and unfavorable outcomes from the individual's
interactions with the environment. Whether a source is an
authority figure or just a trusted source with regard to situ-
ations similar to that causing the uncertainty, the anxiety-
prone individual is likely to apply a source-orientation rule
to govern the category accessibility of his receptivity pattern,
that is, his category accessibility will be governed by the
dominance of rules to the effect that "those categories having
to do with any information from this particular source will
have high accessibility." If this source does not have a
monopoly on the information relevant to the solution of the
problem facing the individual, his reliance on that source-
orientation rule will be inappropriate to the situation. In
the case of the prejudiced individual as characterized by
Adorno et_ aJ. and Rokeach e_t a, 1
_.
the inverse form of a source-
orientation rule often governs the category accessibility of
his receptivity pattern. By the inverse form, it is meant
153
that the rule is applied to exclude information emitted by
certain sources as in a rule to the effect that "those cate-
gories having to do with information from radical, hippie
freaks will have very low accessibility." The over-reliance
on the use of either form of source-orientation rule will
mean lower receptivity-adaptability for an individual since
it hampers his using the most appropriate category accessi-
bility rules for each situation he encounters.
Essentially the same argument, can be made regarding the
likelihood that an individual with a low level of cognitive
development will exhibit an over-reliance on belief- or
attitude -valence rules to govern category accessibility when
he encounters uncertainty. Failing the ability to under-
take the necessary cognitive restructuring, such an individual
can mitigate the anxiety caused by the uncertainty by lowering
his receptivity to any information which contradicts the be-
liefs and attitudes implicit in his cognitive structure (This
would again be the inverse form of a rule since it is intended
to exclude particular kinds of information.) and/or by raising
the accessibility of only those categories having to do with
information which supports his attitudes and beliefs. For
example, in the unlikely case of an anxiety-prone Hindu mystic
who is experiencing uncertainty because of the teachings of
a Calvinist missionary, the likely defense against anxiety
would be the adoption of a pattern of receptivity dominated
by a belief-valence rule to the effect that "All categories
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having to do with information which conflicts with the teach-
ings of the ancient and holy Sanskrit writings upon which I
base my beliefs will have very low category accessibility.”
Again, the consequence of over-reliance on the use of a par-
ticular type of category accessibility rule--in this case a
belief
-valence rule-
-may be that the individual will be unable
to adopt and maintain appropriate patterns of receptivity.
He would therefore have low receptivity- adaptability
.
Situational characterist ics and receptivity- adaptability
.
Gr-eat stress has been laid in our discussion upon the point
that an individual’s patterns of receptivity to information
need to be adaptable to situational circumstances. The con-
cept of an R-A profile was introduced as a means of characteriz-
ing the extent to which an individual is successful in making
the adaptations necessary to achieve a match between his patterns
of receptivity in differing situations and the patterns of
receptivity which would be most appropriate to those different
situations. We have just reviewed the ways in which the levels
of comprehensiveness, differentiation, and integration of an
individual's cognitive structure will influence his ability
to adapt by adopting and maintaining appropriate patterns of
receptivity, but we have not yet discussed how the character-
istics of the situations themselves influence the likelihood
of an individual's adopting one or another pattern of recep-
tivity.
In Chapter III (pp . 80-82) we classified the character-
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istics of situations into two categories: (1) those in-
fluencing the arousal level of the individual and (2) those
influencing the complexity of the potential information input
available to the individual. We will discuss first how the
characteristics influencing the individual's arousal level
interact with the characteristics of the individual's cog-
nitive structure to influence the type of receptivity pattern
the individual will adopt. The situational characteristics
we have categorized as influencing the arousal level of an
individual included:
1. time constraints placed upon behavior;
2. physical conditions contributing to the
comfort or discomfort of the individual;
3. social, material, or physical rewards or
punishments contingent upon the outcome
of the situation;
4. the individual's involvement, investment,
or interest in the situation; and
5. the individual's committment to influ-
encing the outcome of the situation.
Because it is difficult, and unnecessary for our purposes
here, to make clear distinctions between these different
situational characteristics, we have combined them all into
the single variable arousal level . Our interest lies only
in their potential influence on the patterns of receptivity
different individuals will adopt. It is their contiibution
to determining the arousal level of an individual (as dis-
cussed in this chapter earlier, pp . 104-111) that is important
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because arousal level is likely to be a major determinant
of the receptivity patterns adopted by an individual in a
particular situation.
The relationship between arousal and performance is
apparently best described by an inverted, U-shaped curve, 7
i.e., both extremely low and extremely high level's of arousal
are detrimental to performance while moderate levels of
arousal improve performance. Schroder, Driver, and Streufert
(1967, pp. 67-105) have demonstrated that his relationship
also apparently holds with respect to what they term "com-
plexity of information processing," and the way in which they
measure information processing complexity is similar in
some important aspects to the way in which we have charac-
terized patterns of receptivity to information. The five
variables used by Schroder, Driver, and Streufert as mea-
sures of information processing complexity were:
1. the number of kinds of information tracked;
2. the number of ways information was combined;
3. the number of sources of information used;
4. the amount of discrepant information gen-
erated; and
5. the number of higher-level strategies de-
veloped .
7 For an example of the empirical support for the exist-
ence of this relationship between arousal level and perform-
ance see R.B. Malmo, "Activation: A neuro -phychological







Three of these variables can be interpreted as being charac-
teristics of an individual’s pattern of receptivity. The
number of kinds of information tracked would be an indica-
tion of the individual's scope of receptivity (i.e. the
range of categories having high accessibility) since the
broader the scope of receptivity the greater the number pf
kinds of information to which the individual is receptive.
The number of sources of information used would be an indi-
cation of the extent to which source
-orientation rules were
being used by the individual to limit the range of cate-
gories in his cognitive structure with high accessibility.
And finally, the amount of discrepant information generated
would be an indication of the scope of categories in the in-
dividual's cognitive structure from which information is
drawn to supplement information available in the environment.
If we extrapolate from the findings of Schroder, Driver, and
Streufert on the basis of this similarity between their
measure of information processing complexity and our concept
of patterns of receptivity, we can conclude that the scope
of an individual's receptivity patterns will bear an in-
verted, U-shaped relation to the arousal level of the in-
dividual .
Schroder et_ al. (1967
,
pp . 108-124) have also demonstrated
that individuals and groups of individuals having cognitive
structures with greater degrees of differentiation and integra-
tion will exhibit greater information processing complexity
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than individuals or groups of individuals having less differ-
entiated, less integrated structures. Though the difference
is insignificant at extreme levels of arousal, the difference
becomes very significant within the range of arousal levels
that are most conducive to greater complexity of information
processing. Again, if we extrapolate from the Schroder et al.
findings we can reasonably conclude that the effects of arousal
level upon scope of receptivity adopted by individuals with
more developed cognitive structures will be different from
the effects of arousal upon the scope of receptivity adopted
by individuals with less developed cognitive structures.
In addition to similarities between their measures of
information processing complexity and our concept of patterns
of receptivity, these extrapolations from the findings of
Schroder et_ al_. can be justified by some logical deductions
from our earlier discussion of the relationship between un-
certainty and arousal level (see pp. 106-111). In this dis-
cussion the point was made that an individual's desire to
optimize the outcomes he receives as a result of his inter-
actions with the environment constitutes his motivation to
restore predictability to the environment. The size of the
discrepancy between his Comparison Level for outcomes (CL)
and his Comparison Level for alternatives (CL^^) predicted
by the individual to result from the disruption of his
habitual behavior patterns determines the arousal level
of the individual. Since the cause of the uncertainty will
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be those elements of information in the environment which
disrupt the congruity between the individual's cognitive
structure and the environment, this arousal will be associated
initially with these incongruent elements of information.
Attempts to restore predictability will necessarily involve
these primary categories (i.e., those categories directly
related to the incongruent elements of the environment) and
the individual will give these categories high accessibility,
provided the individual eschews information avoidance strate-
gies. In this manner arousal has the consequence of raising
category accessibility in the categories most directly re-
lated to the incongruent stimulus elements (the primary cate-
gories)
. How high the accessibility of these primary cate-
gories will be raised will depend on the individual's arousal
level (i.e., the size of the discrepancy between his CL and
CL
a 2^.)
• If the arousal is not too high, these primary cate-
gories may have an accessibility on a par with a large number
of categories in the individual's cognitive structure and
the pattern of receptivity adopted by the individual will
have a relatively broad scope. If the arousal level is
sufficiently high, these primary categories may acquire an
accessibility which is much higher than all other categories
in the individual's cognitive structure and the pattern of
receptivity adopted by the individual will have a narrow,
focused scope of receptivity. Thus, moderate levels of
arousal would be expected to result in moderately broad
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scopes of receptivity while higher levels of arousal would
be expected to result in focused receptivity patterns.
This deduction is consistent with our earlier extrapolation
from the findings of Schroder et_ al. (see pp . 155-158).
This effect of increased arousal upon the scope of
receptivity adopted would appear at first to be quite function-
al for the individual. It immediately focuses his attention
upon those categories of information which have disrupted his
ability to successfully predict environmental phenomena and
to insure his receiving optimal outcomes from his interactions
with the environment. With his attention focused on the cate-
gories related to the incongruity between the environment
and his cognitive structure, the individual can begin to
gather information which will allow him to make the appro-
priate changes in his structure and thereby restore congruity
and predictability. But as we noted with regard to the prob-
lem of an individual’s maintaining a focused receptivity
pattern, successful cognitive restructuring may require
broadening the scope of receptivity to include some cate-
gories which initially appear to have only secondary rele-
vance to the problem of overcoming the uncertainty facing
the individual. It will be recalled that oui treehouse
builder only solved his problems by raising the accessibility
of a few additional key categories ("bolts" and "baling wire")
thereby making himself more receptive to crucial elements
of information which had previously fallen outside the
focus
of his receptivity pattern. Therefore, it is important
to
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note that arousal may have the effect of decreasing the
scope of an individual's receptivity pattern to such a
narrow focus that it becomes detrimental to his efforts at
cognitive restructuring.
This detrimental effect of arousal can be mitigated by
the influence of integration in the cognitive structure.
Integration is the interconnection of parts of the cognitive
structure by their having in common one or more defining
dimensions. If arousal has raised the accessibility of a
few primary categories (i.e., those directly related to the
incongruent elements causing the uncertainty, and hence,
the arousal)
,
sufficient integration will result in the
generalization, or transfer, of high category accessibility
from these categories to important secondary categories
related to the primary categories by important dimensions.
The effect of this transfer of high category accessibility
to other categories is to broaden the individual's scope of
receptivity and to mitigate the focusing effect of the ini-
tial arousal. It can thus be argued that individuals with
more integrated cognitive structures will adopt and maintain
broader scopes of receptivity at a given level of arousal
than individuals with less integrated structures. Again,
our deduction agrees with our extrapolation from the findings
of Schroder et_ £l. (see pp . 158-160).
Negative arousal, or anxiety, may have an additional
effect on the patterns of receptivity an individual adopts
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in a pai ticulai situation. Overcoming a state of uncertainty
requires cognitive restructuring by the individual to remove
the incongruity between the environment and his cognitive
structure. The process of cognitive restructuring itself
creates additional uncertainty and anxiety for the individual
that he must tolerate until the restructuring has been accom-
plished and its appropriateness validated (see pp. 129-133).
But successful restructuring requires that a condition of
optimal incongruity exist (see p. 115ff) ; and one of the
determinants of the upper limit of what constitutes optimal
incongruity for a particular individual is the amount of
anxiety he can tolerate. If he can tolerate a certain level
of anxiety, any conditions that contribute to the anxiety
he experiences will decrease the reserve tolerance he has
available. Should the anxiety produced by situational
characteristics (i.e., factors contributing to the individual’s
arousal level) be too high, the individual will not have a
sufficient reserve tolerance for anxiety to allow him to
withstand the added uncertainty and anxiety caused by the
restructuring process. An additional consequence of high
negative arousal, then, is to decrease the individual’s
ability to successfully carry out necessary cognitive re-
structuring .
When the level of negative arousal - anxiety - experienced
by an individual as a result of situational
characteristics is
high enough that it prevents the individual from
attempting
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cognitive restructuring, the individual must resort to some
other means of escaping from the anxiety brought on by the
state of uncertainty. The most likely are that he avoids
those stimulus elements which are incongrucnt with his
cognitive structure, distorts the incongruent elements in
such a way that they no longer appear incongruent to him,
or seeks out some source who can explain away the incon-
gruity for him. In taking any of these escape routes from
his anxiety, the individual will adopt a pattern of recep-
tivity that differs significantly from a pattern intended
to help him make appropriate changes in his cognitive struc-
ture. Instead of maintaining high category accessibility
in the primary categories initially associated with arousal,
the individual will apply category accessibility rules which
make him least receptive to information which has brought
about his state of uncertainty. Thus, he may adopt a belief-
valence rule which lowers the accessibility of all categories
having to do with information which contradicts the beliefs
implicit in his present cognitive structure, adopt a content-
orientation rule which lowers the accessibility of all cate-
gories whose content is concerned with the information
associated with the incongruity which has led to his arousal,
or adopt a source-orientation rule which raises accessibility
in those categories having to do with information 1 rom soui ces
which support, rather than contradict, his present beliefs,
or finally, adopt a source-orientation rule which raises
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accessibility in those categories having to do with informa-
tion from a source he believes understands what he cannot
(i.e., understands and can explain the apparent incongruity
between the individual’s cognitive structure and the environ-
ment) and whose advice will therefore protect him from re-
ceiving outcomes which are below his Comparison Level (CL)
.
Each of these possibilities demonstrates that the effect of
excessive levels of negative arousal will be the adopting
by the individual of receptivity patterns dominated by cate-
gory accessibility rules intended to protect the individual
from experiencing further anxiety. It should also be noted
that most such category accessibility rules are intended to
exclude particular elements of information in contrast to rules
intended to include particular elements of information. The
former we have been calling inverse forms of rules.
As we noted when discussing the effects of structural
characteristics upon the individual's tolerance of uncertainty
(see pp. 125-127), greater structural development increases the
likelihood of an individual's having a higher tolerance for
uncertainty, because such an individual is more likely to have
successfully overcome past encounters with uncertainty by
restructuring. Given this greater tolerance of uncertainty,
the same situational characteristics which would result in a
high level of arousal in an individual with a less developed
cognitive structure may result in only a moderate level of
arousal for the individual with a well developed stiuctuie.
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Consequently, this latter individual will have a greater
reserve of tolerance of anxiety which is available to help
him withstand the uncertainty and anxiety that result from
the process of restructuring. He therefore has a higher
limit for what constitutes optimal incongruity and will have
a greater ability to overcome uncertainty. This leads to
the conclusion that individuals with different degrees of
cognitive development will rely on different kinds of cate-
gory accessibility ruies even though the situational charac-
teristics they face are similar. The individual with greater
structural development will rely more on category accessibility
rules that focus his receptivity on the information elements
that are incongruent with his cognitive structure, whereas the
individual with less structural development will, under the
same situational characteristics, rely on rules that divert
his attention from these incongruent elements of information.
We can summarize the effects of situational characteristics
that contribute to arousal on receptivity patterns adopted by
an individual as follows:
1. Situational characteristics that
contribute to high levels of arousal
tend to decrease the scope of re-
ceptivity adopted by an individual.
2. This effect is increasingly mitigated as the
degree of cognitive development of the in-
dividual increases.
3. Situational characteristics that con-
tribute to high levels of negative
arousal tend to increase an individual '
s
reliance on category accessibility
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rules intended to protect
the individual from experi-
encing further anxiety.
4. This effect is mitigated to
the extent that the individual
has a higher degree of cognitive
development which decreases the
negative arousal he is likely
to experience when in a state
of uncertainty.
We turn now to how the second category of situational
factors - those contributing to the complexity of the po-
tential information input to the individual - influencing
the patterns of receptivity individuals are likely to adopt.
As was the case in our treatment of situational factors in-
fluencing an individual's arousal level, we will combine all
of the factors which contribute to complexity into the single
variable information input complexity . However, it is help-
ful to identify the six or so factors that we will include
in the variable complexity and to stress that a more so-
phisticated treatment than is possible in this dissertation
would investigate both the qualitative and quantitative
differences each of these factors has on the patterns of
receptivity individuals are likely to adopt. The first of
these factors is the extent to which the information present
in the situation is static (i.e., continuously available over
time) or changing (i.e.
,
present in the enviionment only parts
at a time in some sort of temporal sequence) . The greater
the changeability of the information, the more complex the
problems of combining separate elements of information becomes
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because the individual does not always have direct access
to all the information and must combine different elements
of information from different time periods with the. risk
that his memory of them may not always be accurate. The
number of sources from which the information comes is a
second factor which influences the complexity of a situation.
The greater the number of sources,, the greater the complexity
because information about the source as well as the informa-
tion emitted from the source must be considered by the in-
dividual. A third factor is the size of the incongruity
between the information available in the environment and the
individual’s cognitive structure (i.e., the novelty vs. familiar-
ity of the information) . A fourth factor is the intricacy of
the relationships between the elements of information. The
more intricate the relationships, the more difficult and
complex is the job of discovering them and including them in
the cognitive restructuring that may be necessary to overcome
uncertainty. Also complicating information inputs to the
individual will be the pattern of stimulus intensity present
in the situation. If the pattern of stimulus intensity is
relatively simple and calls attention to appropriate categories
of stimuli (e.g., a lion’s roar calls attention to the most
immediate problem facing the individual hearing it, gives
the approximate location of danger, and raises accessibility
in those categories of the cognitive structure having to do
with escape)
,
the processing of information will be simpler
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than if a more complex pattern of stimulus intensity fails
to aid, or perhaps even hinders, the individual’s giving
attention to the appropriate elements of information. For
example, the problem of discovering "who done it?" in an
old Perry Mason episode is often complicated for the viewer
by his attention being drawn to misleading clues presented
in dramatic episodes, while the more clever Perry Mason dis-
covers the critical pieces of evidence by giving attention
to small details whose presentation is accompanied by little
intensity and which go unnoticed until Mason draws attention
to them in the courtroom or during the epilogue. Finally,
the size of the information load upon the individual will
also be a factor in determining the information input com-
plexity of the situation. Information load can be of at
least three types:
1. the number of elements of information
present in the situation which must be
combined correctly to allow the indi-
vidual to make appropriate changes in
his cognitive structure;
2. the amount of information the indi-
vidual must generate from his cog-
nitive structure to supplement the




3. the number of elements of irrelevant
or inconsequential information which
must be rejected or ignored by the
individual in his attempt to identify
the crucial elements of information.
The greater the information load present in any of these
three
forms, the more complex the situation for the individual.
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In exploring the influence of these factors which con-
tribute to complexity of information input, we can again
begin with work done by Schroder, Driver, and Streufert (1967)
on human information processing. In their investigation of
the effects of environmental complexity (defined as the
number of dimensions of information presented in a time span,
the diversity of information, and the number of alternatives
each unit of information adds) Schroder et al. (1967, pp. 54 -
66) again discovered that an inverted U-shaped curve best
described the relationship between complexity of the en-
vironment and complexity of information processing. As in
our discussion of the effects of arousal on patterns of
receptivity, we will again assume it legitimate to generalize
from the Schroder e t al . findings regarding information
processing complexity to patterns of receptivity to infor-
mation. In this case we will presume that their findings
suggest an inverted, U-shaped relationship between input com-
plexity (produced by any combination of the six factors just
identified above) and the breadth of the scope of receptivity
adopted by individuals in general. Thus, we would expect low
levels of complexity to result in focused patterns of recep-
tivity, moderate levels of complexity to lead to broader scopes
of receptivity, and excessively high levels of complexity to
lead to highly focused patterns of receptivity. Once again
these assumptions can be supported by logical deduction from
the conceptual framework we have developed up to this point.
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The practical effect of increases in any of the situa-
tional variables contributing to complexity is to increase the
number of stimulus elements potentially contributing to the
incongruity between the environment and an individual's cog-
nitive structure. For the reasons discussed earlier (see pp.
156-158), each of the incongruent elements will initially be
associated with whatever arousal the individual experiences,
and this arousal leads to higher category accessibility in
those categories associated with the incongruent elements.
Thus, an increase in the number of incongruent elements,
which results from increased complexity, leads to high
accessibility in more categories - that is, increased com-
plexity leads to a broader scope of receptivity.
For example, the hero of an Italian-made western, who
is being held in the Taco-Tio Junction jail and is facing the
prospect of being hanged next week when the circuit judge comes
to Taco-Tio Junction to hear his case and sentence him, is
faced with a relatively uncomplicated situation. If he is to
avoid putting in an appearance at the hanging, he must escape
from the one-room jail in which he is being held. The infor-
mation available to the hero-prisoner is that there is one
barred-window in the jail cell which looks out on the alley
behind a Chinese res taurant
,
there is a no t- too-br ight deputy
in the next room who brings him his meals and spends most of the
rest of his time sleeping with his feet on the desk, the stable
is next door to the jail (if the hero's sense of smell is
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accurate), most of the town takes a siesta every day be-
tween 1:00 and 3:00 in the afternoon, and finally, the key
to the jail cell is left on top of the deputy’s desk. Given
this relatively uncomplex situation, the hero-prisoner is
likely to have a relatively narrow scope of receptivity
which includes a focus on ways in which he might either es-
cape through the barred-window or get possession of the key
to the cell door. With either of these accomplished, the hero-
prisoner could then go to the stable between 1:00 and 3:00,
steal a horse, and make his escape on horseback by following
the dry river bed which runs behind the Chinese restaurant.
In contrast, the hero of a Japanese version of a James
Bond-style adventure is faced with a more complex situation.
He. is being held prisoner in an Eastern-Bloc prison that
features computer controlled cell-door locks, electrified grills
as the floors in all of the cell-block corridors, alarms trig-
gered by photo-electric cells on all the doorways leading from
the cell-blocks, armed robot guards patrolling the prison
building and programmed to attack anything which moves unpro-
tected by a special tellurium badge, and so on almost ad
inf ini turn . With all of this information available to the
amazing hero, he is likely to have a broad scope of recep-
tivity which includes high accessibility in the many cate-
gories having to do with overcoming the immense complexity of
obstacles to his escape. This is presuming that the level of
input complexity lias not become so excessive as to begin to
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decrease the scope of his receptivity.
Such a point is reached when the complexity of the
situation results in such a large incongruity between the in-
dividual s cognitive structure and the environment that cog-
nitive restructuring is so difficult as to preclude its being
an available means of escaping the anxiety the individual is
experiencing m the situation. When this point has been reached,
the function of the cognitive structure switches from helping
the individual to understand the environment to the function of
helping to protect him from its threatening aspects, in this
case excessive anxiety. This is achieved by adopting a pattern
of receptivity which protects the individual from further ex-
posure to the information which has given rise to his un-
certainty, and hence., to his anxiety (see pp. 125 - 129 ).
Having reached this level of complexity, further increases in
input complexity will have the effect of narrowing the scope
of receptivity adopted by the individual as the accessibility
of more and more categories is lowered to protect him from
incongruent elements of information. These conclusions
agree with the findings of Schroder ert a^L. that complexity at
first increases the complexity of information processing un-
til an optimal level of complexity is reached and then further
complexity will cause decreases in information processing com-
plexity.
The level of input complexity will also affect an in-
dividual's patterns of receptivity in terms of the category
accessibility rules he uses to govern his receptivity. Up
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to the point where increasing complexity first begins to have
the effect of decreasing the scope of his receptivity, it is
likely that the individual will have relied largely upon con-
tent-orientation and approach-orientation rules to govern his
category accessibility. It is also likely that any rules,
regardless of which of the four types, will be used primarily
with the intention of including (receiving) certain kinds of
information in the cognitive structure for the purpose of
helping in the restructuring process. Once this point of
optimal complexity has been passed, it is more likely that the
individual's pattern of receptivity will be dominated by source
orientation and att itude-valence rules; and it is also likely
that, whatever types of rules are used to govern category
accessibility, they will be primarily intended to exclude
certain kinds of information from the individual 1 s awareness
to protect him from experiencing anxiety. These relation-
ships between complexity and the scope of receptivity and the
types of category accessibility rules dominating the individual
pattern of receptivity are depicted in Figure 4.1.
As in the case of their investigation of the effects of
arousal on information processing complexity, Schroder et. al
.
found that individuals and groups of individuals whose con-
ceptual systems (i.e., cognitive structures) were characterized
by greater differentiation and integration reached optimal
levels of information processing complexity at higher levels








THE EFFECTS OF INFORMATION INPUT COMPLEXITY
UPON PATTERNS OF RECEPTIVITY LIKELY TO
BE ADOPTED BY AN INDIVIDUAL
structures which were less differentiated and less integrated
(Schroder et_ aJ. pp. 108-124). And once again we will hypo-
thesize that this same relationship is likely to hold between
the degree of cognitive development and the scopes of re-
ceptivity adopted by an individual. The more developed (i.e.,
the more comprehensive, differentiated, and integrated) an
individual's cognitive structure, the higher the level of in-
put complexity he can handle before his receptivity patterns
will begin to assume narrower, and narrower scope. This
conclusion can be supported by the argument that for individuals
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with more developed cognitive structures, a higher level of
compelxi ty will have to be reached before the size of the in-
congruity between structure and environment exceeds the range
of optimal incongruity for these individuals. They are able
to handle a higher level of complexity by cognitive re-
structuring than the individuals with less developed cognitive
structures (see pp. 115-129). At this same level of complexity,
the lattei individuals will find that their optimal levels of
input complexity have been exceeded and that the incongruity
between structure and environment has been exceeded with the
result that successful cognitive restructuring becomes un-
likely. The only recourse left to such an individual at this
level of complexity is to adopt a pattern of receptivity that
minimizes his exposure to the incongruent elements of informa-
tion in the situation that caused him to experience uncertainty
and anxiety. By the same token, this difference between levels
of cognitive development and its effect on determining op-
timal levels of input complexity for the two types of individ-
uals also explains why at the same level of environmental
complexity the less cognitively developed individual will adopt
a narrow scope of receptivity which is characterized by the
dominant use of source-orientation and attitude-valence rules
intended to exclude specific kinds of information while the
more cognitively developed individual will have adopted a
broader scope of receptivity characterized by the dominance
of content- or ientation and approach- or process-orientation
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rules intended to include specific kinds of information.
In closing this discussion of the effects of situational
characteristics on the patterns of receptivity adopted by
individuals in general and the mitigation of these effects by
higher levels of cognitive development, it is important to
stress two points. First, though the discussion has been
phrased in terms of total cognitive structures, it is most
pi obable that levels of development of different sub-parts
of a single individual's cognitive structure will vary greatly.
For example, with respect to politics, an individual's cog-





and integration while with
respect to aesthetics in art and architecture, his cognitive




Second, a broader scope of receptivity need not be
"better" than a narrow scope of receptivity judged in terms of
their helping the individual cope effectively with a situa-
tion. It is very conceivable that a situation characterized
by high input complexity requires attention only to a small
amount of the total available information, or perhaps,
attention only to information being emitted by one of a large
number of sources. In a case such as this, a broad scope of
receptivity may handicap an individual by causing him to
divide his attention among both relevant and irrelevant ele-
ments of information. It is therefore possible that some
situations will favor better performance by individuals with




With this last point we have reached the end of the
development of the conceptual framework being offered as an
explanation of why individuals may differ in their ability to
inarch their patterns of receptivity to the requirements of
different problem-solving situations. We move on now to a
discussion of how some of the assumptions and hypotheses in-
cluded in this conceptual framework could be studied and to
a description of a first minor attempt to investigate re-
ceptivity-adaptability.
CHAPTER V
HYPOTHESES, METHODOLOGY, AND RESULTS
In Chapter IV we developed a conceptual framework for
explaining why individuals might vary with respect to their
receptivity-adaptability. The purpose of developing this
conceptual framework was to provide us with some sort of a
logically conceived outline for investigating individual dif-
ferences in receptivity to information that influence problem-
solving ability, especially problem-solving that involves
utilization of information from social sources (see discussion
in Chapter I, pp.4-6). As mentioned in Chapter I, the empir-
ical problems investigated in this dissertation constitute
only a first step on the way to a full-scale investigation
of individual differences in receptivity-adaptability, but
it is appropriate here to give an indication of what some of
the components of that large-scale investigation would be.
A Larger Scale Investigation
of Receptivity-Adaptability
First of all, presuming that receptivity- adaptability
proves to be a useful heuristic concept, the ultimate goal
of a full-scale empirical undertaking would be the identification
of variables which are the sources of differences in R-A among
individuals and which also might be susceptible to conti ol
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by educators working to improve students' problem-solving
skills. Obviously, an important step in reaching this goal
would be the development of a reliable instrument for
characterizing an individual's R-A profile. The format
such an instrument might take was described earlier (see pp
.
73-91), but before it could be constructed several sub-tasks
would have to be completed. These include:
1. developing a means of measuring the
scope of receptivity adopted by the
individual (see pp . 74-75);
2. developing a means of identifying the
dominance of particular forms of cate-
gory accessibility rules over the
pattern of receptivity adopted by the
individual (see pp. 78-80);
3. developing a means of manipulating
the amount and type (positive, negative,
or ambivalent) of arousal experienced
by the individual in particular sit-
uations in which his receptivity
patterns are being recorded (see pp.107-
110 ) ;
4. developing a means of manipulating the
amount and type of information input
complexity experienced by the individual
in particular situations in which his
receptivity patterns are being recorded
(see pp .165-168) ; and
5. developing a means of determining what
an appropriate pattern of receptivity
is for each of the particular situations
in which the individual's receptivity
patterns are being recorded (see pp . 82-91)-
If these tasks were successfully completed and if an
instrument for characterizing an individual's R-A profile
were developed, the study could then proceed with the inves-
tigation of several major hypotheses suggested by the conceptual




MAJOR HYPOTHESES REGARDING RECEPTIVITY-ADAPTABILITY
1. Receptivity-adaptability increases as the cognitive com-plexity (d. e., the comprehensiveness, differentiation
and integration) of salient portions of the individual's
cognitive structure increases.
a. Scope of receptivity is capable of greater variation
as cognitive complexity increases;
b. Dominance of source-orientation and attitude- valence
rules decreases as cognitive complexity increases.
2. An individual's choice of receptivity patterns when he/
she encounters an incongruity between his/her cognitive
structure and the environment will be influenced by whe-
ther the individual is engaged in attempts to escape the
uncertainty by avoiding the information (stimuli) calling
attention to the incongruity.
3. A focused pattern of receptivity can be maintained only
if there is a reasonably continuous supply of "helpful"
information available.
t
4. An individual's scope of receptivity is influenced by the
amount of arousal he/she is experiencing, and in general,
this effect is best described by a bell-curve with arousal
level plotted along the ordinate and scope of receptivity
plotted along the abscissa.
5. The effect of greater cognitive complexity upon the re-
lationship described in Hypothesis 4 is to move the shape
of the function away from a bell-curve toward an inverted,
U-shaped curve, that is, increased cognitive complexity
mitigates the effect of arousal upon scope of receptivity.
_G. An individual's receptivity pattern will be increasingly
dominated by source-orientation and attitude -valence rules
as his arousal level approaches extremely high or extremely
low levels.
7. As an individual's cognitive complexity increases, the
effect of extreme levels of arousal upon the dominance of
source- or ientat ion and attitude- valence rules over his/her
receptivity pattern is mitigated.
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TABLE 5.1 (Continued)
8. An individual's scope of receptivity is influenced by theinformation input complexity characterizing the situation
and m general, this effect is best described by a bell-
curve with information input complexity plotted along the
ordinate and scope of receptivity plotted along the ab-
scissa.
9. The effect of greater cognitive complexity upon the re-lationship described in Hypothesis 8 is to move the shape
of the function away from a bell-curve toward an inverted,
U-shaped curve, that is, increased cognitive complexity
mitigates the effect of information input complexity upon
scope of receptivity.
10. Extreme levels of information input complexity (i.e., very
low or very high) cause an increase in the dominance of
source-orientation and attitude- valence rules over an
individual's receptivity pattern.
11. As an individual's cognitive complexity increases, the
effect of extreme levels of information input complexity
upon the dominance of source-orientation and attitude-
valence rules over his receptivity patterns is mitigated.
It is worth noting a second time that any investigation
of the relationship between receptivity-adaptability and the
complexity of cognitive structures must take into account the
likelihood that the degrees of comprehensiveness, differen-
tiation, and integration of different sub-parts of a single
individual’s cognitive structure will vary greatly . 1
^-Schroder
,
Driver, and Streufert (1967) hypothesize that
this is the case, and Vannoy (1965), in a comprehensive factor-
ial analysis of 20 instruments which purported or could be con-
strued as measuring cognitive complexity , did not find evidence
that the instruments measured a common, general trait that could
be considered cognitive complexity. Vannoy concluded that a
number of factors contributed to the complexity of an indivi-
dual's interactions with his environment.
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The implication of this possibility is that cognitive com-
plexity would have to be dealt with as a content-specific
variable and measured by a battery of cognitive complexity
tests rather than by any single instrument. In addition, it
is important to entertain the possibility that cognitive com-
plexity is a multi-dimensional, rather than a uni -dimensional
,
variable. For, although it is probable that the three charac-
teristics of cognitive structure- compr ehensiveness
,
differen-
tiation, and integration - are interrelated (see pp. 72-73),
it may be the case that attention to each of the characteristics
separately is the only satisfactory way of characterizing an
individual's cognitive complexity.
If a full-scale empirical investigation of the concep-
tual framework presented in Chapter IV were undertaken, it
would be important to investigate not only the major hypotheses
given in Figure 5.1, but also to devote a sizeable amount of
effort to some important subsidiary hypotheses. These have to
do with the relationships among uncertainty, cognitive re-
structuring, and arousal (see pp. 101-137). Ihese hypotheses
are presented in Table 5.2.
Once again considerable care and effort would have to go
into the development of the instrumentation to test for
tolerance of uncertainty, type and level of arousal, and the
extent of the incongruity between a perceived set of stimuli





SUBSIDIARY HYPOTHESES RELATED TO RECEPTIVITY- ADAPTABI LITY
12. A perceived incongruity between an individual's cognitive
structure and his environment places him in a position of
uncertainty regarding potential occurrences in his environ-
ment and this exposure to uncertainty causes him to ex-
perience arousal.
a. Uncertainty associated with circumstances the indi-
vidual predicts will eventually give him outcomes
above those he is accustomed to receiving (i.e., he
predicts his CL
alt is higher than his CL) causes him
to experience positive arousal. (Excitement hypothesis.)
b. Uncertainty associated with circumstances the indivi-
dual predicts will eventually give him outcomes below
his CL (comparison level) will cause him to experience
negative arousal. (Anxiety hypothesis.)
c. Uncertainty associated with circumstances the indivi-
dual predicts will eventually give him outcomes either
above or^ below his CL causes him to experience ambi-
valent arousal. (Thrill hypothesis.)
13. The pattern of receptivity adopted by an individual will
change in the direction of decreased receptivity to infor-
mation concerning uncertainty as that individual becomes
convinced that his condition of uncertainty will persist
unless the circumstances giving rise to it can be avoided.
14. Cognitive restructuring takes place only when an individual
encounters an optimal incongruity between his cognitive
structure and environmental or internally generated infor-
mation.
15. The greater the amount of restructuring necessary to over-
come uncertainty (i.e. the greater the perceived incon-
gruity)
,
the greater the extent of the uncertainty and con-
sequent arousal experienced by the individual attempting
the cognitive restructuring.
16. The greater an individual's tolerance of uncertainty, the
greater the size of incongruities falling within the lange
of optimal incongruity (i.e. the larger the size of cog-
nitive restructuring he can attempt without experiencing




Within the scope of the investigation undertaken for the
empirical portion of this dissertation were some more limited
goals intended to indicate the potential fruitfulness of large-
scale research efforts. One such goal was to discover if
people change their patterns of receptivity to information as
the problem situations they face change. The answer to this
very basic question would give some clue as to whether or not
it is useful to think in terms of receptivity-adaptability
as a human trait.
In the conceptual framework two categories of variables
which influence problem-solving situations were identified:
(1) those variables which contribute to the potential infor-
mation input complexity of the situation and (2) those variables
'S
which contribute to the potential arousal level of an indivi-
dual in the situation. In this experiment only one element
(the problem’s scope, e.g. whether its scope includes only
legal issues or also moral, social, and environmental issues)
in the first category was manipulated in the two problem
situations subjects faced. In one of the problems only two
elements (time-po tentially- available and money-potential ly-
available) which contribute to arousal level were manipulated
and in the other problem situation only one variable f i oin this
category (time-potentially-available) was manipulated. Ihus,
the manipulation of problem situation conditions to achieve
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the first goal of this research effort was very limited and
crude compared to that called for in a full-blown investiga-
tion of this aspect of the conceptual framework.
A second goal of the research was to see if the postu-
lated relationship between receptivity and cognitive complexity
is strong enough to show up even though the instrument used to
measure cognitive complexity presumes that it is a general,
uni-dimensional trait rather than a content - specif ic and multi-
dimensional one as conceived in the conceptual framework. If
this were to be the case, less effort would have to be directed
toward developing a battery of content- specif ic tests of cog-
nitive complexity than if this relationship is not manifested
using this already existing version of an instrument measuring
cognitive complexity.
The third goal of the research was similar to the one
just mentioned. It was to see if any preliminary support for
the existence of a relationship between receptivity-adapta-
bility and tolerance of uncertainty could be found using a test
of intolerance of ambiguity as the measure of tolerance of
uncertainty. If such evidence were found it would be a first
step in the investigation of some of the subsidiary hypotheses
presented in Table 5.2.
Hypotheses . The specific hypotheses tested in association
with the above goals were:
Hypothesis A: As the scope of the problem
diminishes, the scope of re-






As the available completion time
and/or available money diminish,
the scope of receptivity adopted
by an individual will decrease.
Intolerance of uncertainty as
measured by the Budner Intolerance
of Ambiguity Test is inversely
related to intra- sub j ect variation
in scope of receptivity across
problem conditions.
Cognitive complexity as measured
by the Bieri Test of Cognitive
Complexity is directly related
to intra-subject variation in
scope of receptivity across prob-
lem conditions.
It should be noted that the above hypotheses are formu-
lated only in terms of scope of receptivity to information
(i.e., the range of categories with high accessibility) and
not in terms of patterns of receptivity to information. The
decision was made to postpone studying the dominance of par-
ticular forms of category accessibility rules in this study
when it became apparent that developing a reliable and accu-
rate means of identifying such category rule dominance would
greatly complicate both instrumentation procedures and data
analysis
.
Subjects and experimental design . The subjects used in
the experiment were sixty- four male and female college students
enrolled in the ubiquitous introductory psychology course.
Each subject's scope of receptivity was measured under four
conditions in each of two different problem situations. Iheii
scores were then analyzed to determine if there were signifi-
cant changes in scope of receptivity across the foui conditions
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and to find if there were any relationships between a sub-
ject's variation in scope of receptivity across conditions
and his/her scores on a test of intolerance of ambiguity and
on a test of cognitive complexity.
The experiment was set up as two separate analyses of
variance designs each with one between- sub j ect and two within-
subject variables. A subject's scores on the Budner (1962)
Intolerance of Ambiguity Test was the between- sub j ects variable
in the first analysis of variance and the scores on the Bieri
(1955) Cognitive Complexity test the between- sub j ects variable
in the second analysis of variance. In both cases the be-
tween- sub j ects variable had two levels arrived at by a median-
split of the subjects into equal groups of high and low scoring
sub j ects
.
The two within- sub j ect variables were problem scope and
time/money potentially available in both of the analyses of
variance. Each of these two variables also had two levels
yielding four conditions for each problem situation:
Condition 1 -- Broad Problem Scope, Ample Time/
Money
Condition 2 -- Broad Problem Scope, Limited Time/
Money
Condition 3 -- Narrow Problem Scope, Ample Time/
Money
Condition 4 -- Narrow Problem Scope, Limited Time/
Money
The experimental design resulting from this arrangement
of be tween- sub j ect and within- sub j ect variables is represented
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in Table 5.3 below. In this table, 'A' and 'C' are In-
tolerance of Ambiguity and Cognitive Complexity respectively,
*P' is problem scope and '
T
1 is time/money available.
TABLE 5.3
THE EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN













Analysis of Variance 2
Y
6 4 * 2 • 2 * 2
Procedure. Subjects were given a test packet consis-
ting of written directions, eight hypothetical problem situa-
tions, and two electronically- scored answer sheets. (See
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Appendix for copies of the test instruments.) Subjects were
then directed by the experimentor to print their names, class
year, and sex on the answer sheets in the appropriate spaces
and given directions on how to mark their answers for the
three separate parts of the experiment. They were then told
that each part of the experiment should be completed taking
as much time as needed before obtaining the next part of the
experiment. This procedure was to be followed until all three
parts of the experiment had been completed and turned in to
the experimentor. Subjects, after being given an opportunity
to ask clarifying questions about the above directives, were
instructed to begin working on Part I after reading the written
directions that accompanied it. The subjects each completed
the three parts of the experiment in order, turned the tests
and answer sheets in, were given a brief, written explanation
of the purpose of the experiment, and allowed to leave.
Measuring Instruments . The first part of the experiment
containing the eight hypothetical problems actually consisted
of the four conditions identified above for each of two prob-
lem situations. The basic format of the instrument consisted
of a written description of a hypothetical problem situation
and an accompanying list of several elements of information
potentially available to the problem-solver. Each of the two
problem situations was written in four variations intended to
require changes in scope of receptivity appropriate to effi-
cient solution of the problem. For the purpose of the study,
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receptivity was defined as an individual's "taking into
consideration" a particular element of information on the list
accompanying the problem situations. This definition is an
attempt to make a distinction between receptivity and per -
cegtion
,
which implies only having a sensory awareness of a
stimulus, and also to make a distinction between receptivity
and persuasion, which implies acceptance of the value communi-
cated in an element of information.
In actually working through the two problem situations,
each subject read the description of the problem situation for
that condition, rated each of the twenty accompanying informa-






po s s ib ly relevant,
or irrelevant to solution of the problem under that condition,
and repeated this procedure until all four conditions of the
two problem situations were completed. In the case of the
first problem situation, the "abortion problem," the twenty
information items were designed to fit into six categories
(religious, socio-economic, psychological, environmental,
legal, and political) of which only the fifth (legal) was
designed to be of salient importance in the "narrow scope"
conditions. In the case of the second problem situation,
the "transportation problem," the twenty items were designed
to fit into four categories (cost, passenger utilization,
environmental-aesthetic, and sociological) of which only the
second (passenger utilization) was designed to be of salient




These two problem situations with their twenty informa-
tion items were chosen from four situations accompanied by
from forty to sixty-five information items each. A pre-test
and item analysis of these led to the selection of the problem
situations and information items used in the experiment. The
first of the additional instruments completed by subjects was
the Vannoy (1965) modification of the Bieri (1955) test of
Cognitive complexity (which itself is a modification of
Kelly's (1955) Role Construct Repertory Test). The Bieri
test is based on Kelly's theoretical formulations regarding
the existence of personal constructs in each individual. An
individual's system of constructs was hypothesized to function
as the structure through which an individual perceived his
environment and is thus akin to the concept of cognitive
structure presented in Chapter III. Bieri conceived of cog-
nitive complexity as the degree of differentiation in an in-
dividual's construct system and designed the test of cognitive
complexity to measure the extent to which persons used more or
fewer distinct dimensions to describe persons in their lives.
Presumably, the more similarity among descriptions of differ-
ent persons by an individual, the less distinct the dimensions
being used and the less differentiated his construct system.
The Bieri test was selected as the measure of cognitive
complexity in this study for several reasons despite its being




differentiation) identified in the conceptual frame-
work. Chief among these reasons was that it is a more easily
administered and scored test than others which are available.
Also the theoretical assumptions underlying the development of
the Bieri test are more similar to those presented in Chapter
III (wherein the nature of cognitive structures is discussed)
than any other test of cognitive complexity excepting the
Schroder Sentence Completion Test. The Schroder test was not
used because its complex scoring procedures precluded its use
in the experimental design chosen for the study. Finally, the
Bieri test, however inadequate as a measure of cognitive com-
plexity, was judged by Vannoy (1965) to be the best general
measure of cognitive compelxity of the twenty he analyzed be-
cause it seemed to tap to some degree all three of the major
components of complexity identified by Vannoy.
The other instrument used in the study was Budner's
(1962) Intolerance of Ambiguity Test. This instrument was
selected because it purports to measure a trait, tolerance of
ambiguity, which could be presumed to be similar to tolerance
of uncertainty, whose relationship to receptivity-adaptability
was of concern in this study. The instrument was left essen-
tially unaltered with the exception that, to permit mechanical
scoring, the number of possible subject responses to each




Hypothesis A: As the scope of the problem
diminishes, the scope of
receptivity adopted by an
individual will decrease.
The most basic proposition discussed in the theoretical
portion of this thesis and investigated in its empirical
portion is the notion that individuals significantly alter
their patterns of receptivity to information as the conditions
of the problem situations they face change. To the extent that
one factor contributing to information input complexity is a
test of this basic notion the results of the study give it
support. Specifically, the results support the hypothesis that
a change in the problem’s scope, one factor contributing to
information input complexity, is associated with a change in
an individual's scope of receptivity to information. Table 5.4
presents the analysis of variance table pertaining to Hypothe-
sis A.
The first column in Table 5.4 gives the variables and
their combinations included in this analysis of variance. Line
two of the table gives the data pertaining to Variable P. the
scope of the problem. As mentioned in the description of
the experiment given earlier, two levels or problem scope
were present in each problem: broad problem scope and narrow
problem scope. The variance attributable to the main effect
of this problem scope variable was significant at the .01
level of significance as shown in the sixth column of the
table. The F-Test value for the main effect of the problem
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TABLE 5.4
RESULTS OF ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE WITH INTOLERANCE OF



















A 160.9 1 160.9 256.0 0.457
P 14716.8 1 14716.8 256.0 160.8* A
T 11580.
5
1 11580.5 256.0 •157.9* B
A X P 0.0 1 0.0 128.0 0.0 C
A X T 5.5 1 .5.5 128.0 0.1 C
P X T 2265.5 1 2265.5 128.0 120.5* A and B
l X P X T 5.5 1 5.5 64 .
0
0.3 C
S (A) 21688.8 62 349.8 8.0 _
SP (A) 5680. 62 91.6 4.0 _ _
ST (A) 4522.9 62 72.9 4.0 _
SPT(A) 1168.9 62 1819 2.0 -
^Significant at the .01 level.
KEY: A = Budner Intolerance of Ambiguity
P = Problem Scope
T = Time/Money Available
scope was 160.8 while the value required for significance with
one and sixty- two degrees of freedom is 7.08.
Further evidence of the study's support for Hypothesis
A is given when the mean subject score in the broad problem- scope
conditions are compared with the mean subject score in the narrow
problem- scope conditions. Table 5.5 gives the cell means for both
the problem- scope variable and the time/money-available variable.
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TABLE 5.5








































Table 5.6 shows the results of using Tukey's BSD method
of multiple comparisons (Tukey, 1951). The Tukey test indicates
whether or not the difference between means is significant
and, in addition to indicating the significance of main effects,
is an aid to interpreting the significant interaction effects
between problem scope (Variable P) and time/money available
(Variable T)
.
The first column in Table 5.6 indicates which cell means
are being compared, for example, to determine whether the
difference between the mean score under narrow problem- scope
conditions and the mean score under broad problem- scope con-
ditions is significant, the number five and number six cell
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^'Significant at .01 level
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means from Table 5.5 are compared. In this case the differ-
ence is significant and we can conclude that the main effect
of problem scope upon scope of receptivity was not a chance
occurrence. This result thus supports Hypothesis A.
Hypothesis B: As the time and/or money avail-
able for problem completion
diminishes, the scope of re-
ceptivity adopted by an indi-
vidual will decrease.
As m the case of Hypothesis A, Hypothesis B was for-
mulated to investigate the validity of the notion that changes
in problem situations will cause individuals to alter their
patterns of receptivity to information. While Hypothesis A
concerned a variable that affected the information input com-
plexity of a problem situation, Hypothesis B concerns variables
which affect the arousal level of the individual in the prob-
lem situation. The specific variables mentioned in Hypothe-
sis B are the time and the money available for problem solution.
As shown in the third line of Table 5.4 above, the ini-
tial analysis of variance did indicate that time/money avail-
able (Variable T) was a significant source of variance. The
F statistic for Variable T (time/money available) was 157.9,
while the F required for significance at .01 level was only 7.08.
As in the case of Hypothesis A, when the significance of
the main effect of time/money available (Variable T) is tested
by comparing the appropriate cell means (numbers 7 and 8 in
Table 5.5) and subjecting them to the Tukey test, the re-
sults again support Hypothesis B. The difference between the
198
mean score of subjects under the limited time/money avail-
able conditions and their mean score under the ample time/money
available conditions is 9.52, as shown in the third column of
Table 5.6, while a difference of only 5.41 would be signi-
ficant at the .01 level.
As mentioned earlier, the Tukey test for multiple com-
parison of means allows us to go beyond the data given in the
initial analysis of variance which shows that the main effects
of problem scope (Variable P) and time/money available (Varia-
ble T) and their interaction effect (see line 6 of Table 5.4)
are significant. The nature of the interaction between these
two variables becomes more clear when we refer again to the
results of the Tukey multiple comparison analysis presented
in Table 5.6.
As the third and fourth rows of the table show, the in-
teraction between problem scope and time/money available is
complementary in nature. That is, when the two variables
are both operating to decrease an individual's scope of re-
ceptivity, their combined effect is much greater than either of
them operating singly (row 3 of the table)
;
and when the two
variables are operating in opposition to one another their
interaction has the effect of cancelling each other out
(row 4 of the table)
.
This complementarity between problem scope and time/
money available is also shown by the comparisons presented in
rows 4, 5, 6, and seven of Table 5.6. The fourth and fifth
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rows contain data suggesting that the effect of problem scope
under conditions of limited time/money available is much strong-
er than under conditions of ample time/money available. Simi-
larly, the sixth and seventh rows of the table show that time/
money available has a significant effect upon scope of re-
ceptivity when the problem scope is narrow, but that the effect of
time/money available does not reach significance when the prob-
lem scope is broad.
This last finding gives rise to an interesting implica-
tion regarding the interaction effects of the two variables
(problem scope and time/money available). As argued in the
theoretical chapters of this dissertation, it is usually quite
functional foi an individual to decrease his scope of recep-
tivity when either the problem scope or the availability of
time/money is decreased. At first glance the complementarity
of these two variables when they interact would also seem to
be quite functional. However, there are cases when this com-
plementarity may be disfunctional
. For example, when problem
scope is broad it is probably more important for an individual
to be responsive to decreases in time/money available for prob-
lem solution than it is when the problem scope is narrow . Yet
this situation would call for the individual to respond to
the two variables in an inverse fashion resulting in the seventh
row of Table 5.6 showing a significant difference between
means. This implication suggests that an individual with high
receptivity-adaptability would have to do more than just follow
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a natural tendency to decrease his scope of receptivity as
more and more variables individually change in a direction calling
for a decrease in receptivity. Rather, the individual would
iiave to consider what sort of an. interaction between the varia-
bles would result in the most appropriate pattern of recep-
tivity for that particular problem situation.
A final comparison made in Table 5.6 does not pertain
directly to either Hypothesis A or B
,
but is nevertheless of
passing interest. The eighth row in the table shows the re-
sults of a comparison between the effects of problem scope and
time/money availability. Since the difference in means is
not significant, it suggests that neither of the two variables
is significantly stronger than the other.
Hypothesis C: Intolerance of uncertainty as
measured by the Budner Intoler-
ance of Ambiguity Test is in-
versely related to intra- sub j ect
variation in scope of receptivity
across problem conditions.
Hypothesis D: Cognitive complexity as measured
by the Bieri Test of Cognitive
Complexity is directly related
to intra- sub j ect variation in
scope of receptivity across
problem conditions.
The other two hypotheses investigated in this study con-
cerned the relationship of intra- sub j ect variance in scope of
receptivity across problem-situation conditions to subject
scores on the Budner Intolerance of Ambiguity Test (Hypothesis
C) and the Bieri Test of Cognitive Complexity (Hypothesis D) .
The data pertaining to Hypothesis C is contained in rows 4,5,
and 7 of Table 5.4 above. The data pertaining to Hypothesis
D essentially parallels that of Hypothesis C but is given in
a separate table, Table 5.7 below.
TABLE 5.7
RESULTS OF ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE WITH COGNITIVE





















1 20.7 256.0 0.057 _
P 14716.8 1 14716.8 256.9 168.8* A
T 11580.5 1 11580.5 256.0 159.0* B
C X P 265.9 1 265.9 12 8.0 3.05 D
C X T 21.5 1 21.5 128 .
0
0.296 D
P X T 2265.5 1 2265.5 128.0 120.0 A and B
C X P X T 1.0 1 1 .
0
64.0 0.529 D
S(C) 21828.9 62 352.8 8.0 - -
SP(C) 5414.6 62 87.3 4.0 - -
ST (C) 4506.8 62 72.7 4.0 - -
SPT(C) 1173.4 62 18.9 2.0 - -
* Significant at the .01 level.
KEY: C = Bieri Cognitive Complexity
P = Problem Scope
T = Time/Money Available
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It is quickly apparent by looking at the fourth,
fifth, and seventh rows of these two tables that neither Hy-
pothesis C nor Hypothesis D received any support from the
study s results. An F statistic of 7.08 was required for
significance and none of the interaction effects which included
either intolerance of ambiguity (Variable A) or cognitive
complexity (Variable C) demonstrated even a slight tendency
toward reaching significance. It should be remembered that it
was only the interaction of these two factors with the in-
dependent variables manipulated in the problem situations
(i.e., problem scope and time/money availability) which re-
late to the hypotheses since it was predicted that intra -
subject variatio n in scope of receptivity across conditions
would be related to intolerance of ambiguity and cognitive
complexity. It was postulated that these two characteristics
would influence how much a subject responded to changes in
factors potentially contributing to his arousal level or
the information input complexity of the situation.
In the case of the Budner Intolerance of Ambiguity Test
(Hypothesis C) there are several possible interpretations of
the study's disappointing results. It may be that Budner 's
test is an adequate measure of intolerance of uncertainty and
that the postulated relationship between this trait and
receptivity-adaptability does not exist. It may be that the
Budner test is not an adequate measure of intolerance of un-
certainty on the other hand, which is a serious possibility
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since its choice was based only upon the face validity of the
Budner test and the logical (not empirical) relationship
between ambiguity and uncertainty rather than upon any exist-
ing data.
Another, and more likely possibility, is that because
the subjects were left to imagine the arousal level they would
expei ience under the various conditions of the problem sit-
uations, the effect of arousal level (expected to be exacerbated
by a high intolerance of uncertainty) upon subjects' patterns
of receptivity was insufficiently powerful. This interpre-
tation gains some support from the observation that subiects
seemed to have been affected more by money as a factor contri-
buting to arousal than by time availability . 2 If this is
because a lack of money and its effects are more easily imagined
than a similar lack of time, an actual experiencing of factors
contributing to arousal level by the subjects would quite likely
have increased the possibility of a significant interaction
effect supporting Hypothesis C showing up in the results. In
other words, had the experimental design provided for a
sufficiently strong means of inducing arousal, the postulated
relationship between intolerance of uncertainty and recep-
tivity-adaptability might have shown up as a significant
interaction between intolerance of ambiguity and intra-subj ect
variation in scope of receptivity.
2This result showed up in an unsystematic comparison of
Variable T effects in the two different problem situations.
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A final explanation of the failure of the results to
give even minimal support to Hypothesis C concerns the dis-
cussion m Chapter IV of the shape of the curve describing the
relationship between arousal and scope of receptivity (see pp
.
156-166). Ihere it was argued that the curve describing the
relationship is probably an inverted, U-shaped curve. It was
also argued that some of the characteristics of cognitive
structure that favor high receptivity-adaptability and a
higher tolerance of uncertainty would tend to mitigate the
effects of arousal. Ihis would steepen the sides of the curve,
making it less and less bell-shaped, for a subject with a
greater tolerance of uncertainty but leave the major areas
under the two curves coinciding. It would be only in limited,
critical portions of the curves near either tail that signi-
ficant differences between subjects would appear. Figure 5.8
presents such curves for two hypothetical subjects. Note that
the two subjects differ in their reactions to arousal only in
those portions of the curves near the tails and labelled ’ K
'
and ‘L’. The significance of this occurrence is that the
arousal level induced by the problem situations would have to
fall into those limited critical regions of the arousal curve
in order for the effects of differences in tolerance of un-
certainty to manifest themselves as differences in scope of
receptivity. It is quite possible that for most of the sub-
jects, the act of imagining the arousal levels they would
experience in the different problem- si tuation conditions would
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FIGURE 5.8
TWO HYPOTHETICAL SUBJECTS' CHANGES
RECEPTIVITY AS A FUNCTION OF THEIR
IN SCOPE OF
AROUSAL LEVEL
KEY: = subject with high tolerance of
uncertainty
= subject with low tolerance of
uncertainty
not result in an arousal level high enough or low enough to
put them in the critical areas near the tails of the curve
where inter- sub j ect differences would be greatest. Conse-
quently, subject variability with regard to tolerance of
uncertainty was probably too small to be detected of to be
of import.
With an eye toward such future research efforts, we should
now speculate as to why the relationship between the Bicii test
scores and the intra- sub j ect variability were not strong enough
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to appear m the results. One possible explanation is essen-
tially the same as the last one discussed above concerning the
Budner test: the manipulation of the arousal
- level variable
(time/money available) was probably not strong enough to bring
out significant differences in intra-subject variability
attributable to inter- sub j ect differences in cognitive com-
plexity
.
A second possible explanation is based on the assumption
that cognitive complexity is probably a content- specif i c trait
rather than a general trait. Assuming this is the case, and
recalling chat tne Bicri test was constructed only to measure
cognitive complexity in the area of social perception, we may
conjecture that the lack of overlap in areas of content (sub-
parts of a cognitive structure) covered by the Bieri test and
the problem situations made stronger relationships unlikely.
This would occur if there were no consistent, positive re-
lationship between subjects' cognitive complexity in the areas
covered by the Bieri test and their cognitive complexity in
the areas overed by the problem situations.
A third possible explanation of the lack of significant
interaction effects also concerns the construction of the
Bieri test. As mentioned earlier (pp. 188-190), Bieri conceived
of cognitive complexity in terms of the differentiation of a
cognitive structure while the theoretical framework presented
in Chapter IV characterizes cognitive complexity as consisting
of the degree of differentiation and the degree of comprehen-
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siveness and the degree o£ integration of the structure.
Thus the Bieri test purports to measure only one of the three
characteristics of cognitive structure we have hypothesized will
influence receptivity-adaptability. Although no guesses were
made in Chapter IV as to which of these characteristics is most
closely related to receptivity-adaptability, it is not unlikely
that they have differential importance. For example, differ-
ejit iat ion of cognitive structures may correlate highly with the
scope of receptivity individuals adopt under given problem-
situation conditions, but not correlate highly with adaptability
of scope of receptivity across conditions. If this were the
case, and if integration of cognitive structures correlated highly
with both scope of receptivity and adaptability, the influence
of cognitive complexity would have been altogether lost in
this study since the analyses considered only the relation-
ship between differentiation (as measured by the Bieri test)
and adaptability (as measured by the intra-subject variation
in scope of receptivity.) To alleviate this problem, future
research, as mentioned at the beginning of this chapter,
would have to measure cognitive complexity as a multi-
dimensional variable, rather than as a uni-dimensional variable
as it was measured in this study.
In summarizing the study's results, we may say that the
data supports the notions that persons adapt their patterns of
receptivity to problem- situation characteristics, but the data
gives no support whatsoever to the notion that tolerance of
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uncertainty and receptivity-adaptability, or cognitive
complexity and receptivity adaptability are closely related,
although several plausible reasons for why these relationships
could exist without appearing in the data can be offered.
CHAPTER VI
IMPLICATIONS FOR RESEARCH AND PRACTICE
It is customary and reasonable to conclude an empirically
oriented dissertation with a chapter devoted to the identifi-
cation of the implications the study has for further research
in that field or for applications in a closely related prac-
tical field. My primary goal in this dissertation has been
to present the broad outlines of a theory regarding the de-
terminants of an individual’s receptivity to information, based
on a structuralist view of an individual's interaction with
his environment. Only secondarily was my goal to take a first
step toward an investigation of the major hypotheses of which
the theory is composed. The scope of the theoretical, or con-
ceptual framework outlined is broad. By contrast, the em-
pirical undertaking, that first step toward the investigation
of major hypotheses, is narrow. As a consequence, the im-
plications of the theoretical portion of the dissertation
are broad, speculative, and pertain to suggested directions
that educational/psychological research and educational prac-
tice might take while the implications of the empirical study
are narrower and pertain to specific suggested research pro-
jects that might be undertaken. This concluding chapter le-
flects this difference by dealing with implications in two
separate sections: (1) implications of the empirical study
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for further research; and (2) implications of the conceptual
framework for further research and for educational practice.
Implications of the Empirical Study
for Further Research
Two of the hypotheses investigated in the study received
strong support:
Hypothesis A: As the scope of the problem dim-
inishes, the scope of receptivity
adopted by an individual will
decrease
.
Hypothesis B: As the time and/or money available
for problem completion diminish,
the scope of receptivity adopted
by an individual will decrease.
Among the implications of these hypotheses is that in-
dividuals do adapt their patterns of receptivity to infor-
mation to changing problem situations. A series of experi-
ments should be directed at discovering what the situational
characteristics are that influence these changes in receptivity,
and a parallel scries of experiments might be directed at dis-
covering what patterns of receptivity to information are most
appropriate to effective problem solving given defined sets
of situational characteristics. The results of a successful
set of such experiments would be two-fold. The first result
would be a greater knowledge of the problem-solving process
one including the information-gathering component. The study
reported here assumed that two categories of situational
characteristics, those contributing to arousal level and to
information input complexity, are important influences upon
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the range of categories regarded as pertinent during infor-
mation gathering. One characteristic from each category,
time/money availability (arousal level factor) and problem
scope (information input complexity factor), was chosen to
test this assumption initially, and the results were strong
enough to suggest that further investigation of the effects
of these characteristics and others in the same categories
would be fruitful.
The second result of a series of experiments such as
that suggested above would be the establishment of a base for
constructing a means of measuring individual differences with
respect to the effect of specific situational characteristics
upon information-gathering aspects of problem solving. It
is likely that situational characteristics contributing to
arousal level and information input complexity probably have
significant differential effects on people and that these
differences would have import for other areas of investigation
into problem-solving processes. A significant practical con-
cern worth investigating would be the implications of the
differential influences of these situational characteristics
upon persons taking allegedly "standardized” aptitude and
achievement tests; for example, what effect does time-availa-
bility have on different test-takers' scopes of receptivity.
The other two hypotheses investigated in this study
concerned possible sources of these individual differences.
Neither Hypothesis 3, that subject intolerance of ambiguity
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as measured by the Budner test is related to intra- subj ect
variation nor Hypothesis 4, that cognitive complexity as
measured by the Bieri is related to intra-subject variation
in scope of receptivity, received significant support. These
results may suggest that the search for underlying differences
in human traits influencing differences in receptivity-
adaptability should be broadened to include others besides
cognitive complexity and tolerance of uncertainty. However,
the more important implications of these inconclusive results
may be methodological rather than theoretical. On the one
hand, actual problem-solving situations with experimentor
control over factors that affect arousal levels may have to
be substituted for paper and pencil situations requiring sub-
jects to imagine the presence of these factors. On the other
hand, perhaps the development of better instruments for mea-
suring tolerance of uncertainty and cognitive complexity
should precede any further attempts to link either of these
factors with individual differences in receptivity- adaptabil ity
.
More generally speaking, the most significant impli-
cation of the results of the empirical study is that recepti-
vity-adaptability is a concept worth further investigation.
Implications of the Conceptual Framework
Implications for Future Research . In addition to the
research endeavors suggested in the previous section and on
pages 178 to 183 above which focus upon the relationships
between characteristics of cognitive structure and recept ivit>
-
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adaptability, the conceptual framework presented in Chapter
IV suggests the importance of identifying and investigating
possible sources of individual differences in characteristics
of cognitive structure. Careful case studies of children
identified as being various "cognitive types" similar to the
studies conducted by Adorno et_ al. into the early home and
school environments of children could yield important insights into
environmental factors which are possible contributors to
differences in cognitive development. Further, more precise
study of these factors could then be undertaken. In parti-
cular, the thinking underlying the theory developed in Chap-
ter V implies that the roles played by parents and early
teachers in controlling the child's exposure to uncertainty
and the consequences of such exposures may be crucial. For
example, do highly authoritarian parents on the one hand reduce
a child's exposure to uncertainty through tight control over
the behavior patterns he or she is allowed to engage in and
througli limiting in a constant way the environmental stimuli
to which the child is exposed? And might they on the other
hand foster a low tolerance for uncertainty in the child
by meting out punishment when he or she departs from the
prescribed patterns of behavior (i.e., delves into uncertain
areas). Similarly, could highly authoritarian parents en-
courage an over - dependence upon source-orientation and/or
at titudinal -valence types of category accessibility rules?
Such might be the case if these parental types consistently
insisted that the child use the source and/or attitude valence
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of information as the criteria for accepting or rejecting
information from the environment.
Implications of the Conceptual Fr-amework:
A
- Implications for future research
. In Chapters II
through „ IV two major conceptual themes were developed: (1)
that receptivity to information is most appropriately descri-
bed as a dynamic process undergoing transformations as the
characteristics of the situations in which an individual
finds himself change, and (2) that the characteristics of an
individual's receptivity to information are linked to charac-
teristics of his cognitive structure through the influences
of the latter on the individual's emotional or affective states
when confronted with uncertainty. The implications of the
thinking upon which these two themes are based fall into three
broad research areas. The first of these is an investigation
of the process involved in an individual’s selectively re-
ceiving information from his external environment and/or
stored in or generated by his mind. A preliminary attempt
was made in the discussion of Chapter III (pp . 7 7ff j to identify
key components of patterns of receptivity to information -
namely category accessibility rules of several types and
scope of receptivity. This attempt to identify the critical
components of receptivity patterns serves only to highlight
the value a systematic investigation of this issue would have
for facilitating further exploration into individual dif-
ferences in receptivity to information. The departure made
215
in the conceptual framework from characterizing receptivity
only in terms in scope and degree of openness to counter-
att i tudinal information by introducing the notion of cate-
goiy accessibility rules adds a new, and perhaps useful,
perspective to explorations into individual differences in
receptivity
.
The conceptual framework also implies that future in-
vestigations into receptivity should lay a heavier stress
upon exploring the interaction of situational variables such
as time availability and information novelty with personality/
cognitive characteristics of individuals. More specifically,
the conceptual framework recommends particular attention to
situational factors contributing to arousal and/or information
input complexity and their interaction with characteristics
of cognitive structure such as comprehensiveness, differentiation,
and integration with personality characteristics related to
tolerance of uncertainty (e.g., tolerance of ambiguity, mani-
fest anxiety, degree of felt security, etc.).
One of the more intriguing notions discussed in the
conceptual framework (pp . 105f f) was that of the difference
between positive, negative, and ambivalent arousal as factors
influencing patterns of receptivity to information. Because
this is an extension beyond the usual treatment of arousal
as a single factor, it also merits consideration as a topic
for future research into receptivity patterns and their de-
terminants .
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A second research area for which the conceptual frame-
work has implications is the area of problem solving. The
most obvious implication is that the information seeking/
processing aspect of problem solving needs to be studied as
a constantly changing process witli an attempt made to iden-
tify the different patterns of receptivity appropriate to
particular problem-solving phases (e.g., problem definition,
identification of alternative solutions, evaluating potential
consequences of a given situation, etc.) and to different
problem characterist ics (e.g., problem scope, problem com-
plexity, solution verifiability, etc.).
In addition, the conceptual framework supplies a ra-
tionale for following the lead of Schroder, Driver, and
Streufert (see pp . 156 ff ) in investigating the differential
effects of situational factors upon individuals during the
information gathering phases of problem solving. Their cat-
egorization into factors contributing to potential information
input complexity and factors contributing to potential arousal
level provide two possible foci for such investigations.
A third research area for which the conceptual frame-
work suggests possible lines of exploration is the area of
cognitive development. A sizeable portion of Chaptei 111 is
devoted to identifying and discussing characteristics of
cognitive structure and three of them (comprehensiveness,
differentiation, and integration) selected as the most im-
portant in determining the cognitive complexity of a particular
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individual. This assumption needs a much more complete ex-
ploration than it has yet received - an exploration that first
attempts to define the role each plays in determining cog-
nitive complexity and then attempts to determine the nature
of their interrelationships.
The extensive discussion given each of these character-
istics in Chapter III (see pp . 60 ff) implies that a fruitful
approach to their exploration might be based upon the notion
of a cognitive structure made up of categories which in turn
consist of the overlapping of the dimensions which define
them. This notion of evaluative dimensions as the basic
building block of cognitive structure is attractive because
it is consistent with the essential multi-dimensional nature
of environmental phenomena and allows for the explanation of
differences in perception of a given phenomenon among dif-
ferent individuals.
In Chapter IV, the discussion of cognitive structure
was expanded to a consideration of the process by which changes
in a cognitive structure would take place. The relationship
between uncertainty, arising out of an individual’s encoun-
tering a situation the outcome of which he could not predict
because of incongruities between the situation and his cog-
nitive structure, and arousal was cited as a crucial factor
in determining whether or not an individual would attempt
cognitive restructuring. This is a basic hypothesis, which
if true, could have significant implications for educational
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piactices ( see section below) and for this reason merits
further investigation. On a broader scale, reasoning pre-
sented in the conceptual framework implies that future inves-
t igat ions into the sources of individual differences in cog-
nitive complexity should give careful attention to the inter-
relationship between aspects of the environment pertaining to
an individual's cognitive functioning (e.g., variety of
phenomena present, level of abstraction at which information
pertaining to phenomena are presented, the distinctness of
dimensions characterizing the phenomena, the sequence of
presentation of stimuli, etc.) and aspects pertaining to his
affective state (e.g., threat presented by failure to over-
come uncertainty, security level associated with the environ-
ment, the potential for receiving positive outcomes as a result
of encountering uncertainty, etc.).
Implications for educational practice . Given the ab-
sence of significant experimental validation of most of the
conceptual framework presented in Chapter IV, all practical
implications derived from it must be tentative. It should
also be noted that none of the implications for educational
practice discussed below are very novel since most of them
conform to practices currently based on a smattering of
learning theory and a sizeable store of intuition and "con-
ventional wisdom." The implications are nevertheless presen-
ted because they help to reinforce presumably desireable
practices - to raise their priority - lest they be neglected
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for other practices also supported by intuition and "con-
ventional wisdom" but not by any systematic theory, however
untested
.
The most general implication contained in the conceptual
framework concerns the role uncertainty plays in motivating
attempts to make changes in cognitive structure resulting in
cognitive growth. Following Berlyne’s notion of conceptual
conflict one can reason that uncertainty arises when an in-
dividual encounters an incongruity between environmental
phenomena and his representation of the environment as em-
bodied in his cognitive structure. Because the individual
cannot rely on the relationships represented in his cognitive
structure to predict the consequences likely to follow from
the occurence of incongruent phenomena, he has no means of
choosing actions on his part that will lead to optimum out-
comes for him. Consequently, the individual experiences
arousal, which, if negative he will wish to relieve and if
positive or ambivalent will be eager, to forgo in favor of
discovering and experiencing anticipated rewarding outcomes.
A significant means of alleviating negative arousal through
restoring predictability and removing uncertainty is for the
individual to engage in information-gathering behavior (in-
volving either externally available information or infor-
mation generated internally by directed thinking) and to use
this information to make appropriate changes in one’s cog-
nitive structure - changes that render it congruent with the
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environment and restore the ability to predict the conscpuen-
ces of events.
Applying this principle of motivation to educational
settings implies that a major role to be played by the ed-
ucator is that of arranging for his students to encounter
significant incongruities between their cognitive structures
and their environment, the latter being partially susceptible
to manipulation by the educator. It is apparent than, that
simply providing information to a learner, even when it is
accompanied by some extrinsic form of motivation to recall
the information or use it in the process of solving a problem,
may not be sufficient to motivate the learner to undertake
cognitive restructuring. For the latter to occur, a significant
incongruity must be encountered.
Related to this implication for educational practice
is one derived from the notion that an individual can choose
to deal with uncertainty either by attempting to overcome it
through cognitive restructuring or through isolating himself
from the environmental or internal stimuli that are the source
of the incongruity. The assumption made in the conceptual
framework is that the former course of action will only be
chosen if the incongruity is of an optimal size (or the sti-
mulus situation moderately novel according to Piaget). Recall
that optimal incongruity occurs when the incongruity is neither
so small that the relevant cognitive categories are not dif-
ferentiated enough to allow the individual to percei\e the
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incongruity nor so large that the comprehensiveness and/or
integration of the individual's cognitive structure is in-
sufficient to allow him to perceive appropriate structural
changes .
The application of this principal of optimal incon-
gruity to educational practice calls for the educator to be
both sufficiently familiar with each of his students' cog-
nitive structures and sufficiently concerned with getting
continuous feedback from his students to allow him to make
reasonably accurate judgements about what learning situations
would expose each student to optimal levels of incongruity.
The teacher's responsibility, then, is to insure that the
cognitive restructuring necessary to remove the incongruity
does not require excessive increases in comprehensiveness (the
formation of new cognitive categories), in differentiation
(the addition of new dimensions to existing categories) , or
in integration (the recognition of dimensions held in common
by new or existing categories) . Phrased in more general
terms, the principle of optimal incongruity implies that the
major concern of the educator must be to help the student
make transitions from one level of cognitive development
to another and should not be to confront the student
with
situations which cater strictly to his present level of
cognitive development or which presume a level of
cognitive
development which the student is incapable of acheiving





In the conceptual framework the emphasis placed on the
existence of three interrelated characteristics of cognitive
structure (comprehensiveness, differentiation, and integration)
suggests yet another educational practice pertaining to
cognitive development. This is quite simply that both cur-
riculum development and instructional activities must have
as their object the development of all three characteristics
of the cognitive structure. Educators concerned only with
increasing comprehensiveness are wont to neglect two other
important cognitive capacities. They may neglect the im-
portance of increasing students' capacities to make subtle
discriminations (i.e., they fail to increase the differen-
tiation of their students' cognitive structures) or they may
neglect the importance of increasing their students' cap-
acities to perceive relationships between diverse phenomena
(i.e., they fail to increase integration of their students'
cognitive structures)
.
Another implication that the conceptual framework
has for educational practices pertains specifically to in-
creasing problem-solving effectiveness. This implication
is that much greater effort should be given to helping
students
develop the information selection/rejection processes in-
volved in problem solving. Just as students can be
taught
to apply important components of the scientific
method of
investigation, so could students be taught to apply
principles
relating to the appropriateness of particular
patterns of
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receptivity to different problem-solving situations. The
effectiveness of problem-solving efforts would be greatly
improved if individuals consciously select appropriate patterns
of receptivity, that is appropriate scopes of receptivity
and category accessibility rules, for the situations with
which they are dealing. Currently most public school
curricula concerned with learning in the cognitive domain
focus upon the acquisition of knowledge contained within dis-
creet disciplines rather than focusing on the acquisition
of general intellectual skills such as the one just dis-
cussed. The generalizability of public school learning to
’’real life" situations could be noticeably enhanced by
curricula designed specifically to foster the growth of
this and other general intellectual skills.
In addition to educational implications which concern
learning in the cognitive domain, the conceptual framework
suggests some guidelines for educational practices pei
taining to the affective domain. The first of these relates
directly to the preceding discussion regarding the development
of skill in matching one's receptivity pattern to the char-
acteristics of the problem-solving situation (developing a
high degree of receptivity- adaptability) . If this skill is
to be developed, students must not only be able to make
correct
judgements about the scope of receptivity and category acc-
essabil ity which should be adopted, they would also have
an
appreciation of the psychological dynamics underlying
the
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adoption of particular patterns of receptivity by themselves
and others. Committment to maintaining a perspective that
acknowledges the influences of situational factors which
contribute to information input complexity and arousal level
upon an individual's behavior would be necessary before he
could accurately assess the character of, and exert control
over, his patterns of receptivity.
Also pertinent to an educator's concern with the
affective development of students is the hypothesized role
an individual's tolerance of uncertainty plays in determining
his ' recept ivity-adaptability . The implication of this
hypothesis is that teachers should be highly concerned
with developing in their students an appropriate attitude
towards uncertainty. On the one hand teachers should ex-
pose students to situations in which encountering uncertainty
leads to positive arousal, i.e., situations of uncertainty
wherein the students' anticipated CL a i t 's are higher than
their current comparison levels (CL) (see pp. 105 ff_ ) . On
the other hand it requires that teachers provide situations
in which the students experience negative arousal (their
anticipated CL a ^t's are lower than their CL's) but are suc-
cessful in avoiding the anticipated adverse consequences of
the encounter with uncertainty by carrying out the cog-
nitive restructuring necessary to restore congruence between
environment and cognitive structure. Repeated exposures
to both of these types of situations would help the students
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to build and/or maintain a higher tolerance of uncertainty
than if, as is often the case, the predominant outcome of
their encounters with uncertainty are negative arousal followed
by the experiencing of anticipated adverse consequences.
Finally, the importance of tolerance of uncertainty in
determining an individual's R-A profile also necessitates that
the teacher not exacerbate the consequences of a student's
unsuccessful attempts to overcome uncertainty by cognitive
restructuring. This would mean providing encouragement and
support to the student when he is unsuccessful - encourage-
ment that helps the student continue to tolerate uncertainty
and continue to attempt to make appropriate changes in cog-
nitive structure, and support that will help him identify
the needed changes.
The hypotheses contained in the conceptual framework
also imply that school environments should possess partic-
ular characteristics. Despite the important part a teachei
must play in providing students with optimal levels of in
congruity between their cognitive structures and their en-
vironments, the realities of present school staffing pat coins
preclude a teacher's having adequate time to provide and
systematically monitor a sufficient number and variety of
learning situations to cater to the cognitive development
needs of all students. If, as Piaget argues (see pp.92
ff)
,
a child will select from its environment those
stimuli




it would be reasonable to rely on an adequately planned but
relatively unmonitored total school environment to contain
a broad range of stimuli capable of providing each child
enough encounters with optimal incongruity to supplement the
more carefully planned and monitored learning situations
arranged by teachers. But for this to be the case, the school
environment must be diverse and constantly changing rather
than uniform and bound by strictures which prevent a broad
range of interactions between students and the events and
objects in their environments. It must also facilitate
frequent and varied interactions between the teacher and in-
dividual students rather than constrain the teacher to "sub-
ject-centered" and total-class interactions with students.
Only in the former kind of environment does the teacher have
ample opportunity to assess the character of each student's
cognitive structure and motivate the student's cognitive
development through his contributing to a process in which
the student encounters optimal incongruity, seeks or generates
new information about the incongruent aspects of the envir-
onment, and then changes his cognitive structure to bi ing i,
back into congruence with the environment.
To foster in students a degree of tolerance for uncer-
tainty sufficient to encourage continuing cognitive development,
the school environment should have less predictability and
appear less structured from the student's point of view
than
is typically the case in public schools now. Highly
structured
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schedules, spaces divided into isolated subparts, and rigid
rules governing behavior patterns are likely to militate
against students' encountering uncertainty. What limited
uncertainty students do encounter in such an environment is often
the result of their subordination to the wishes of a series of
arbitrary authority figures and is likely to be associated
with negative arousal and therefore lower the students' toler-
ance for uncertainty. Instead, schools should strive for an
atmosphere often punctuated with uncertainty and likely to
induce x^ositive arousal (excitement associated with an-
ticipated favorable consequences resulting from successful
attempts to overcome uncertainty) . Normat ively based evaluation
procedures which promote comparisons between students and the
labelling of some of their efforts to overcome uncer-
tainty as "failures" or inadequate performances, are likely
to cause students to associate negative arousal with the en-
countering of uncertainty. Evaluation procedures stressing
diagnosis of individual progress rather than genei al catcgoi-
ization of student behaviors should be used if tolerance i oi
uncertainty is to be built.
From the teachers' perspective the school environment
should appear more structured, albeit in a flexible way, than
it does to the student. This must necessarily be the case
if the teacher is to be in a position to monitor individual
students' needs and systematically manipulate factors in
the
students' environments to foster cognitive development.
The
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structure should consist of clear objectives at an institutional
level toward which all teachers are working and of a well-
conceived set of curricula which provides a flexible frame-
work within which teachers can function. Thus, the character-
istics of a school environment derived from a concern with
the major hypotheses developed in the conceptual framework
differentiate it from those found in "free schools" by
emphasizing the importance of a flexible structure, clear goal
orientation, careful monitoring of student progress toward
goals, and consistent and systematic manipulation of the en-
vironment to provide students with carefully chosen learning
situations. And, other equally important characteristics
derived from the conceptual framework differentiate such an
environment from those found in "traditional schools" by
emphasizing ever-present variety, both planned and unplanned
change, individually oriented teacher- student interactions,
intellectual skills -oriented rather than "subject-oriented"
curricula, careful encouragement of efforts to cope with
uncertainty rather than adverse reactions to unsuccessful
attempts, de-emphasis of constraining spatial arrangements,
de-emphasis of constraining author ity- subordinate relationships,
and de-emphasis of rules governing behavior.
The presumptuous nature of this last set of educational
implications underscores the motivation behind the theoretical
and empirical tasks undertaken in this dissertation. Nearly
all educational practice is based on equally tentative
theoretical
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notions or, more often, upon conventional wisdom that is
seven parts intuition, three parts experience, and a dash
of theory. Though grandiose, and consequently initially
superficial, such efforts are needed to guide subsequent
research efforts which systematically address the task of
building a comprehensive theory of human psychological
development. The results could have a profound impact
on education and possibly upon the human condition.
APPENDIX
Instruments Used in the Empirical Study
please read these directions carefully before beginning
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On the following pages are eight problem situations which are intended to
Investigate human problem-solving behavior. Your task in each problem situation
ts to indicate the importance of different categories or elements of information
to your solving the problem. For example, in solving the problem of where to buy
your clothes the following categories of information might be available to you:
1. The relative expense of the clothes carried by the store.
2. The styles and types of clothing carried by the store.
3. The political party affiliation of the store's owner.
4. The availability of credit at the store.
5. How long the store has been doing business at its present address.
Your task would then be to indicate for each of the above categories of information
if you think it is:
(a) CRITICAL INFORMATION (i.e. you could not solve the problem adequately
without it)
(b) IMPORTANT INFORMATION (i.e. you could solve the problem without this
information, but the solution would be much
easier and/or better if you have this in forma t ion)
(c) RELEVANT INFORMATION (i.e. you could definitely solve the problem a
little more easily and/or better with this infor-
mation)
(d) POSSIBLY RELEVANT INFORMATION (i.e. you could possibly solve the problem
a little more easily and/or a little
better with this information)
(e) IRRELEVANT INFORMATION (i.e. this information would be of no use to
you in solving the problem)
Your indication of the importance of the item of information should be made by
filling in the appropriate space opposite the category's number on the separate cr
sheet. Your answers to the example given above might appear on the answer sheet as
follows
:
1 2 3 4 5
1. II © I I II 11
2. HI ill' " "
3. II I I I I II $
4. I|U * II ll
5. I Ml I I I) |l






1. Rend each problem carefully . Some of the problem situations appear
to be exactly like one another but in actuality differ slightly
(pay particular attention to underlined words and phrases).
2. Treat each numbered problem separately and without regard to any of
the other problems you have done no matLer how similar. For example
when doing problem I.V treat it as though you had not done problem II.
3. Do the problems in the order in which they are presented. Do not
under any circumstances skip ahead to read or work on other problems
or go back to reconsider any problems you have already done.
4. For tihe purposes of this experiment assume all the information given
in the problems is correct eventhough you may think or know it is
not accurate or true in reality.
Now please begin doing the problems.
I.
SENATOR'S AIDE PROBLEM 233
You are an aide to a very prominent United States Senator who lias Been
receiving heavy pressure from women's groups to write and sponsor a bill legalizing
abortions in the United States. The senator has assigned you the task of compiling
and summarizing all background material relevant to the arguments made by both
those against and those favoring the legalization of abortion nation-wide.
The
senator has asked that, whatever your feelings on the matter, you write an
unbiased
summary that he can use to decide whether or not to write and sponsor a
bill to
legalize abortion, and, if so, to decide what specific measures the
bill should
contain. This session of congress has just begun, so your summary is not needed
for several weeks giving you plenty of time to carry_mit^thej^^^ In
addressing yourself to the task the following elements of information
are poten-
tially available to you.




You are an aide to a very prominent United States Senator who has been
receiving heavy pressure from women's groups to write and sponsor a bill
legalizing abortions in the United States. The senator has assigned you the
task of compiling and summarizing all background material relevant to the
arguments made by both those against and those favoring the legalization of
abortion nation-wide. The senator has asked that, whatever yotr feelings on
the matter, you write an unbiased summary that he can use to decide whether or
not to write and sponsor a bill to legalise abortion, and if so, to decide what
specific measures the bill should contain. This session of congress has just
two weeks remaining, so the senator needs your report on his desk within the
next two days leaving you very little time in which to complete the task .
In carrying out the assignment the following elements of information are poten-
tially available to you.




You are a law clerk for a Supreme Court Justice of the United Slates and
you have been assigned the task of compiling and summarizing all baiiground
material relevant to a Court Opinion the Justice must write. The opinion
must justify the as--yet-unannounced decision of the Court to strike down a
Montana state law prohibiting abortions. Whether you agree or not with the
Court's decision, your task is to supply the Justice with mater ia l which can
be included in the legal rat ionale for the Cou rt's ruling the Montan a abortion
law unconstitutional . Because the Court is presently hearing another case
and will not be announcing its ruling for several months, you have ample time
to complete the task. In addressing yourself to the task the following
categories of information are potentially available to you:
.
(Use information set A)
IV.
LAW CLERK PROBLEM
You are a law clerk for a Supreme Court Justice of the United Stutes
and you have been assigned the task of compiling and summarizing all back-
ground material relevant to a Court Opinion the Justice must write. The
opinion must justify the as-yet-unannounced decision of the Court to strike
down a Montana state lav; prohibiting abortions. Whether you agree or not
with the Court’s decision, your task is to supply the Justice with ma t erial
which can be included in the legal rationale for the Court’s ruling, t he
Montana abortion law unconstitutional . Because the Court wishes to announce
the decision shortly, you have only two days in which to complete the task ,
and get the summary on the Justice’s desk. In carrying out the task the
following categories of information are potentially available to you:
(Use information set A)
IX.
URBAN TRANSPORTATION PROBLEM 237
Tin-, now mayor o 1' Vancouver, British Columbia has just hiied y*‘i !<» .1 i rc««:l
> compruhcns ive study of possible sol uLions } o Vancouver's nipldjy £r« \w i nji
transportation problems . He has chosen you, a general Lst without specialized
knowledge of transportation systems, to direct the study because he wants a
final report from the study that reviews in an unbiased manner
many possible
approaches to solving the problem of overcrowded city streets. You
have been
given three years and a large budget for conducting the study
and you are expected
to produce a final report that can be used as the basis
for both selecting a
longterm solution to Vancouver’s transportation problems and
guiding the imple-
mentation of the chosen solution.
All you know about Vancouver at the outset of the
transportation study
is that it is a typical big city suffering from almost
total dependence on the
automobile as a form of transportation serving the city
and the surrounding
suburban and rural region. You must now identify
what categories of information
about different transportation systems you think
the study should compile in
order to produce the kind of final report
desired by the mayor. The following
categories of information are potentially
available to you:




The new mayor of Vancouver, British Columbia has just hired you to direct
a comprehensive study of possible solutions to Vancouver's rap yd rowing
transportation problems . He has chosen you, a generalist without specialized
knowledge of transportation systems, to direct the. study because he wants a
final report from the study that reviews in an unbiased manner many possible
approaches to solving the problem of overcrowded city streets. You have
been
given only six weeks and a very small budget for conducting the study
and you
are expected to produce a final report that can be used as the
basis for both
selecting a longterm solution to Vancouver’s transportation
problems and guiding
the implementation of the chosen solution.
All you know about Vancouver at the outset of the
transportation study is
that it is a typical big city suffering from almost
total dependence on the
automobile as a form of transportation serving the city and
the surrounding
suburban and rural region. You must now identify what
categories of information
about different transportation systems you think the
study should compile in
order to produce the kind of final report desired
by the mayor. The following
categories of information are potentially available
to you:
(Use information set C)
URBAN TRANSPORTATION PROBLEM
239
The new mayor of Vancouver, British Columbia is intent upon solving the
problem of overcrowding and congestion on Vancouver's freeways and cit\ streets.
The Canadian Federal Government lias offered to pay the bill for a full-scale
study of Vancouver's transportation problems and to provide money to cover
50% of the cost of implementing a longterm solution if one condition is met.
That one condition is that the new mayor prove by means of a small-scale pilot
project that the automobile commuters and taxi users living in and around
Vancouver will abandon their cars for some alternative means of transportation.
The mayor has hired you to direct a study of possible transportation systems
to i dentify a system that would be the most likely to attract drivers away
from their cars . The study's final report will be used by the mayor for choosi
a transportation system to be used in the pilot project and also for guiding
the implementation of the pilot project.
All you know about Vancouver at the outset of the transportation study
is that it is a typical big city suffering from almost total dependence on the
automobile as the form of transportation serving the city and the surrounding
suburban and rural area. You must now identify what categories of information
about different transportation systems you think the study should compile in
order to produce the kind of final report desired by the mayor, lie has given
you two years and a generous budget to accomplish the task . The following
categories of information are potentially available to you:




The new mayor of Vancouver, British Columbia is intent upon solving the
problem of overcrowding and congestion on Vancouver's freeways and city streets.
The Canadian Federal Government has offered to pay the bill for a full-scale
study of Vancouver's transportation problems and to provide money to cover 50%
of the cost of implementing a longterm solution if one condition is met. That
one condition is that the new mayor prove by means of a small-scale pilot pro-
ject that the automobile commuters and taxi users living in and around Vancouver
will abandon their cars for some alternative means of transportation. The
mayor has hired you to direct a study of possible transportation systems to
iden tify a system that would be the most likely to attract drivers away from
their cars. The study's final report will be used by the mayor for choosing
a transportation system to be used in the pilot project and also for guiding
the implementation of the pilot project.
All you know about Vancouver at. the outset of the transportation study is
that it is a typical big city suffering from almost total dependence
on the
automobile as the form of transportation serving the city and the surrounding
suburban and rural area. You must now identify what categories of
information
about different transportation systems you think the study should
compile in
order to produce the kind of final report desired by the
mayor. He has given
you only s ix weeks and a very small budget to accomplish
the task. The following
categories of information are potentially available to you:


















Statistics compiled by the University of Indiana comparing the number of upper-
and middle-class women who had secured legal abortions in the United States avid
abroad to the number of lower-class and poverty-level women who were able to
secure legal abortions in the United States and abroad.
A ruling by the South Dakota State Supreme Court that the state’s law prohibiting
abortion violated the state constitution's guarantees of individual freedom and
instructing the State Legislature that any law restricting a woman's action with
respect to her own physical person (excepting actions which contribute directly
to the immorality of others or to the physical detriment of her person) is pro-
hibited by the state's constitution.
A treatise written by the president of Zero Population Growth arguing that abortion
and other means of birth control must be allowed if the earth is to be saved from
world-wide famine caused by over-population.
A depaitment of Health, Education, and Welfare study purporting to substantiate
the relationship between the incidence of unwanted children and the socio-economic
level of the parents.
A recent issue of the Harvard Law Revl ew reviewing decisions made by state and
federal courts regarding state abortion laws.
A column by a nationally syndicated journalist arguing that abortion as an issue
should be dealt with at the state rather that at the national level to prevent
its becoming a national political issue that could cause an unhealthy schism
along religious lines in the upcoming national elections.
The testimony of the president of the National Association of Adoption Agencies
and Child Placement Services that there is an immense demand among childless
couples for adoptable children and that liberalized abortion laws are the major
contributor to this condition because they have drastically reduced the number
of illegitimate children put up for adoption.
A psychotherapist's testimony before a state legislature committee that serious
neuroses can be caused by the guilt often experienced by women who have had
abortions.
A prominent Protestant theologian's contention that there is no moral justification
for a society's taking from a woman the right to make decisions regarding abortion
according to the dictates of her own conscience.
A national poll on the question: "Do you favor the liberalization or
repeal of
abortion laws in this country?"
Census Bureau st
decreased nearly
atistics that show that the birth rate in the United States lias
to the point of zero population growth in the last
five years.
Statistics compiled by the American Medical Association that
four of every five
illegal abortions not performed by a doctor result in
death or permanent injur,
to the woman upon whom the abortion was performed.
A respected English philosopher's arguments
concerning why abortion rs
and an affront to the dignity of human existence.
immoral
An American Civil Liberties Union
of the Constitution's ammendments
tract detailing legal arguments for why
several
protect the civil rights of women to obtain
15 .
^ 4 A
A research article by a noted social scientist which describes the results of
over-population in communities of rats as leading to a complete breakdown of
social order in the rat communities, abnormally high intra-species aggression,
and severe distortions of normal patterns of rat sexual behavior. The article
concludes that excessive human population densities would probably lead to
similar social disruptions.
16. A statement by the President of the United States that he did not believe any
branch of the Federal Government should take a position on the issue of abortion,
but that it should be left to the individual states to decide upon,
17 . A Yale Law Review article authored by a noted "strict constructionist" which
argues that the Supreme Court must exercise caution and restraint in interpre-
ting the civil rights and individual freedoms sections of the Constitution or the
Court will destroy the distinction between the legislative functions of Congress
and the judicial responsibilities of the Federal Courts.
18. A set of volumes containing arguments and opinions made by the Supreme Court
since its founding in 1789.
19. An impassioned letter written from a physician serving a prison term for performing
an illegal abortion who is urging the passage of a liberalized abortion law in
California that would remove that state’s physicians from the untenable position
of either having to break the law or having to refuse to perform operations which
they believe are critical to the physical and psychological well-being of their
patients
.
20. A report by a presidential commission recommending the distribution of infor-
mation about birth control and the availability of legal abortions as part of a




To what extent the system will disrupt present pedestrian, automobile, and
bus routes.
2 . How the system will affect the street-level aesthetics
of the downtown area
of the city.
3. What effect the system will have on the incidence of crime
in various
locations within the city including along its major transportation routes.
4. How aesthetically attractive the system's vehicles will be.
5. How many jobs are likely to be created by the construction of
the system.




7. How the system is likely to influence the growth or decay
of retail businesses
along its routes.
8 What influences the system can
be expected to have on future patterns of
population density in and around the city.
9. How likely the noise level of the system
will prove disturbing to private
residents, schools, hospitals, etc.
10. How quiet and comfortable the system
will be for passengers during rush
hour periods.
11 HOW the system is likely to influence
the degr,ee to which new building
construction in the city will replace older
burldings.
12 H/»v i»
win tabs t rj actually put the system into operation.
-n To what extent construction and operation
of the system will require re-
location of inhabitants of the city and surrounding areas.
14 . how the operation of the system will affect
the presently available
sources of energy upon which the city is dependent.
,r what activities the system will allow passengers




(e.g. reading, eating, watching television,
playing
cards, betting on horses, etc.)
16. To what extent the system lends itself
to use as a means of raising public
revenue through the sale of advertising space.
17. How the system will affect
the city's prominent features of
physical beauty.
X8 . How convenient it
will be for the users of the system to
transport packages,
luggage, and other objects.
19 How the system Is likely to
Influence community participation in
neighborhood
*
vs. City-wide cultural and entertainment
events.
20. How the system will affect
the habitats of local wildlife.
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Ihe persons described below represent specific individuals that vou know
personally. In each of the numbered spaces at the top of the grid on the following
page, write the first name or initial of the person who is correspondingly numbered
below on this page. For example, in space 1 at the top of the grid write your name
or initials, etc. Do not repeat any names. If a person is already listed, select n
second choice.
(1) Yourself.
(?) A person you dislike (or have disliked)
(3) Your mother (or person most like a mother)
(4) A person you know whom you would like to help.
(5) Your father (or person most like a father)
(6) Closest friend of the same sex.
(7) Closest friend of the opposite sex (or spouse)
(8) A person with whom you feel most comfortable.
(9) A boss you had on a previous job.
(10)
A person you know who is difficult to understand.
You will notice on the page containing the grid that there are are ten pairs
of traits along the right side of the grid. Starting with the first pair (shy-outgoing'
you are to decide for each person you have listed which half of the pair, "shv" or
"outgoing", best describes him. If a person is better described by the trait "shy"
write in the box under his name an "L". However, if a person is better described by
the trait "outgoing", write in the box under his name an "R". "L" means that vou
think the person is better described by the trait on the left, and "R" means that
he is best described by the trait on the right. After you have rated all ten indi-
viduals on the first pair of traits, repeat the process for the next pair (adjusted-
maladjusted) and so on until you have rated every person on all the pairs of traits.
Be sure to rate all persons listed on each pair of traits before proceeding to the next
pair of trai ts. When you are finished, there should be a rating in each box. Do not
leave any boxes blank.
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We would like to have your opinion on a variety of tonics. The following
are statements with which some people agree and others disagree. Please mark
each one on the answer sheet (numbers 1 through 16), according to the amount
of your agreement or disagreement, by following the scale below:
1 . Strongly agree 4. Slightly disagree
2. Moderately agree 5. Moderately disagree
3. Slightly agree 6. Strongly disagree
1. A good teacher is one who makes you wonder about your way
of looking at things.
2. Teachers or supervisors who hand out vague assignments
give a chance for one
to show initiative and originality.
3. People who insist upon a yes or no answer just don’t know
how complicated
things really are.
4. An expert who doesn’t come up with a definite
answer probably doesn’t know
too much.
5. Many of our most important decisions
are based upon insufficient information.
6. I like parties where I know most of
the people more than ones where all or
most of the people are complete strangers.
7. It is more fun to tackle a
complicated problem than to solve a simple one.
8 A person who leads an even,
regular life in which few surprises or unexpected
happenings arise, really has a lot to be
grateful for.
9 In the long run it is
possible to get more done by tackling small,
simple
problems rather than large and complicated
ones.
10. People who fit their lives to
a schedule probably miss most of the iov
of
of living.
u. I would like to live in a
foreign country for awhile.
12'. The sooner we all acquire similar
values and ideals the better.
13. There is really no such
thing as a problem that can't be
solved.
14. A good job is one where what
is to he done and how lL
always clear
.
15 . often the most interesting
and stimulating people are those
who don’t mind
being different and original.
16.
What we are used to is always
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